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SlffiARY
Recent French feminist thinkers have begun to expand upon a feminist 
perspective in philosophy which attempts to negotiate on the one hand, the 
implicit valuing of autonomy, universality and abstraction when these are 
coded as masculine, and yet on the other hand, can resist the dissemination 
of meaning into the free play of circuits of desire or signification. In 
the context of ethics, this perspective constitutes a challenge to more 
traditional ethical conceptions of the agent, of ethical action, and to the 
very parameters of the philosophical enterprise itself. It is such a 
perspective which forms the starting point of this study.
This study begins by articulating the paradoxes of a feminist perspective 
in philosophy, in the context of the work of Simone de Beauvoir, paradoxes 
which entail a re-examination of the parameters of philosophy as a 
discipline. The codification of Woman as Other simultaneously positions 
women as a necessary complement in dualistic divisions but also as a 
symbolic 'otherness1. The ambiguity of such codifications may be taken up 
strategically for its critical and developmental potentials in relation to 
philosophy. In the following chapters, the development of sexual identity 
as it is theorised in psychoanalysis is used to furnish a notion of 'the 
feminine/matemal' as symbolically negative and critical, but also located 
in the materiality of the body. Recent radical perspectives in 
phenomenology are also drawn upon to indicate a re-thinking of the 
epistemological ordering of subject/object, of sexual identity and of 
ethics, which still retain the importance of embodiment and sexual 
difference. The apparent requirement of some ethical 'foundation' for the 
development of new perspectives in ethics is examined, particularly when 
this is consciously or unconsciously built upon 'the feminine/matemal', 
either as nature or as 'divine'. Feminist perspectives in philosophy make 
deliberate use of such symbolic codifications, 'miming' more traditional 
theories of ethics, in order to draw attention to the debt owed to the 
forgotten 'otherness' of philosophy. It is concluded that such strategies, 
while complex, metaphoric and evasive, present a challenge to the 
discipline of philosophy and begin the project of developing theories of 
ethicality for feminist theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Woman becomes the possibility of a "different" idea.
Luce Irigaray
Recent continental philosophy^*) has taken issue with the ethical agent at 
the centre of the majority of ethical theories in philosophy. As part of a 
critique of the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, autonomy and projects 
of knowledge based on a subject possessing epistemological clarity and the 
potential for progress in knowledge, the ethical agent is brought into 
question. The critique of such ideals provokes questions about their 
neutrality, questions which extend further back into the history of 
philosophy to uncover the roots of their presuppositions.
In brief, the conjunction of ideals of rationality and autonomy seems to 
produce an agent who, through the progressive development and application 
of reason, will develop a capacity for independent judgement and 
universalising ethical principles. Such a capacity will free the agent 
from the problems of empirical and relative situational judgements, which 
are seen to be limited, particular and contingent. The development of 
reason will further add to the progressive and cunulative civilisation of 
human nature, a teleologically directed aspiration. Value is placed upon 
the individual hunan subject, upon a capacity for reason and for 
universalising judgements in ethics.
The legacy of these ideals is seen in philosophy as a tendency for ethical 
theory to inherit the implicit value placed upon the individual, a capacity
for reason and universalising judgements. Apart from the study of the 
history of ethical theories in the broader context of the history of 
philosophy, the development of ethics has tended to concentrate upon the 
clarification and refinement of the above conjunction of ethical ideals.
However, as continental philosophy began to question the implicit values 
entrenched in the apparently neutral development of thought in the 
philosophical enterprise, certain key themes began to emerge in such 
critiques. To what extent are the above ideals, elaborated in the 
Enlightenment optimism concerning the progress of knowledge and hunan 
nature and the egalitarian appeals to a shared capacity for reason which 
might culminate in universal equality (the possibility of treating each 
rational being as an end in themselves), actually disguising fundamental 
inequalities, and even perpetuating them? Political projects emerging out 
of Marxist and feminist theory, together with structuralist and post­
structuralist theory, raise questions about the neutrality of reason and 
the autonomy of the human subject, as well as the possibility of knowledge 
and hunan nature as teleologically directed.
In the light of these far-reaching critiques, my concern will be to raise 
the following questions: Is the development of ethics still possible or 
viable? If so, how is it possible to develop an ethics which can recognise 
difference, and specifically sexual difference?
These questions present difficulties for the established problems within 
the more traditional theories of ethics, where there is a general tendency 
to assume that difference is an obstacle to be overcome in approaching
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ethicality, if universality is the aim of the theory. If sexuality is an 
example of difference, the sex of an ethical agent should make no 
difference to the development of the theory. If the aim is equality of 
treatment or the independence of the ethical agent, such initial 
differences need to be disregarded such that the agent can aspire to his or 
her autonomy, and so recognise what is rational as the 'universal' element 
of human beings, in encounters with others.
But if rationality, freedom of choice and a capacity for universalisability 
are the criteria used in identifying ethical agents, it seems that a more 
fundamental inequality emerges. If these capabilites are seen to be 
unequally distributed in human beings, those lacking such capabilites or at 
a less 'developed' stage on the progress towards reason and autonomy make 
defective or inadequate ethical agents. The comparison of the explicit 
ethical philosophies of philosophers central to the philosophical canon, 
with their views on human nature as a whole and women in particular, the 
implicit definition of the ethical agent, produces a serious contradiction.
This contradiction consitutes one of the basic paradoxes of ethical theory 
as it is activated in philosophical inquiries. A great deal of marxist, 
post-modernist and feminist work indicates the serious objections raised in 
the face of an apparently universal agent, ostensibly neutral, when the 
differences attributed to men and women are made explicit. Although the 
universalism may seem to be motivated by the best of intentions: in the 
name of equality, or in maximising a capacity for practical reason, or to 
the end of furthering the progressive development of hunan nature as a 
whole, (5) such theories undermine their own intentions through a lack of 
attention to this contradiction.
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It may seem that the ethical agent being indicted in these charges never 
'really' existed, in the reductive straw-man guise that he appears to 
assune on occasion; a parody of unrealistic rationality and caricatured 
solemnity. It is only when examining classical texts in the canon of 
ethical writings that it becomes evident certain traits do appear with 
regularity and constitute a continuity in the philosophical narrative. 
Although such readings run the risk of collapsing the history of philosophy 
into a seamless narrative of 'the same', the priority of ontology and 
rationality in the course of Western philosophy tends to dominate. ^
In order to support this claim it is necessary to consider the constitution 
of the philosophical enterprise as a process of selective choice, as to 
what counts as the significant set of texts which will comprise the 
philosophical canon. Although the texts most often challenged with 
prioritising rationality and universality and sirmiltaneously making 
distinctions regarding their definition of hunan nature are not the only 
texts in the history of philosophy, if this challenge is accompanied by 
questions concerning the boundaries of philosophy as a discipline, it is 
possible to see reason attempting to self-legitimate itself.
Such self-legitimation is often taken to be self evident, and so not 
necessary to question.
Reason is already of itself so confined and held within limits by 
reason, that we have no need to call out the guard, with a view to 
bringing the civil power to bear upon that party whose alarming 
superiority may seem to be us to be dangerous...'
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In other words, the superiority of philosophy rests upon an unquestioned 
and unquestionable confidence reposing in reason.
There are examples of approaches to ethics in philosophy which do not 
conform to this tendency, but they have tended to be shifted sideways or 
submerged in the interpretative narrative of philosophy as the narrative of 
reason constructed by successive generations.
The questions I have raised present difficulties to the newly established 
canons of 'post-modern' writers. To suggest those thinkers who have 
provided the basis and motivation for feminist departures from their work 
also have difficulties in dealing with difference (although for very 
different reasons from the 'traditionalist' approach), may seem like 
ingratitude, not to mention the dangers of losing supportive readers in the 
squabbles of counter-counter criticisms. But feminist readers of writers 
such as Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Levinas find themselves disturbed, 
or confused or irritated by the recognition that they share certain views 
of the diagnosis of crisis or the problematic status of the hunanist 
subject, and yet wonder if they have had time to claim a 'feminine' 
subjectivity before it is swept away into signification, desire, or 
structures of power.
The main direction of this study will be to try and examine the above 
question(s), to draw upon the resources provided by thinkers in the recent 
currents of philosophy, in order to produce a speculative reading of 
philosophical ethics for a feminist viewpoint. In the light of more
5-
orthodox ethical philosophy I will put the case for an ethical agent 
(although not the same ethical agent) which, for the purposes of this 
study, will be a feminine or feminist agent, in order to present sexual 
difference as a challenging topic to the philosophical agenda. Thus from 
this point of view I will seem to be flouting certain recent theoretical 
approaches which argue that not only is such agency dangerous, impossible 
or regressive, but that a feminine agent is even less desirable or 
attainable. Why should women seek the 'bankrupt' status of identity, if 
they are already positioned as a force of negativity, outside philosophy, 
beyond language, if this is the state that (male) philosophers appear to 
find desirable?
The answer is that, as the work of many feminist philosophers makes clear, 
from a feminist perspective, the stratifications of power(s) as 
symbolically realised and played out in the structures in which we live, 
are untouched by the relinquishing of identity in this way. To identify a 
'feminine' force in language is not necessarily a feminist approach to 
philosophy, although it may have feminist implications for philosophy which 
can be developed and/or extended. I
I do not mean to claim for a realm of 'real' economic relations underlying 
the symbolic approaches to identity and diferences activated here, or a 
realm of foundational biological sexual difference, since according to the 
methodology I will adopt, such a realm of relations would be open to 
question just as much as the symbolic notions of 'the feminine' I intend to 
explore. However, it will be my concern to argue for an approach which can 
take into account the struggles conducted in spheres of experience too
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often neglected by a great deal of philosophy. I do not consider a 
feminist approach to philosophy to be a matter of reflecting upon questions 
of sexual difference within the existing boundaries of philosophy as it has 
been constituted, but to imply a consideration of the constitution of 
philosophical disciplines as a political issue.
This will involve expanding upon feminist work in philosophy^®) which 
takes into account the critique of the hunanist subject, but not as a 
prelude to reimporting a category of experience named Woman. To reimport 
this universal identity, without the disruptive effects engendered by post­
modern thinking, is a return to 'the same', a réintroduction of the 
metaph)d.cal identity already made problematic. It remains to be seen if 
this question can be successfully negotiated in feminist theory.
Luce Irigaray is the thinker who is most insistent that this possibility is 
opened up for the future. She is also, perhaps, the most utopian, and 
along with Emmanuel Levinas, stakes the most on ethics as a chance to 
intiiate new potentials for the future. Julia Kristeva is more cautious. 
But I will suggest it is worth taking this risk, in order to (even if 
strategically or hypothetically) assert the need for a reconceptualisation 
of otherness, which will have repercussions even beyond the narrow circles 
of philosophy. A naive hope perhaps, that thinking difference in 
philosophy will coincide with other areas of thinking, to engage with 
difference in a series of differences for which there is no convenient 
geometrical model to be enlisted as an illustration (race, poverty and 
wealth, age, mobility, literacy - at this point I do not want to write 'and 
so on', but will interrupt this catalogue abruptly; other differences will 
appear). However, in this study I will take a feminist perspective as my
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strategy, to negotiate the dualities of material/metaphysical, 
reason/passion, transcendence/immanence, masculine/feminine.
The real impact of the strategy of a 'carnal ethics',^' as Irigaray calls 
it, or an ethics which recognises sexual difference, or 'ethics in the 
feminine', is its refusal to take for granted the whole basis upon which 
ethics has been constructed. I will suggest a specific feminist slant to 
this strategy.
Rather than the codes for a life lived by a subject faced with mirror 
images of himself, the endless likenesses of an other encountered according 
to the edicts of sameness all co-existing in the reassurance of similarity, 
'ethics in the feminine' would conmence with the thought of difference. 
Hitherto, the work of ethics might have presumed itself to be concerned 
with masculine subjects, or has chosen on behalf of neutral subjects those 
characteristics deemed to be neutral, but already within the parameters of 
a structure codified as masculine. The encounter with the other is then 
subsumed under this presumption. However, the partiality of juxtaposing 
'feminist' and 'ethics', acts to introduce the bias of sexual difference 
into an apparently neutral discipline, suggesting a different approach.
An initial and fundamental difference between subjects, prior even to the 
manufacture of 'ethical codes', would serve to make the relation and 
production of this difference the primary ethical question. In other 
words, rather than containing sexual difference with in the horizon of 
ethics as a discipline which may consider 'sexual morality' as a sub­
question under its rubric, the positing of iritial difference could initiate
a reconceptualisation of what ethics is and will be. The irreducibility of 
otherness in this context, the unavoidable confrontation of the self by an 
other construed as absolutely different, would act to shake the foundations 
of the subject'8 self-certainty, and by extension the foundations of an 
ethics based on the suppression of this difference. In this sense, the 
subject's conditional reliance on otherness, and with it the uncertainty 
into which the self is cast, may be recognised. The significance of 
otherness as difference is the shift it occasions from the development of 
ways of investigating and negotiating existence as similarity, to 
understanding the process of difference which shapes the very basis of 
subjectivity.
I will argue for a view of ethics as the production of particular kinds of 
subject, not the theories produced based on the actions of ethical agents. 
Hence if we are to gain an understanding of what ethics might mean it is 
via the investigation of the meaning and construction of sexual difference, 
not via the investigation of possible actions performed by the individual. 
In this context, what is possible and what can be known are not accessible 
through analysis based in the similarity of subjectivity, since this is a 
labyrinth which leads back on itself. And further, they are not 
'accessible' in the same way through alternative conceptions of the same 
epistemological framework. Instead, the project will be to see if 
'alterity' (otherness as difference) is the condition for the existence of 
e t h i c . d «
It is important to recognise this as a strategic challenge. It would be 
futile to deny that ethics has always appreciated the differences between
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subjects and has seen the negotiation of those differences as its 
concern, (13) but the starting point has generally assuned an 
epistemological subject in place, to which questions of agency or of action 
may be submitted. This has the effect of setting up a framework such that 
the subject/object dichotomy pervades every kind of question which might be 
raised about agency and knowability. In this framework the otherness which 
is generated is in terms of domination and appropriation - distanced by the 
artificial but pervasive terms of this line of philosophical inquiry, or 
suppressed by claims to neutrality/universalisability. The construction of 
this framework not only ensures that inquiries are conducted within its 
own terms, but also (necessarily) obscures the conditions of its 
construction, presenting them as foundational. The contingent nature of 
the framework as one possibility is hidden to guarantee coherency. But the 
constant slippage of the guarantee suggests that perhaps there are other 
possibilities.
The notion of difference which forms the basis of this inquiry is not a 
simple oppositional difference which leads to the attributing of 
essentialist qualities or identities. The notion of difference operating 
here will be one which accounts for both the interdependence of identities, 
but also the interdependence of identity and difference. Therefore 
although it is alterity which provides the radical nature of a challenge to 
ethics, sexual difference itself here must be understood not as a 
repetition of the epistemological organisation of self and other, but as a 
p r o c e s s . T h i s  fundamental move indicates that the use of sexual 
difference and alterity as the basis for inquiry into ethics is a strategic 
gesture; that is, it is not intended as a replacement for the founding
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binary distinction (subject/object), but as an intervention radical enough 
to expose the supposed neutrality of the ethical agent, but one which loses 
its radicality if sexual difference is not itself seen as a construction. 
Therefore I will confront the univocal coherence of rationality and 
attempts to universalise in ethics with sexual difference, an initial 
alterity. But I will also oppose constructed sexual difference as part of 
the limits set on analysis to protect the humanist undercurrent predicated 
by such limits; the binary structures which preserve and replicate the 
status quo.
Therefore my project will be to explore this interface, with the intention 
of identifying how particular kinds of subject have been produced and 
ossified as foundational in ethics, which will be a critical exposure of 
woman as other. In distinction, but with ultimately similar conclusions in 
mind, an exploration through this notion of otherness will contribute a 
necessarily complex but positive counter to the dissolution of subjectivity 
altogether.
Rather than finding this approach to throw up the kinds of paradoxes which 
lead Toril Moi to call a feminist perspective 'impossible' (meaning that it 
wants both an ontological subject and dentes this, s i m u ltaneously),I 
will argue that it is only through the intricacies of an equivocal or 
ambiguous approach to feminist philosophical interpretation that such 
interpretation can be advanced. Again, this is nothing new to feminist 
methodology. But I will argue that its resources provide for the 
development of an embodied ethical phenomenology, using the work of Julia
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Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, and drawing upon Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
the radical phénoménologies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ermanuel Levinas.
From this work, I will develop a theorisation of sexual difference and 
identity in which the body may be seen as a sexualised dimension, open to 
otherness. In developing this line of argunent, I will engage in a 
critique of some of the forms of understanding of otherness taken in 
existentialist thought, in psychoanalysis and in phenomenology, as well as 
trying to develop the positive aspects of these lines of thought in the 
context of philosophy.
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CHAPTER OWE; ETHICAL V C IG U ITY : SDCNE PE BEAUVOIR
In this chapter I will establish the analysis of otherness in the context 
of gender relations and philosophical duality, an analysis which will prove 
to have broad implications for the construction of a philosophical agenda 
and for sexual politics. The construction of both these arenas is deemed 
to be an ethical question in that the exposure of a merely formal 
commitment to neutrality and equality prompts a further examination of the 
issues of identity and the imbalance of power relations.
The situating of these further questions begins with the work of Simone de 
B e a u v o i r . T h i s  is partly to illustrate the continuity of feminist 
development within the problematic of Woman as Other(2), which gives rise 
to notions of negative 'feminine' force with a critical edge. Examining3e 
Beauvoir's work also allows us to question the extent to which her 
philosophical framework both grounds and limits the ethical expansion of 
her theories of emancipation and identity.
Simone de Beauvoir is a figure who is generally lauded as the 'god-mother' 
of feminism for her insights into the notion of 'Woman as Other', but who 
is also criticised for her adaptation and adherence to an existentialist 
framework, the most common criticisms being that any framework which places 
most value on creative projects and transcendence and least value on the 
(gendered) situating of the body is uncomfortably incompatible with 
feminist attempts to review both of these systems. Michèle le Doeuff(^) 
relates this tension to a generic discomfort between philosophy and
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feminism, in that philosophy, as an historical discourse of reason, has 
been based on the exclusion, suppression or domination of otherness, which 
is the move feminism is precisely concerned to expose or undermine.
However, the tension between these two modes of interpretative reading make de 
Beauvoir's work the privileged locus here, to explore the possibilities of 
negotiating the two modes in the interests of the continuing debates of 
philosophical feminism.
The Second Sex will provide an initial theorisation of models of exclusion 
and censorship concerning otherness. Secondly, it gives the foundation for 
a feminist account of embodiment which leads onto a philosophical theory of 
gender identity. De Beauvoir's accounts of biological, economic (Marxist) 
and psychoanalytic (Freudian) descriptions of Woman as Other, together with 
her objections to these positions, lead her to philosophical ground, in 
seeking to locate her discussion of otherness in ontology.
It is the apparent disjunction between her historically situated 
observations about women's oppression and her abstracted discussion of 
ontological otherness which may seem to create apparent contradictions in 
her work. Rather than either suppress or attempt to overcome these 
contradictions, we will see how, via a discussion of The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, while, de Beauvoir's speculations rest on an existentialist 
framework, her explorations of the conditions for an emancipatory 
consciousness and her situating of self/other relations in gender both 
throw the framework into question and point towards further developments of 
her position.
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Beginning with the work of Simone de Beauvoir will provide an initial space 
in which to outline the problematics of this study. In de Beauvoir's 
writings, the background of existentialism is activated, even as its weak 
points are stretched to their very l i m i t s , a pre-empting of the 
themes which will be developed more extensively in this study. The 
challenge of de Beauvoir's work, read as existentialism, includes her 
demand that existence be seen as a spectrum of concerns (passion and 
irrationality as well as rationality), her view of the existent as an 
upsurge into the world, and her critical political engagement in 
questioning established social structures. In the light of these themes, 
de Beauvoir fulfils the radical tenets of her existentialism. But her work 
also opens this perspective to further questioning, which is her feminist 
contribution. As a feminist philosopher then, she develops themes which 
are still vital in current feminist thought. These themes are, primarily,
i) an existential phenomenology, which is primarily occupied with questions 
concerning an embodied existence.
ii) the value, nature and activity of ethics which can be developed in this 
context.
iii) questions concerning sexual difference.
It is The Second Sex which provides the initial characterisation of woman 
as other, a gendered otherness which is shown to permeate even the most 
seemingly innocuous and neutral of dual relations. While much feminist 
criticism comments on the value of this perspective, using the insight of 
woman as other to locate and challenge injustices, we can also see it as
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beginning to articulate a challenge to philosophical methodology itself. 
This challenge is not just as the "existentialist ethics" she
claims to be writing, but as a specifically feminist theorisation of 
domination, colonisation and oppression located in, and yet critical of, 
ontology. In other words, de Beauvoir provides neither^specifically 
biological nor historical/economic account of woman as other, but takes 
philosophy to task at the very heart of its thinking of categories of 
otherness. Some critics read an apparent disjunction between her 
historical analysis of women's situation as other, and her apparently 
ahistorical perspective provided by her ontological standpoint, as a 
weakness in her work. I will suggest it is precisely this disjunction, and 
de Beauvoir's ability to move between different locales, which provides her 
perspective with the necessary fluidity for this complex set of 
problematics, but also ensures sufficent richness in her work for it to be 
still relevant to current thought. Far from being 'transcended' or 
overcome in successive 'waves' of feminism (an artifical historicising of 
conceptual approaches to questions of sexual d ifference),her  work 
provides a significant and sophisticated network of challenges.
We can see such challenges beginning to surface in the Ethics of Ambiguity, 
a work which predates The Second Sex and Sartre's rethinking of Being and 
Nothingness in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. In this work, de 
Beauvoir sets out to develop an existentialist elaboration of the 
individual, and what it would take to account for an 'emancipatory 
consciousness'. TWo points should be noted immediately. Apart from the 
implications for a feminist project conveyed in the notion of emancipation, 
we can also see that contradictions will arise between emancipation as a
collective project (which will require a certain reading of historical 
tradition, interpreting from a specific viewpoint, i.e. that of women as 
other), and the notion of the individual as existential agent.
De Beauvoir emphasises the fundamental ambiguity of existence, as a 
strategic attempt to resist totalising or homogenising moves concerning 
subjectivity. Such resistance will take the form of a recognition of the 
negativity bound up with existence, a constant fissuring of consciousness 
with the dimensions of non-existence. Authenticity and ethicality will be 
entwined with an ability to affirm this negativity. Once set in motion, 
this process will dynamise existence into projects of life, establishing 
the dialectics of metaphysical desire which motivate existence. De 
Beauvoir recognises the importance of this dynamism which resists 'pure 
inwardness or pure externality'^ for ethics, in that it establishes 
meaning for projects, not as external goals but as immanent forces.
Existence asserts itself as an absolute which must seek its 
justification within itself and not Suppress itself. To attain his 
truth, man must not attempt to dispel the ambiguity of his being, but, 
on the contrary, accept the task of realising it.'-10'
The tragic note sounded in conjunction with the affirmation of ambiguity is 
characteristically Kierkegaardian. ( H )  To be authentic in the pursuit of 
ethical projects involves one in the paradox of affirming the negativity of 
one's own existence, as 'a being whose being is not to be'. However, 
contrary to theological e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , d e  Beauvoir stresses the 
humanist dimension, which throws all the responsibility onto the individual
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to affirm the weight of freedom. Uithout any transcendent element to 
excuse or condone one's action, she hopes to place freedom and authenticity 
(and so ethics) in the domain of the agent, an intensification of these 
questions in a human and material aspect. Subjects are both initially free 
but also must struggle to attain freedom in the authenticity of their 
actions. Freedom is the goal of actions, and this demands the individual 
should engage to the utmost of his or her will. Like Kant, the 
participation of the agent must be as involved as possible. This maximum 
engagement is the salvation of ethicality from the heart of anarchy and 
absolute licence. De Beauvoir expresses the dilemma as follows:
...if man is free to define for himself the conditions of a life which 
is valid in his own eyes, can he not choose whatever he likes and act 
however he likes?...to re-establish man at the heart of his own destiny, 
is (this not) to repudiate all ethics?^1-3'
De Beauvoir will answer this objection by the intensification of 
responsibility in the midst of action. Ethics cannot be a passive 
abdication of responsibility to any other force than the individual him or 
her self.
Despite the focus on the individual and his or her will though, de Beauvoir 
seeks to avoid the universalising element of imperatives which would 
reunite individuals under the horizon of the ethical. Her quarrel with 
universalisation is the extent to which it subordinates the specificity of 
individuals to a greater goal, and thereby denies the value of 
individuality she is trying to preserve as the measure of the authenticity 
of projects. She wants to keep the particular nature of each agent.
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In prioritising rationality too, (as the passion of the will reflected 
upon) she finds a denial of the spont neity and emotion, (not to mention 
the negativity), which makes up the version of existence she is tracing.
She writes critically of Kant; '...for (Kant) genuine reality is the human 
person insofar as it transcends its empirical embodiment and chooses to be 
universal',(14) and similarly of Hegel; 'particularity appears only as a 
moment of the totality in which it must surpass itself'.(15) ¿s we 
see, this critique of rational priority is the notable perspective taken by 
many feminist philosophers, in that it cannot account for difference 
because it locates ethicality solely in 'universal reason'. From de 
Beauvoir's perspective it is a repressive and artificial account of 
existence. Instead, she locates ethicality in the specificity of 
individuals.
It is not impersonal universal man who is the source of values, but the 
plurality of concrete, particular men projecting themselves towards 
their ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is as radical 
and irreducible as subjectivity itself.'lb-'
But we can note in this passage that subjectivity is given a certain 
irreducible value as an entity or ground for actions, despite its 
plurality. This focus on subjectivity and consciousness lessens the force 
of radicality at work in de Beauvoir's text, reinstating the universality 
she was critical of in Kant and Hegel. Universality reappears here as pure 
subjectivity.
Rationality also reappears in the valuing of conscious choice, ('his 
passion is not inflicted upon him. He chooses it'). She is critical
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of Kant for the priority of rationality at the expense of, for example 
passion, despair, suffering and the erotic, which amounts to suppression of 
the spontaneity of the agent.
(Kant) defined man as pure positivity, and therefore recognised no other 
possibility in him than coincidence with himself...unlike Kant, we do 
not see man as being essentially a positive will. On the contrary, he 
is first and foremost defined as negativity.'19'
Existential experience is to be contradictory and negative as well as 
rational, to affirm the fundamentally fractured and ambivalent character of 
existence ('Subjectivity radically signifies separation')^°) But freedom 
arises through the rejection of oppression, which requires, for de 
Beauvoir, an active recognition of its conditions. Although the agent is 
active and spontaneous, motivated by passionate inclination rather than 
disinterested and so disengaged duty, the recognition of distinctions 
between authentic and inauthentic, inmanent and transcendent, demands a 
founding moment of epistemological consciousness. This leads her back into 
the validation of rationality and universality. Authenticity and the 
recognition of its appearance is inseparable from an awareness of one's own 
responsibility. While this is anchored into the individual, it is not so 
far from the Kantian categorical imperative in its formilation. Subject 
formation is made to depend on awareness of choice, which equals 
responsibility or duty to one's fellow man. Although this aspect of choice 
allows a certain degree of freedom in formulating the kinds of ethical 
action which can be most appropriately fulfilling, instead of binding the 
agent with a wooden sense of duty, it can be just as unmerciful.
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Firstly, if moral action is synonymous with successful choices, harsh 
judgements may be made on those who make apparently 'inauthentic' choices. 
It makes little allowance for delusion or false consciousness and yet 
provides no guidelines for making choices, since decisions rest with the 
individual agent. In this respect, women fare particularly badly, since if 
they are ontologically positioned in the role of those who do not choose 
(as they are other, and so have had choices made for them), they may lack 
the possibility of making choices, and yet will be held responsible for 
their failure to act authentically.
We can see de Beauvoir struggling with this contradiction in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity in a way which highlights certain passages in The Second Sex.
She recognises that an ontological elaboration of freedom, responsibility 
and choice assumes a universal character to subjectivity, and begins to 
modify this analysis by recognising the impact of social structuring on 
subjectivity - in other words, to acknowledge that different subjectivities 
may be impacted upon in different ways, according to the determinations of 
the situation. But this is not merely an external constraint, a denial of 
the conditions of freedom. De Beauvoir also considers how this constraint 
must have a shaping effect on the awareness of repression - its penetration 
to the psychic structures which generate and motivate the struggle for 
authenticity against oppression. This is the hitting at the very creation 
of such categories of responsibility. She begins to stress the 
interconnectedness of agents rather than their autonomy and individuality, 
acknowledging the common structures of meanings which allow or constrain the 
conditions of freedom.
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One can reveal the world only on a basis revealed by other men. No 
project can be defined except by its interference with other projects. 
...my freedom, in order to fulfill itself, requires that it emerge into 
an open future; it is other men who open the future to me, it is they 
who, setting up the world of tomorrow, define my future; but if, instead 
of allowing me to participate in this constructive movement, they oblige 
me to consume my transcendence in vain...they are..cutting me off from 
the future, they are changing me into a thing.'21'
The originary freedom of individual subjectivity is cast into doubt by the 
limits of material oppression. She writes; ’The less economic and social 
circumstances allow an individual to act upon the world, the more this 
world appears to him as given. This is the case of women who inherit a 
long tradition of submission and of those who are called*the humble'. 
However, she adds: 'There is often laziness and timidity in their 
resignation; their honesty is not quite complete; but to the extent that it 
exists, their freedom remains available, it is not denied'.(^2)
In this, de Beauvoir's significant modification of the existentialist 
framework, Michèle Le Doeuff recognises the radical perspective being 
created for feminism here. (^3) ghe points out that de Beauvoir 'makes 
oppression equivalent to a moral failing', which has the effect of 
'dramatising oppression', thereby creating a new perspective on dominant 
ideologies.
She can see oppression where the dominant discourse says there is 
protection, or seduction, or, worse, duty. The reference to ethics 
remains, in any case, central.^24'
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The dramatising of oppression (making it more evident in such a way as to 
form a critique of its process) will recur when we focus on the work of 
Kristeva and Irigaray. However, for now we can note that a specific 
perspective for such a critique is being laid down, which will coincide 
with the analysis of woman as other which is expanded in The Second Sex.
Le Doeuff calls this 'an operative viewpoint', indicating it gives a 
specificity to the ethical existential challenge to oppose oppression. It 
names sexuality as a particular ins tan iation of oppressive forces, and 
requires the resources of an unprepared existentialist analysis to fight on 
this behalf.
By naming 'Woman as Other', a risk of essentialism and of pinning identity 
down, is taken. Perhaps this is the hesitation of which de Beauvoir writes 
in the Introduction to The Second Sex, ('For a long time now I have 
hestitated to write a book on woman* realising the danger of a
replication of the duality One and Other, which eternally seems to be 
engaged in hostility. And an unevenly matched hostility.
In actuality the relation of the two sexes is not quite like that of two 
electrical poles, for man represents both the positive and the neutral, 
as is indicated by the common use of man to designate hunan beings in 
general; whereas woman represents ..only the negative, defined by limiting 
criteria, without reciprocity.
But as de Beauvoir points out, even to draw attention to this, (in that she 
has to qualify her position as a woman writing a book on women), is to show
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there is a problem of inequality, ('...there is an absolute human type, 
the masculine'
So far, we have seen that de Beauvoir's analysis begins to displace the 
category of universal subjectivity sustained in existential analysis. This 
is achieved by considering the impact of material conditions which will act 
to fix and deny some subjectivities the freedom which is assuned to be an 
ontological starting point. Thus on the one hand she is able to criticise 
an essentialist category of subjectivity, whether this is to be found in 
Kant and Hegel or in existentialist perspectives. She expands upon this 
critical point of view in The Second Sex by having recourse to the 
historical construction of subjectivity (which has constructed the 
categories of male and female as sexes). On the other hand, she is 
flouting the relativising of oppression which might occur in historical 
analysis (reducing it to circumstance), by demanding an ontological 
category for Woman.
Many feminist critics point to an apparent disjunction in de Beauvoir's 
work concerning the body. Existentialism seems to be committed to a 
version of the Hegelian project of transcendence, which implies that 
material and limiting factors are to be transcended in order to realise the 
freedom which lies in the future. The value of this project cannot be 
denied, in that it provides an impulse of revolutionary critique, a way of 
surpassing 'things as they are' towards 'things as they might be', and as 
such can produce an analysis of oppressive forces. But it seems as if
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transcendence becomes aligned with classical dualisms concerning spirit and 
body, metaphysical and material, such that the body becomes that which must 
be transcended. This is complicated by the simultaneous affirmation of 
embodiment as a situated point of critique; we are 'in the world' just as 
much as going beyond its situatedness. Thus de Beauvoir's 'operative 
viewpoint' maps on to this problem of dualistic ambiguity, this time 
scissioning it with questions of sexual difference. Hence she is affirming 
transcendence as emancipatory, since for feminism this is what engages with 
a critique of material conditions. Yet this appears to lead on to a 
transcendence of the body, at odds with feminist attempts to affirm the 
(specifically) female body, in the face of its devalorised position in 
patriarchal cultures.
Hence if it is true that existentialist perspectives tacitly try to 
overcome embodiment, this does correspond to a denial of the feminine body. 
If the body is seen as a constraining factor which limits the scope of 
possible projects, then it is understandable that any move to overcome such 
limitations is a progressive move to liberating consciousness. De Beauvoir 
sems to be saying that women are more prone to awareness of embodiment 
through reproduction, and if this were overcome, without the 
'inconveniences' of being a woman, women would be freer to affirm projects 
in the world. Without the limitations of maternity, women could aspire to 
the condition of existential subjectivity as transcendence.^8) They are 
momentarily held back by the institutionalised forms of marriage, 
motherhood and child care. But is de Beauvoir arguing that maternity is 
merely institutionalised unproductively, or that there is a biological 
'real' which is responsible for holding women back? Her impassioned
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attacks on the problems of the female body seem to echo certain 
misogynistic expressions of distaste.
It has been well said that women have 'infirmity in the abdomen', and it 
is true they have within.them a hostile element - it is the species 
gnawing at their vitals.'29'
An attempt to overcome the body as female is also found in feminist writers 
who wish to overcome the 'biology is destiny' argument/30  ^ The apparently 
most conspicuous marker of sexual difference - biological sex - is held to 
be responsible for discrimination, so it is this factor which must be 
overcome.
This part of de Beauvoir's writing corresponds to anti-essentialist 
arguments in feminist theory, rejecting a straightforward notion of 
difference which will lead to women being positioned as secondary. In 
keeping with existentialist assertions of freedom, it also corresponds to a 
demand for women's self-determination. Whether oppression is located in 
the realm of biology or in the realm of material/historical conditions, de 
Beauvoir is arguing for a dimension of escape and critique against these 
determinations.
But, as Genevieve Lloyd argues, if transcendence is equated with a 
masculine realm and inmanence with a feminine realm (in the dichotomies of 
spirit/body), then transcendence becomes transcendence of the negative 
realm of the feminine, a flight from that which is designated as 'women's 
space'. If women seek this transcendence, they will be engaged in self­
defeat. Lloyd writes:
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[Transcender»ce3 is breaking away from a zone which for the male remains 
intact - from what for him is the realm of particularity and merely 
natural feelings. For the female, in contrast, there is no“realm which 
she can both leave and leave intact.'32'
I think the fundamental ambiguity of existence which is a characteristic of 
existential analyses should be recalled here. Far from being a 
straightforward overcoming of embodiment, there is a stress in (atheistic) 
existentialist perspectives on the embodied nature of existence which makes 
it a materialist humanism rather than a simple replay of Cartesian dualism. 
In other words, the situatedness of existential projects prevents us from 
writing off existentialism for feminism. But this does not mean it can be 
unproblematically elided with feminist perspectives either, as its 
framework resurrects categories of subjectivity which replay the 
ontological bias of Western philosophy in favour of Being (doubly, neutral 
and masculine).
Instead, we need to expand upon the play of otherness as it operates in de 
Beauvoir's texts - an ambiguity which draws both on an historical account 
of woman as other, making difference contingent and open to question, but 
also the positioning of woman as other which accords a specific sex to 
women - a notion of difference which allows women appeal to an identity of 
their own.
De Beauvoir's equivocation on these perspectives leads to accusations that 
she is both a biological essentialist and that she is arguing for sexual 
difference as merely cultural constructions. She is seen as a biological 
essentialist by those writers who find her oppositions of 
transcendence/immanence and spirit/body to reproduce fixed categories of 
masculine/feminine. She is seen as denying sexual difference by those who
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focus on her insistence that difference is cultural, and so open to 
reformulation. This denial would free identity from determinism, to allow 
for a future in which differences and identities could be exchanged in some 
space of equality.
In this second aspect to her texts, the category of sex is seen wholly as 
an inherited complex of meanings which has no intrinsic essence of its own, 
other than the knot of identity which it produces in specific situations.
It is the work of Judith Butler^^) which emphasises this aspect of de 
Beauvoir in a positive way. As an existentialist feminist, Butler argues 
from a perspective which emphasises freewill and self determination. This 
is a strength for feminist theory because it allows for interventions in 
the various construction of sexual identity.
Butler picks up de Beauvoir's assertions that 'One is not born but becomes 
a woman'. We can find other instances of this kind of characterisation
of existence as constructed.
Doubtless» everyone casts himself into the world on the basis of his 
physiological possibilities, but the body itself is not a brute fact. 
It expresses our relationship to the world, and that is vrtiy it_is an 
object of sympathy or repuls ion... It determines no behaviour.' '
...the body is not a thing, it is a situation.
From this anti-determinist perspective, there is no biological given, but 
the body becomes a process of historical sedimentation. The various 
meanings of the body result from a whole historical network of meanings 
constantly being revised and either affirmed or discarded. Any
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understanding of the body then would be consonant with the way such
understandings are fulfilled, or embodied. Thus a denial of biological sex
would be read not as a refusal of the body, but a strategic method of
pointing to its historical construction; the ways this occurs and the
meanings accrued around it would then be specific, not absolute. Despite 
present
appearing to ^ an argunent for the all-pervasive effects of ideology such 
that there is no 'objective' space from which to assess the validity or 
otherwise of various representations of the body, Butler wants to argue 
that the 'real' is the constant transmission and regeneration of meanings 
in a cultural context. Thus biology is part of a set of meanings which 
draw their relevance from their encoding in very specific circuitstances. 
Within such circumstances they can have localised dimensions of truth and 
falsity, but such values are always kept available for review. In terms of 
the understanding of the body, this would mean there could be a set of 
meanings about sexual difference which might be more entrenched than 
others, but this set of meanings would operate on a series of levels or 
axes which was flexible. As the dialectic of understanding such meanings 
moved in its process, more radical possibilities thrown up could be 
incorporated, thus making the whole conception of identity more fluid. 
Butler's position is similar to Foucault's regarding the construction of 
sex, but Butler goes against Foucault in aspiring to maintain an 
ethical/feminist perspective, one which could still judge.
Butler interprets de Beauvoir's notion of 'becoming' a woman not merely as 
the fulfilment of pre-given categories of sex, tut in an existentialist 
sense of a willed process on behalf of the subject to actively take on the 
enactment of identity. This means that gender becomes a project. The 
stress on activity means that gender is a constant and unending effort of
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exercising freedom; even if it seems that oppressive forces are determining 
one's identity, or that the perfect state of embodiment as a woman has been 
reached, identity is still 'in fact' a struggle to sustain that figure; its 
continuity is dependent on the effort required to maintain it consistently. 
In Butler's formulation, the body becomes
...a field of cultural possibilities that are enacted and mobilised in 
various ways, and we might think of the body as the theatre of gender, 
the sites of received cultural ^meanings, and yet also the place of their 
reproduction and variation.
This apparently gives identity the potential for subversion and change, 
such that gender could be re-worked on one's own terms. Refusing to take 
the hunan body as a 'natural fact', gradual shifts in understanding and 
interpretation might be effected. Butler evokes de Beauvoir when she 
writes 'What if gender were nothing but the acts which realise it?' She is 
optimistic that such a subtle modification of stereotypes will bring about 
a shift to ' the proliferation of gender beyond binary oppositions'.^39  ^
There are certain problems with this perspective which arise in the context 
of freewill and determinism. Butler seems to argue that determinisms 
acting on identity could be overcome by sheer force of will; realising 
one's choices will provide for ways to negotiate stereotypes. But it is 
not clear what the motivation for such acts of will would be or how they 
could arise, through the representation and recognition of choices perhaps? 
But this is to come back to a question of rational cognis of choices, 
which is problematic if women are positioned as the irrational other. As 
Butler realises, choosing to become the other is to actively become the
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identity which doesn't choose, pure body and identity frozen by the gaze of 
the Self.
As Other, women are not devoid of choice; rather they are constrained to 
choose against their own sense of agency and so distort and undermine 
the very meaning of choice...For de Beuavoir, it seems, we must 
understand the gender of woman as that particular modality that is 
culturally constrained to choose against itself.'**0 '
But I think this problem is thrown up by Butler's position too, since she 
emphasises choice and responsibility, but without marking how deeply 
determinations might run, or in what name choices are to be made. In her 
later work, Butler recognises that it is a question of where the boundaries 
between freedom to choose and determining forces acting upon identity are 
drawn. Since certain constraints will inhere in the networks of
signification, there cannot be a total freedom of gender roles, to be 
freely chosen by either sex. Clusters of meaning will retain masculine 
and/or feminine markings. Such markings make the notion of sexual 
difference meaningful in the first place. They also provide the position 
from which to desire to be 'other'. Many feminist writers have made this 
critical point in response to Derrida's wish for freedom from determining 
gender roles. Derrida sees sexual difference as a binary opposition, which 
he would like to deconstruct in his playful dream of a future sexual dance 
in '...the area of a relationship to the other where the code of sexual 
marks would no longer be discriminating'. (^2) Choreographed by whom? Such 
strategic mimicry depends upon some level of fixity concerning identity 
being assuned. Perhaps the problem lies not with the desire for a play of 
significations, but the manner in which gender boundaries are maintained 
and the relative power of the individual who desires to be 'other'.
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process.
De Beauvoir herself describes the project of an androgynous future as 
'useless and utopian'. She says she is not looking to abolish difference, 
but to locate it in a social setting, such that signification is open to 
change; while at the same time she denies any difference at the fundamental 
'level of enunciation'.
Women simply have to steal the instrument, they don't have to break 
it...we must use language. If it is used in a feminist perspective, 
with a feminist sensibility, language will find itself changed in a 
feminist manner... For me, (difference) comes from the social situation. 
I consider it almost anti-feminist to say that there is a feminine 
nature which expresses itself differently, that a woman speaks her body 
more than a man.'**3'
Here de Beauvoir is resisting any determinations of identity which might be 
seen as putting essentialism or biologism back in place. In so doing, she 
locates both oppression and the conditions and possibilities of addressing 
it in the realm of signification, the transmission of social and cultural 
meaning. This implies she is maintaining a view of such processes as 
fundamentally neutral, rational, communicative and ordering, at the expense 
of those forces which she herself has broached as radical. Signification 
is the public space of projects and creativity, where women could compete 
if they only aspired to the cultural ideals of literature already in place. 
De Beauvoir places her faith in the canon of great art which has been 
valourised in what she takes to be an objective history of evaluation.^
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This is a question of control, over the process of signification and over 
the dangerous Pandora's box which is opened up by naming woman as other.
If 'woman' is metaphorically placed as disruptive force, as that which 
reminds subjectivity of its failure to surmount the ambiguity at its heart, 
and as other identity which challenges and provokes the passage of 
masculine transcendence, de Beauvoir cannot expect to contain this powerful 
disruption in her own texts.
She resists the relinquishing of identity to the vicissitudes of historical 
process because this threatens the notion of choice and autonomy which will 
be important for feminist critique (as well as for ethical existentialism). 
Hence the framing of feminine identity is still couched in terms of 
Scrambling to catch up with masculine subjectivity;
...as Virginia WoolfAmade us see, Jane Austen, the Bronte sisters,
George El iot, have had to expend so much energy negatively in order to 
free themselves from outward restraints that they arrive somewhat out of 
breath at the stage from which masculine writers of great scope take 
their departure; they do not have enough strength left to PtgCit by 
their victory and break all the ropes that hold them back.*****'
She also resists the notion of any unconscious forces eroding the 
sovereignty of subjectivity. Her critique of Freud is based on an analysis 
of the deterministic aspect given to biology in his work. She focusses on 
the constraints this implies, criticising the biological account given of 
the psychic forces (which lessen the control and responsibility accorded 
to the agent), and resists seeing the radical potential of such forces, 
particularly when they are aligned with the cultural codification of 
femininity - other, disruptive and irrational.
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Thus far we have identified two forces at work in de Beauvoir's texts; one 
which leads her to analyse woman as alternative identity constituted as 
other, the second which rejects any form of identity and argues that such 
positions are historically constructed. Rather than dismissing this 
contradiction as inconsistency, I will argue that such equivocation is 
necessary for understanding sexual difference ethically. This will form 
our basic position for the following chapters. Kristeva and Irigaray 
follow up on the analysis of woman as other, while simultaneously 
criticising the whole category of subjectivity. This double critique owes 
a debt to de Beauvoir. But the developments of psychoanalysis and accounts 
of signification which stress the way that representation is not just 
comnunicative and corresponding, but also betrays its own conditions of 
presentation, bring into question even the frameworks which articulate her 
version of otherness.
If de Beauvoir makes woman other, then she also recuperates such otherness 
in the resolution of an Hegelian dialectic. Despite identifying woman as 
other to the masculine/neutral subject, which represents a demand for women 
to have an identity other to that which is shaped for them, but is also a 
challenge to the epistemologically dominating subject, the structures of 
subjectivity are called into question only to be reinstated again. Even 
though otherness is shown to be permeating the very structures of 
individuality, in the forces of negativity which are meant to drive 
existence (such that to be is to be other, even to oneself), these forces 
merely serve as motivation and are reconstrained in the interests of 
projects of ontological and epistemological control. De Beauvoir provides 
the radical grounds for a critique of the determinations which place woman
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as other, but in restoring the categories of subjectivity and the narrative 
of history as objective truth, she closes off a more radical version of 
otherness which might provide disruption even in the sanctity of these 
structures.
But I wish to resist definitive readings of de Beauvoir which fix her as 
either 'the "good" founding mother of modern feminism or the "bad" phallic 
perpetrator of hunanism rationalism', as Rosi Braidotti puts itf^*^. It 
is evident that her texts could be interpreted in these ways. But instead, 
her questions will lead to further examination of the problems we began 
with.
We have seen that the question of otherness is crucial for an ethical 
approach to difference, because it gives a material situatedness to 
intersubjective relations, and allows questions of sexual difference to 
impinge upon the philosophical understandings of subjectivity and agency. 
However, if it is to resist recuperation into the structures which produce 
and restrain such categories, a further radicalisation of otherness is 
required. This requirement leads us to examine the work of Kristeva and 
Irigaray. Here we will find that the symbolic figuration of woman not just 
as other but as 'other to the other', as the sex which does not exist or is 
not one at all, is taken up as a strategic appropriation of absence and the 
unrepresentable in order to challenge the very conditions of representation 
and question its structures. As Judith Butler writes:
Women are not only represented falsely within the Sartrean frame of 
signifying-subject and signified-other, but the falsity of the 
signification points out the entire structure of representation as
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inadequate. (47)
Here she implies that the dominant view of representation as mimetic is to 
be brought into question. In the next chapter we will consider how 
Kristeva and Irigaray activate the representation of woman as other (when 
this otherness is also absence and negativity) to unsettle the frames of 
such representation.
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CHAPTER IMP: NEGATIVITY. FEMINISM AND THE FEMININE
The next few chapters will consider the increasingly complex theorisation 
of otherness that feminist theoreticians in France have drawn upon, to 
account for not only the situating of Woman as other, but to combine the 
forceful critique this provides with an analysis of identity which stresses 
not the mastery of identity, but its vulnerability to the displacing 
effects of desire and the unconscious. Whereas de Beauvoir stresses the 
control which must be exerted in struggling for equality and autonomy, this 
view of identity and otherness will maintain that such levels of control 
are not available. In this respect, feminist attempts to unsettle the view 
of identity which prioritised rationality and its alignment with values of 
masculinity, coincide with the psychoanalytic displacement of consciousness 
by forces which call into question the epistemological basis of 
subjectivity. Such forces will be seen, in addition, not as bodily 
processes of desire, but as linguistically constructed and disrupted, in 
accordance with Lacanian theory concerning structuralism and 
psychoanalysis. The unconscious is not & biological force but a more
pervasive force, manifest in systems of representation and language. Such 
a view emphasizes difference not only as difference between the Same and 
the Other in an intersubjective sense, but as operative in the very systems 
of signification which create and sustain such categories of subjectivity. 
In addition, I will examine the codification of such forces as feminine.
In the following chapter, I will draw upon the work of Julia Kristeva and 
Luce Irigaray, thinkers who inherit the recognition of the problematics of 
otherness from Hegel, Sartre and L a c a n , b u t  who also infuse such
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theories with additional theorisations of otherness as feminine. Although 
Kristeva and Irigaray make few references to de Beauvoir, I will briefly 
identify how their work will elaborate upon the questions I have suggested 
de Beauvoir has raised.
So far, we have seen that a connection has been established between sexual 
difference and the polarities of self/other, autonomy/dependency, 
spirit/body. De Beauvoir's insight has allowed this connection to be 
made from a specific (feminist) viewpoint, which is to say, she has made it 
possible to politicise the understanding of these divisions. Apparent 
neutrality is thus opened up for analysis as an imbalance of power, a 
position which will have repercussions for any discussion of ethics which 
has recourse to a certain liberalist ancestry. The question of difference 
has been raised in the context of de Beauvoir's characterisation of Woman 
as Other, and in the tension this creates in relation to the existentialist 
project of autonomy.
However, de Beauvoir returns to her existentialist/humanist framework when 
discussing a possible feminist ethics. She stresses the struggle women 
must engage in to compete equally with men, but she does not submit the 
very framework - which inscribes possible projects and the notion of 
creativity itself - to question.
We can recognise Kristeva's objections to de Beauvoir in the following 
passage from 'Women's Time':
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In its beginnings, the women's movement, as the struggle of suffragists 
and existential feminists, aspired to gain a place in linear time as the 
time of project and history, in this sense, the movement, while 
iiivnediately universalist, is also deeply rooted in the socio-political 
life of nations. The political demands of women; the struggles for 
equal pay for equal work, for taking power in social institions on an 
equal footing with men; the rejection, when necessary, of the attributes 
considered feminine or maternal in so far as they are deemed 
incompatible with insertion into that history - are all part of the 
logic of identification with certain values: not with the ideological 
(tnese are combatted, and rightly so, as reationary), but, rather, with 
the logical and.ontological values of a rationality dominant in the 
nation state.'3 '
Irigaray writes:
'Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre always resisted psychoanalysis. I have 
trained as an analyst and that is important... for thinking sexual 
identity. I also belong to a philosophical tradition in which 
psychoanalysis takes its place as a stage in understanding the self- 
realisation of consciousness, especially in its sexuate dimension.(4)
Psychoanalytic theory is valuable to feminist theory, in that it suggests 
the process of constructing identity involves the exclusion or suppression 
of certain forces, processes occurring on macro and micro levels. Such a 
model of exclusion or supression take place not only in the socio-symbolic 
sphere, but also, as Irigaray suggests, within the process of sexual 
identity formations. Kristeva and Irigaray attempt to account for intra­
psychic divisions as well as intersubjective relations of difference.
As Kristeva writes;
'Underlying causality' - a figure of speech that alludes to the social 
contradictions that a given society can subdue in order to constitute 
itself as such. But a figure of speech that is also used to designate 
that 'other scene'; the unconscious, drive related and transverbal scene 
whose eruptions determine not only my speech or my interpersonal 
relationships, but even the complex relations of production and 
reproduction which we so frequently see only as dependent on, rather 
than shaping, the economy. '•b'
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Kristeva is not suggesting we take on unproblematically the causality 
referred to in this passage; the forces which are constituted as disruptive 
are given a figuration as causal but this does not mean they are 
reductively 'real' origins. She calls them 'figures of speech' to draw 
attention to the way she considers them to be symbolically constituted, and 
in this respect unsettling of causal relations. This point will be 
important in that it refuses to posit an underlying experiential 
domain of forces and drives, and hence risk reinstating desire as 
fundamentally biological.
Psychoanalysis provides a theoretical framework for a 'philosophy of 
desire', the movements of an intentional force which is activated 
dynamically towards an other as object of desire. This intentional force 
is given an embodied context in sexual difference. But it simultaneously 
undermines a subject/object distinction constituted in terms of an 
opposition, through the disruptive agency of the unconscious. It is 
therefore effective in expressing difference as both sexed and 
heterogeneous
In this chapter I will argue that the feminist perspectives on 
psychoanalysis developed by Kristeva and Irigaray utilise the insights of 
psychoanalytic theory on the dynamic and intentional aspects of desire and 
the heterogeneity of the unconscious. But they also raise important 
questions about the limitations of psychoanalysis if it theorises sexual 
difference through perceived biological difference, or as generated by the 
processes of linguistic multiplicity.
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In the introduction to her book Feminism and Psychoanalysis, Jane Gallop 
writes;
Psychoanalysis, for instance, can unsettle feminism's tendency to accept 
a traditional, unified, rational, puritanical self - a self supposedly 
free from the violence of desire. In its turn, feminism can shake up 
psychoanalysis'8 tendency to think itself apolitical but in fact 
conservative by encouraging people to adapt to an unjust social 
structures.(8)
Both Irigaray and Kristeva seek to recapture a privileged site coresponding 
to an experiential body, such that women can lay claim to a site of agency. 
But both want to avoid the pitfalls of a category of experience which could 
be construed as self-present, known unproblematically. To this end, they 
move towards a phenomenological reading of psychoanalytic theory from a 
feminist perspective.^ The possibility of reading the encounter with the 
other as a validated experience of the lived body, taking place according 
to the structures of desire, is combined with their elaboration upon the 
connection made between 'the feminine' and negativity. If the feminine 
acts as a negative force, it can act to displace the subject as unified and 
self-present. But this development is a 'strategic' appropriation of the 
feminine as negative, and as such involves an ironic stance in relation to 
this equation.
If this radically different notion of experience is sustainable it will 
form the basis for a different version of ethics.
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I  Lacan and feminism
Feminism's problematic relation with psychoanalytic discourse may be due in 
part to the production of the subject category 'Woman'. Psychoanalytic 
theory takes on this category and may show the extent to which identity and 
sexuality are constructed by conflicting and quasi-deterministic forces, as 
well as indicating the permeation of such forces to psychic structures. At 
the same time there is an acknowledgement of the sexuate nature of 
structure and economies which are ostensibly neutral. (1^) Hence on one 
level it provides a generalisable account of the forces of identity 
construction, cross-culturally and trans-historically. Despite the dangers 
of a kind of 'universal identity' which this analysis courts, it does give 
a certain force to an analysis of sexual difference. The dominant forces 
which perpetuate a structure of woman as other need to be negotiated at 
this level in certain contexts. But many feminist critics are concerned 
about what seems to be a critical impasse produced by the contradictions 
of, on the one hand, the ontological status of Woman as political agent 
and, on the other, the analysis of subjectivity as a site or intersection 
of different forces as part of a resistance to totalities, the 
destabilisation of 'metaphysical identities' in an attempt to go beyond 
binary logics.
The discourse of feminism itself produces a subject, then seeking to 
emancipate that subject from the very constructions which allowed it to be 
produced in the first p l a c e . W e  cannot, therefore, expect a simple 
resolution of the ambiguities which arise from this situation. I will
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suggest that while a hypostatised or essentialist notion of identity is 
unproductive for a development of radical feminine alterity, as women will 
continue to be addressed and oppressed in a site named as other, it is 
necessary to concern ourselves for some time longer with the discourses of 
the subject, although attempting to develop in a non-oppositional and non- 
essentialising way.
The force of feminist theory influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis is a 
kind of 'return of the repressed' .(^) xhe unnameable and unrepresentable 
feminine, coded as an ideal (Woman) is accorded the power of disruption and 
destabilisation. This power seems to be particularly effective in the 
context of psychoanalysis and philosophy, disturbing schemas of identity 
and the effaced question of sexual difference with an insistent 
questioning. Where disciplines set up an implicit order of the same, which 
embraces a hierarchy of masculine over feminine, coding the feminine as 
radical heterogeneity is Intended to unfix the fantasy of fixation. While 
this move is relatively easy to see on a symbolic level - the undefinable, 
non-essential nature of feminine negativity is a force, emphatically not an 
identity - the problems arise if we want to politicise this notion. Some 
writers consider that the more radical move is to retain feminine
negativity in its uncodified, disruptive characterisation.^) Any attempt
to realise it will merely recuperate its radicality and constrain it back 
within the dominant economy it was meant to interrupt. The move from 
symbol to particular instantiation (Woman to women), they suggest, should 
be resisted. But we must question the extent to which this refusal can be 
sustained in an apparently self-conscious way. 1 will argue that the 
codification which connects the metaphorical force of negativity with the
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feminine already impinges on women as 'lived bodies', and therefore must be 
acknowledged. Failure to do so allows the dominant economy to name that 
relation anyway, and in a powerfully constricting fashion.
The slippage of the construct Woman, as that which both facilitates 
language and designates an irredeemably Other realm as feminine, into women 
and the particularity of their supplementary, inexpressible jouissance, 
apparently codes women with the excessive, ex-centric and ecstatic; not 
only symbolically outside the social contract, but excluded from access to 
power in a social context. The absent Woman symbolises the primordial 
origin in the guise of the pre-Oedipal mother, giving birth in an act of 
supreme passivity to the initial divisions of difference, and necessarily 
suppressed and repressed to allow such divisions to come to be. This 
figure of primary narcissism is re-presented as a site of unmediated 
jouissance, unrestricted and unconstrained, a phantasmic backwards 
projection to a prior moment of expressivity. There is supposedly no 
necessary connection with the subsequent gender identification which takes 
place in relation to the flesh and blood mother, but Lacan elides the 
metaphorical function of the ideal mother with women-as-such, so while on 
one level there is no essence of Woman, this move may also deny the agency 
of women.
...the woman does not exist. The woman can be perfectly well 
delineated, since it is all women, as you might say. But if women are 
'not Then we say that the woman is all women, it is an empty
Similarly, Lacan's shifting of the castration complex from the biologically 
deterministic organisation around the penis to the supposedly more neutral
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term of the phallus indicates no necessary connection between visual lack 
and lack as such (the vicissitudes of desire). The phallus is meant to 
negotiate the sexualised connotations of biological difference, standing 
for a generalised loss of heterogeneous jouissance with entry into the 
Symbolic, a linguistic construct for the shared experience of 'castration' 
for both male and female.
Two points need to be made in relation to Lacanian theory at this stage. 
Firstly, the designation of the phantasmic ideal of Woman as the archaic 
Mother may be read as confining women to a biological determinism, 
or reforging the equation of women with a solely maternal function, 
positioning her as the 'natural' realm of chaos and continuun outside or 
beyond the ordering of 'civilised' culture.
Secondly, it is clear that the phallus retains its links with biology 
despite Lacan's extravagant claims for its linguistic status as the 
'signifier of signifiers' and its arbitrary associations. In its role as 
ideal symbol it supports the continuity of the status quo and the hegemony 
of masculine power. Meaning is equated with the masculine, the 'vital 
flow' of signification and the one-to-one correspondance of truthful 
description underline the political and topological impulses dictating the 
choice of this signifier.
... this signifier is chosen because it is the most tangible element in 
the real of sexual copulation and also the most symbolic in the literal 
(typographical) sense of the term, since it is equivalent there to the 
(logical) copula.'15'
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Lacan even acknowledges this connection himself his later work as he begins 
to explore the phenomenal and topological spacing of the body. 'For what 
is the phenomenal being of the subject if not to all intents and purposes a 
body?...a form drawn from the most salient and, so to speak, the most 
conspicuous organ of procreation.. .chosen on account of its 
erectibility' .(1^) Given that here Lacan is concerned with the way the 
body is symbolically understood rather than a direct perception of the 
body, we must still question how distinct from Freud this position is.
In its very construction the Lacanian framework is emphatically unfeminist. 
Lacan's obedience to the constituted field of metaphor is a constricting 
starting point. Nevertheless, Lacan accords women a kind of power, the 
possibilility of disrupting signifying systems albeit without the agency of 
identity to do anything other than constantly disrupt, efface, move on.
I believe in the jouissance of the woman in so far as it is something 
more, on condition that you screen off that something more until I have 
properly explained it.^17'
An attempt of the master to retain his mastery? I
II 'Any theory of the subject has.been appropriated by the "masculine'
At the beginning of her book Éthique de la difference Sexuelle , Irigaray
states her belief that sexual difference is the burning issue of our age, 
the issue of difference which potentially could be 'our salvation on an 
intellectual level... the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry 
and language; the creation of a new poetics'.( 1$) The development of this 
event is hampered and constrained by the systematic repetition of sameness
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being compulsively reiterated in the spheres of philosophy, politics, 
religion and science. Whether this is a preoccupation with degeneration 
and destruction or a lament for conformity, it amounts to a re-working of 
the same ground, the reversal or proliferation of existing values which 
Irigaray lists as
...the consuner society, the circular nature of discourse, the more or 
less cancerous diseases of our age, the unreliable nature of words, the 
end of philosophy, religious despair or the regressive return to 
religion, scientistic imperialism or a.technique that does not take the 
hunan subject into account, and so on.'**'
According to Irigaray, this repetition works to conceal or efface a 
possible mode of articulating alterity which, she thinks, can take place in 
the context of the question of sexual difference.
Why privilege sexual difference? Her reasons for promoting this belief lie 
in her specific appropriation of psychoanalytic discourse, particularly the 
work of Lacan, which also includes strategic departures from it. 
Psychoanalysis has enabled a theoretical treatment of sexuality and 
identity to take place via the (generalisable) analysis of forms of 
patriarchal identity as constructions, and the permeation of such forces to 
psychic levels. Its usefulness rests in some part on its capacity to 
analyse the symbolism of masculine and feminine as a pair of terms which 
pervade wide and various sets of relations, such that the symbolisation 
becomes tangled up in the very process of conceptualisation. The common 
oppositions of the Pythagorean table of opposites^®) become aligned with a 
symbolic interpretation of anatomical difference, and, significantly, the 
unified, non-contradictory and homogenous terms come to dominate. Across a 
range of systems and at different levels, exclusion and censorship operate
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to prioritise the masculine term at the expense of the feminine, such that 
the very operation itself is obscured from view. The status quo is 
maintained at the price of a peculiar violence. As regards subjectivity, 
masculine/feminine forces may become aligned with male and female, but the 
very notion of subjectivity itself has already been appropriated to the 
masculine.
The deterministic implications of the way these constructions are 
internalised is offset somewhat by the notion of the unconscious. The 
unconscious can act as a constant reminder of the failure of this 
internalisation process, 'a resistance to identity at the very heart of 
psychic life', as Jacqueline Rose writes.(21) The splits, forcings and 
divisions of psychic life place pressure against the notion of coherent 
identity, a widespread replay of an incomplete adjustment to the norm.
This moment of failure, negativity, fluidity/formlessness, is symbolically 
bound up with the feminine. As Rose suggests, feminism can recognise 
certain similarities with its own project - a symbolic 'failure to adjust 
to normality'(22) and the resistance which accompanies it.
Dissent takes up a strategically oppositional place to a position 
identified as dominant, in order to identify the power relations of 
exclusion. The dangers of occupying a marginalised position are, 
obviously, the dangers of celebrating difference but being irrelevant, or 
of being recuperated back into the dominant ideology which can easily 
incorporate straightforward opposition. Feminism has had to negotiate the 
double mine-field of either
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a) enthusiastically embracing the decentring of subjectivity only to find 
no political position to speak from (the relatively recent struggle for a 
feminine subject is not to be surrendered so lightly), or, b) the 
politically active subject with the ontological status Woman, which may 
turn out to be 'the repressive re-enactment of a metaphysical authority'; 
the replay of a universalisiable self in an era which has attested to the 
inadequacy of such a self.
It is through her understanding and seizure of a certain lack of 
synchronisation therefore, that Irigaray situates her project.(23)
In the context of philosophy, she announces her desire to 'have a fling 
with the philosophers' ,(24) paradoxically to indicate the seriousness of 
her engagement with philosophical questions. She means to be as intimate 
and familiar with philosophical history as possible, but also to challenge 
it from the position of a woman; that is one who is symbolically positioned 
outside or other to philosophy, one who can only 'flirt' with ideas, or 
conversely, deflate them by being too playful, refusing to take them 
seriously. This positioning allows her to follow through some of the main 
canonical texts of Western philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Meister Eckhardt, 
Descartes, Hegel, Spinoza, Plotinus, Kant, Marx, Freud),(25) reconstructing 
their logic carefully in order to show how it interrupts itself. What she 
calls 'the blind spot in an old dream of symmetry',(26) the hidden 
assumption so necessary to the symmetry and so necessarily hidden, will 
entail analysing philosophy's unconscious.
For Irigaray, what is repressed is 'the feminine', that which allows 
philosophy to get off the ground, but must remain essentially unspoken, as 
the ground. The negativity of symbolically occupying this groundless
-49-
ground constantly places women in an impossible position. (2?)
What she proposes instead is a particular conception of psychic health to 
counteract these moves, which would involve the adequate conceptualisation 
of both masculine and feminine elements in a non-hierarchical exchange and 
process. However, we are far from this stage.^8) The feminine is still 
inadequately conceptualised. It is only by intervening on the destructive 
circuit that another age of difference might be broached, an intervention 
which Irigaray nominates as ethical.
III Kristeva's theorisation of negativity
There is a certain continuity in Kristeva's work concerning the notion of 
negativity, despite her quite large-scale shifts in position in other areas 
of her w o r k . ^ ®  Through a complex intersection of theories she attempts 
to develop a notion of a material/linguistic force which is disruptive for 
identity but also located in the corporeal space of the body. There is an 
attempt to balance the material or embodied aspect of the subject with the 
metaphysical force of negativity, often verging on a quasi-mystical 
understanding in her later work when it is discussed in relation to 
theology, or towards aesthetics or politics in relation to the avant- 
garde.^^ The heterogeneous relation of both embodiment and the force of 
negativity will be significant in subsequent explorations of the ethicality 
with which Kristeva endows them; particularly as this is characterised as 
feminine, the heretical ethics of the maternal body and jouissance.
Kristeva makes clear that for her, as for Hegel, negativity is not merely 
nothingness or negation, the diametrical opposition of positivity or 
identity. But in order to sustain its disruptive characterisation it
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cannot be subsuned under the same logic of identity which operates between 
disparate and discrete identities.
Although negativity is a concept and therefore belongs to a 
contemplative (theoretical) system, it reformulates the static terms of 
pure abstraction,.as a process, dissolving and binding them within a 
mobile law..
Negativity as process characterises the relation between identity and 
difference as inseparability and interpenetration. The Hegelian logic is 
not merely an external relation but inscribes its force of production, 
driving the contradictions which motivate the processes of desire. What 
Kristeva theorises, however, is an excess of otherness which interrupts the 
dialectic in such a way as to invade the process and continuity of being. 
This will be shown to be a non-telological, resisting synthesis.
A negativity inseparable from the Hegelian notion of Being is thus 
precisely what splits and prevents the closing up of Being within an 
abstract and superstitious understanding... it prevents the 
immobilisation of the thetic, unsettles doxa and lets in all the 
semiotic motility that prepares and exceeds it.'*-31*''
Kristeva objects to the Hegelian recuperation of the force of identity and 
difference into the pure form of thought, the abstraction of Force. She 
reintroduces a certain materiality (instantiation of the subject) and prior 
division (the scissions of the semiotic which intervene on any founding 
notion of consciousness) acting as constant disruption. Because the 
Hegelian consciousness finds its reality in rational expression, that is, 
thought, ultimately it cuts itself off into a pure inner space which 
becomes void, while heterogeneity remains an externalised force. The
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totalising process of the dialectic denies the ethical admission of 
otherness in anything other than an external sense, feeding the ego of 
self-consciousness and recuperating difference through violence.
In conceiving radical negativity as an expression the idealist dialectic 
deprives itself of negativity's powerful moment; the scission that 
exceeds and precedes the advent of thetic understanding...
This impeccable logic (Force as expression) constitutes signifying 
unity on the basis of explosions - scissions, impulses, collisions, 
rejections - yet they remain driven back in the name of and in view of 
the subjective unity not only of the Understanding but also of reason, 
which is necessary, because it assures the assertion of reality.
The real impact of negativity is obscured in this frozen circularity - 
since this is the process which underlies, precedes and guarantees the 
circle. To disrupt the circle, not only repetition but displacement is 
required, an ex-centric sideways move contextualised in psychoanalytic 
discourse.
IV Subversion through signification
For Kristeva, Lacan's 'return to Freud' (his reworking of F r e u d ) w h i c h  
engendered the shift from biology to a linguistic shaping of sexuality and 
identity, provides a space for some form of subversion. If sexual 
difference is implicated in the conceptual framework itself, Kristeva's 
characterisation of language as a shifting process of the production and 
decay of meaning allow her a potential for mobility on the question of 
identity formation. The Freudian focus on a visible/biological structure 
seems very limiting in the light of the fluid freeing of sexual diffemce 
into the Symbolic arena. But in some ways all that has happened is a
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shifting of the terms of formation. Lacan's point that an initial 
framework of cultural reference is necessary to guarantee any subsequent 
account of sexual difference negates any simplistic biological starting 
point. Now that difference is produced by systems of meaning, there is
no direct access to a pure biological understanding of physical bodies, 
since it would be impossible to recognise those bodies outside of the 
system of meaning. This is the basis of the development of the imaginary, 
the realm which severs full cognisance of the body and renders its relation 
metaphorical or 'morphological'. This notion is developed in much more 
detail in Kristeva and Irigaray, since the possibilities of intervening 
strategically on the imaginary with its metaphorical/linguistic 
connotations, rather than biological ones, are much more promising.(^7) if 
identity is seen as structuration rather than development through time, 
the issue shifts from questions of anatomical difference (at what point in 
development do differences appear) to questions as to what such differences 
mean within the symbolic, and the extent to which they are open to 
subversion.
The focus of Kristeva's work on femininity is governed by this 
understanding. If the structuration of identity is at the level of socio- 
symbolic, but this process is constantly invaded by the 'language' of the 
semiotic, then its stability is called into question. Perhaps by insisting 
upon the disruptive rather than the constitutive elements of language, a 
sufficently transgressive notion of the subject can be produced to allow it 
ethical access to the other?
In her 1974 essay 'The Ethics of Linguistics'/38) Kristeva is critical of 
theorists who focus on language as a homogeneous, logical system with
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internal coherence. It would seem she has in mind the priority of 
cormunicabi 1 ity, consensus and competence seen in the work of Saussure, 
Chomsky and in Lacan's symbolic. While on the one hand she sees this 
preoccupation as 'a bulwark against irrational destruction and 
sociologising dogmatism'(39) arKj an advance on the individual 'making' or 
creating an utterance, she identifies a certain overcompensation. The fear 
of reinstating a transcendental ego as origin or source of meanings leads 
to the prioritising of rational and sensemaking elements of language, at 
the expense of those marginal elements of linguistics which, she suggests, 
may provide greater insight into the connection of the material subject and 
the materiality of signification.
Kristeva theorises the poetic and artistic 'pathologies' of language in a 
different way from more traditional linguists, who had seen these forms of 
language as continuous with conventional signification, but less
successful. If the formal practice of language uses is emphasized, these
todeviant practices are judged according to their conformityAor deliberate 
flouting of the rules. Any somatic connection was feared to reintroduce 
'subjective' elements, so for example the problematics of Chomskyan 
generative grammar were classified as 'extra-linguistic' concerns.
Kristeva seeks to identify a connection, but as she makes clear, it is a 
productive and dynamic relation she is interested in, not a relation of 
stasis. She takes pains to separate her own theorisation of the subject in 
process from two more static models. 1
1. Certain theorists developed a model in which the relation between 
signifier and signified is not purely arbitrary but 'motivated'; a direct
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oralising of certain somatic drives and forces. Kristeva notes that this 
approach validates elements which had been neglected in linguistic theory.
(This theorisation) seeks the principle of this motivation in the 
Freudian notion of the unconscious, insofar as the theories of drives 
(pulsions) and primary processes (displacement and condensation) can 
connect 'empty signifiers' to psychosomatic functionings, or at least 
can link them in a sequence of metaphors and metonymies; though 
undecidable, such a sequence replaces arbitrariness with 
articulation...Such a linguistic theory... restores to formal linguistic 
relations the dimensions (instinctual drives) and operations, 
(displacement and condensation, vocalic and intonational 
differentiation) that formalist theory excludes.'**1'
However, Kristeva argues that, although this aspect of 'extra-linguistic' 
theorising acknowledges the realm of the unconscious and therefore does not 
re-introduce a subject of self-reflection, it does not account for the 
transitional move into an arena already invested with symbolic meanings. 
This transition will be developed in respect of her notion of the 'chora', 
which will be discussed in the next section.
2. The second aspect concerns the placing of the phenomenological subject
and the thetic. Kristeva is distinguishing her theory from a Husserlian 
transcendental ego, since its positing, even if undemonstrated, indicates a 
substrate acting as a ground and guarantee of meaning. (^) The 
transcendental ego reveals its limitations when it is shown itself to be 
irreducible in reduction, and becomes the locus of the recuperation of 
unity. Once again, there is a kind of stasis, a 'bracketing out of all 
that is heterogeneous to consciousness'^2 3  ^which corresponds to a certain 
denial of difference. What is useful, however, is the notion of 
positionalities and the experiential dimension of 'placing', the way a
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subject reacts and responds to signification. 'We see that Husserlian 
phenomenology might serve as the bridge leading to an interrogation of the 
very positionality of the speaking subject*.
It is clear that the the tic 'placing' remains important, since this 
possibility of identity is what makes the recognition of divisions and 
boundaries possible. The communicative dimension of language involves 
some denial of otherness in its universality, as individuals are initiated 
into its structures. But it cannot wholly erase the traces of meanings 
which remain other, haunting each moment of construction and destruction. 
If it attempts to do so , 'it renders invisible the infrastructure of 
otherness through whose means, as it were, language speaks'.^5)
Kristeva questions the assumptions of rationality in the phenomenological 
method, as well as the boundary between what is 'properly' the subject of 
linguistics and the extra-linguistic. By identifying an arena of non­
verbal signifying practice (the semiotic chora), she makes significant 
challenges to the theorisation of subjectivity and the subversion of 
identity. This challenge takes place on a nunber of fronts.
Firstly, it challenges the Freudian and Lacanian notion of the repression 
of drives occasioned by entry into language. Kristeva is concerned not 
merely with the 'successful' rational/conmunicative space established by 
the renunciation of heterogeneity, but the means by which such a space is 
apparently attained at all, and the constant subversion and 
displacement of this space by forces supposedly repressed. Focussing on 
rhythm, repetition, ellision and displacement reinforces a notion of the 
subject as 'in process', rather than ideal enunciator, since it concerns
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the apparent failures rather than the successes, of the struggle to 
maintain a coherent identity. Further, it is these 'failures' which open a 
space to allow for dialogue, engagement with the other and love. This does 
not become apparent until Kristeva's later work.
Secondly, she draws attention to a connectivity between the psychic 
orderings into provisional articulations and the linguistic positionings 
which allow participation in social practice and the symbolic. This 
connectivity focusses on the disruptive results in the symbolic.
Identity formation based on repression is therefore destined never to be 
wholly successful, permitting the breakthrough of forces of otherness 
which, although now articulated only in the communicative sphere, 
nevertheless permit some initial topographical account of the psychic 
spacing of the body.
V The semiotic chora
The notions of the semiotic and the 'chora' in Kristeva's work present an 
attempt to theorise the untheorisable; a pre-discursive realm which is 
described in terms of space or a locus to avoid pinning it to any 
particular designation. We can see even in Kristeva's early work she is 
seeking a means of expressing an 'open' grounding of heteronomous, bodily 
and signifying forces from which to consider a disrupted and disruptive 
body. This will be developed in her later work in conjunction with 
maternity and in relation to theological themes. However, in her earlier 
work this notion is worked out in the context of psychoanalytic discourse. 
Therefore it is still within the context of the individual's development
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and identity that these notions are elaborated and given an initial 
alignment with feminine or maternal symbolism.
Kristeva writes of the semiotic as a kind of primordial writing or 
signifying of the body, although this is not strictly an accurate 
description, since it is concerned with 'the body of a subject who is not 
yet constituted as such'.^^ Still, we can note this pre-signifying 
signification, a textuality of the body which is more experiential than 
meaningful. 'We understand the term semiotic in its Greek sense; “
distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof engraved or written 
sign, imprint, trace, figuration. jt a pre-signifying ordering of
energies which initiates the inscription and conditions for representation. 
Hypothesised as both the material rhythms and forces underlying the 
possibility of textuality, and the imprinting of of psychical energies to 
connect sensation to movement, it acts as a preparation for entry into 
language. This space is as yet undifferentiated but it cannot be described 
as homogeneous, shot through with 'psychical marks' and in a state of 
motility. Kristeva names it as 'the chora... an essentially mobile and 
extermely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their 
ephemeral stases
That this notion is positioned 'prior' to signification should not be taken 
to indicate a necessary chronology in time, since this realm is 
symbolically 'other' to temporal order as well as topographical space. 
Kristeva writes:
...the semiotic that 'precedes1 symbolisation is only a theoretical 
presupposition justified by the need for description. It exists in 
practice only within the symbolic and requires the symbolic break to
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obtain the complex articulation we associate with it in musical.and 
poetic practices...only theory can isolate (it) as preliminary.^'
Therefore although it is given an apparently archaic and originary status, 
it does not constitute a reified origin divided from the subject in the 
symbolic. This would replicate a duality which Kristeva is concerned to 
resist; the terms are not equal and the notion of origin is only 
reconstructed in retrospect from positions already in language. She also 
points to the inadequacy of theoretical discourse as a means of 
representing such a notion; it does not quite seem to capture what she 
wants to say... in this sense we can see parallels with Rousseau's state of 
nature in the Discourse on I n e q u a l i t y and with the fall from grace in 
Pascal's Pensées.(51) Both formulate a notion of origin from which we are 
separated, but tragically and paradoxically, it is only through separation 
we can sense the loss of bliss, grace, unmediated jouissance. The 
imperfect 'fallen' discourse is condemned to be opaque, figurative, corrupt 
and undecidable, and yet our only means of characterising this posited 
origin. This point is offered as a response to critics who firstly accuse 
Kristeva of a cause-and-effeet relation between semiotic and symbolic, and 
secondly accuse her of making the repression of the mother the condition of 
subjectivity. (52) on the first point we may see the relation is not 
straightforwardly causal;
Our discourse - all discourse - moves with and against the chora in the 
sense that it simultaneously depends upon and refuses it. Although the 
chora can be designated and regulated it can never be definitely posited 
as a result, one can situate the chora and, if necessary lend it a 
topology, but one can never give it axiomatic fotm.^3 '
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On the second point, I think this corresponds to a confusion of description 
and prescription; that is, Kristeva is being accused of advocating the 
system she is in fact analysing. As she draws attention to the symbolic 
connection of the chora with feminine or maternal notions, she is taking up 
pre-figured connections which identify the notion of an origin with a 
primordial mother, but also with an 'absent deity'.
'(We can read) in this rhythmic space, which has no thesis and no 
position, the process by which significance is constituted. Plato 
himself leads us to such a process when he call this receptacle or chora 
nourishing or maternal, not unified in an ordered whole because deity is 
absent from it.^54'
We can only make this connection with 'a sort of bastard reasoning', as 
Plato characterises it in the Timaeus, a logic which is 'prior' to names 
and syllables, and otherwise to the divine; going against God's law, or 
flouting the established patriarchal order. (55)
This subversive hint initially presents a note of optimism for feminist 
theory; not only is the process of signification and identity shown to be 
in a constant process of disruption, but the equivocal otherness is marked 
by symbolic association with negativity and femininity/matemity. The 
multiple implications of making this linkage do not become fully apparent 
until it is given greater attention in Kristeva's later work. For the time 
being we will note the dangers of activating a symbolic/metaphoric 
association of women with a primordial void, a space beyond meaning which, 
in keeping with negativity is also connoted with death. In addition, such 
symbolism 'turns back on itself' to re-present an Ideal Mother figure, 
'outside' the social and political matrices within which women live.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE FEMININE AS EIHICAL
At the beginning of £ thieve de la. difference sexuelle, Irigaray writes:
For the work of sexual difference to take place, a revolution in thought 
and ethics is needed. We must re-interpret the whole relationship 
between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the 
subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic...In order 
to live and think through this difference, we must reconsider the whole 
question of space and time.'1 *
Irigaray links the reconsideration of these categories with the possibility 
of thinking through sexual difference in a more productive way. Her 
sceptical strategy is intended to arouse doubt as to the certainties of 
apparently foundational structures by questioning their neutrality, but 
simultaneously to evoke new potentials in the rupturing of such categories. 
In this chapter I will consider the attempts made by Kristeva and Irigaray 
to unsettle these relations in such a way that the association of the 
feminine with negativity is itself put into question, in order to prevent 
it being cancelled out. To refuse the cancellation of such a force is, for 
Kristeva and Irigaray, to refuse the tmowKlisation or incorporation of the 
feminine as a disruptive, but ultimately directionless force. What is 
required is a re-thinking of space and time, and of the body, such that 
other possibilities might emerge.
In the previous chapter we saw how the characterisation of the feminine as 
other is metaphorically aligned with heteronomy and negativity, an 
alignment which engenders the disruption of subjectivity from 'within'. 
However, to indicate that this force is not merely nihilistic, it will be 
necessary to consider how Kristeva and Irigaray link such a notion with the
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future of sexual difference and see this rupture as ethical. The 
positioning of the feminine/matemal as the 'eternal irony of the 
community' expresses the ambivalent position that women occupy, 
simultaneously essential and threatening to the formulation of ethical 
precepts.
In the final parts of this chapter 1 will discuss the way that Kristeva and 
Irigaray examine notions of therapy, borrowed from the psychoanalytic 
session, to explore the ethics of sexual difference. Such a notion of 
therapy is intended to open up more fruitful symbolic relations, to 
generate 'an ethics of love and of the passions'^), without reproducing 
either the dangers of essential difference or the obliteration of 
difference in a more general horizon. Both Kristeva and Irigaray locate an 
ethics of the passions in the context of an excessive experiential 
dimension.
Recent readings of Kristeva^) suggest significant difficulties with her 
theorisation of maternity and the feminine. These difficulties concern 
firstly, her apparent comitment to a dissolution of metaphysical 
identities, the collapse of 'male' and 'female' as homogeneous entities 
into the process of signification, a freeing of essentialism, which echoes 
Lacan's pronouncement that 'Woman does not exist' ^  (in the sense of the 
cumbersome ideal existence which, in applying to the whole sex, fits no 
woman in particular). Despite the fact that some post-modern theoreticians 
see this as a liberating gesture, the endless dance of positionalities in a 
future not dominated by any particular sexual mark, it has a disturbing 
side. This is the loss of the specificity that feminist theory has sought
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for the establishing of political identity, into a non-specific and 
therefore neutralised space of sexual in-difference.
In Edith Wyschogrod's book Saints and Post-modernism, she echoes this 
concern of the loss of identificatory markings in ethical terms. She is 
critical of what she identifies as a strand of the 'metaphysics of nihil' 
in post-modern thinking. She is seeking a means of presenting a 
possibility of ethics in the face of, as it were, the apocalyptic tones of 
post-modernism, a possibility which does not reinstate categories shown to 
be problematic, but equally does not cede to the apparently 'pandemic 
character of d e s i r e ' . T h i s  is a legitimate concern, since it seems that 
the notion of the unconscious initiates an unleashing of forces which are 
resistant to the legislative jurisidiction of the social self as 'there can 
be no vantage point other than desire itself for acquiring purchase against 
desire'.(7) The anonymity produced in this anti-foundationalist move is 
antithetical to the recognition of difference and the opening of a radical 
kind of ethicality. However, it is not clear that Kristeva is to be so 
clearly conscripted into thinkers with 'pernicious consequences for ethical 
existence' as Wyschogrod seems to think. Wyschogrod's accusation is 
formulated thus:
By adhering to the postmodern 'canons' of limitless desire and the 
indistinguishability of moral from literary discourse, Kristeva can 
neither endorse nor excoriate the racist work of Celine, to which she 
appeals on other grounds. (8)
For Wyschogrod, this leads to 'moral ambiguity', occasioned when the 
commitment to radical difference falters. In passages such as the
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following, it might seem that Kristeva is suggesting a loss of 
discrimination, and so a loss of ethical judgement and also of sexual 
difference: 'No reference point in the unconscious...No present, no past, 
no future. No true or false either. It displaces, condenses, 
distributes'.
But Wyschogrod, in basing her reading of Kristeva upon one text alone 
(Powers of Horror) fails to capture the subtleties of her later texts (eg. 
Tales of Love and In the beginning was Love; psychoanalysis and faith), 
which are, ironically enough, precisely focussed on radical readings of 
'saintliness'; the conjunction of ecstasy and religious ethicality. The 
misreading of Kristeva is based on seeing her notion of the abject^®) as a 
'black mysticism', an apocalyptic flushing out of the sacred into the 
despair of a secularised amoralistic world, leaving it bereft of any means 
of discriminating or judging. Literature seems to become the only 
sanctuary in this nightmare vision, and then to abort its own santity, 
since the flow of signification provides no place to hide. Hence for 
Wyschogrod, Kristeva becomes a thinker of not only subjective annihilation 
but also the attempted denial of the abject, as it is theorised in 
conjunction with the sacred, and also with the figure of the mother (this 
view of Kristeva is also echoed in Mark C. Taylor's book Altarity)*
My concern is not merely to defend Kristeva, but to expand upon her complex 
theorisation of otherness to indicate how, in fact, she is a thinker who is 
precisely articulating the ethical and (post-)theological preoccupations of 
Wyschogrod and Taylor. In the passage itnnediately following the one quoted 
above, Kristeva writes:
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...what the father doesn't say about the unconscious, what sign and 
time repress in their impulses, appears as their truth (if there is no 
absolute, what is tenth, if not the unspoken of the spoken?) and 
this truth can be imagined only as a woman. A curious truth: outside 
time, with neither past nor future, neither true nor false; buried 
underground, it neither postulates nor judges. It refuses, displaces, 
breaks the symbolic order before it can re-establish itself.
This 'curious' version of truth corresponds to Wyschogrod's own notion of 
post-modern ethics, the anchorage she proposes to rescue from the infinite 
regress of 'limitless desire'. Kristeva suggests three ways in which this 
curious truth may be understood: 'Jouissance, pregnancy, and marginal 
speech: the means by which this 'truth', cloaked and hidden by the symbolic 
order and its companion, time, functions through women.'(*3) Here Kristeva 
is linking 'a vigilance, call it e t h i c a l ' , w i t h  the figuration of the 
feminine and the maternal as 'other'. It is a critical and disruptive kind 
of ethicality, linked to a capacity to resist the fixation of subjectivity 
and to remain critical, but also seeking a means to express such 
'otherness'.
...to refuse all roles, in order, on the contrary, to surmon this 
timeless 'truth' - formless, neither true nor false, echo of our 
jouissance, of our madness, of our pregnancies - into the order of 
speech and social symbolism. But how? By listening; by recognising 
the unspoken in speech; by calling attention at all times to whatever 
remains unsatisfied, repressed, new, eccentric, incomprehensible, 
disturbing the status quo.^1-*'
Kristeva's characterisation of this 'other' truth is heterogeneous, bodily 
and questioning of the status quo. It rescues an attentive and listening 
vigilance from the demand for an ethics of the community as consensus, but 
also from the uncontrollable circulation of polysemy and desire.
So we are prompted to ask: What is it that is significantly different about
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Wyschogrod's exposition of heterogeneous alterity which allows it to be 
called ethical, in contrast with the unruly and apparently amoral forces of 
desire that she wishes to condemn? This is a crucial question as it lies 
at the heart of the distinction between the post-modern theorists of 
difference who are concerned to think difference in a productive and 
positive way, and those who maintain a critical or sceptical perspective.
We might also question what is at stake in Wyschogrod's wish to keep 
separate the categories of moral and literary discourse, if this is one of 
the fundamental dualisms that post-modernist writers have already 
questioned, a questioning which she has already subscribed to.
Despite Kristeva's characterisation of the subject as 'an open system', she 
is in no way committed to the denial of sexual difference or the 'erasure' 
of the subject. Her project is an unsettling of the vicious dichotomies 
which sustain violence; which, in Lacanian terms, tear us from bliss and 
fatally foreclose on the possibility of reconcil iation by fundamentally 
splitting us in language, creating the space of desire which is lack. The 
division which places women symbolically on the wrong side of the divide 
means the totalising aspect of Lacan's theory demands sacrifice and 
suppression of difference. Kristeva's work is seeking to allow for the 
possibility of pleasure and the opportunity for dialogue.
...another relationship arises out of sexual difference and the 
impossible element it infers on both sides...A painful laboratory that 
entails mistakes, failures, victims. But if you want to talk.about 
it... you find yourself once again face to face, two by two...' '
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The configuration of a notion of temporality as chronological progression 
and division apparently allows and guarantees conmunicability and the 
positioning of a subject in language. It also appears to present, in 
respect of the above, the possibility of ethicality, if ethics is seen to 
reside in a network of pre-distinguished social/intersubjective relations. 
The notion of externality which is implied in this conception of ethics is, 
however, what is being opened to question, since it seems to render 
homogeneous not only those subjects who are under discussion as moral 
agents, but also relations between them, and to imply a presentation of the 
time of the moment as conmunicable, with an implicit telos to this time's 
unfolding. As Kristeva and Irigaray suggest, the occlusion of difference 
in these contexts amounts to a 'forgetting' of sexual difference as well. 
The presentation of ethics in this external mode rests upon certain 
assumptions about comnunicability, socialisation and presentation which, 
while seeming to open emancipatory possibilities (since they appeal to a 
conmon sense of shared experience and the possibility of dialogue) in fact 
reinscribe dogmatic principles even as they seek to break from them.
In her essay 'Women's time',^^ Kristeva indicates a positioning of women 
in respect to a different or alternative conception of time - cyclical time 
(repetition) and/or monunental time (eternal). This positioning is 
intended to pinpoint a symbolic equation not a literal one, but one which 
is meant to act as a form of critique of the above 'external' notion of 
time. But such a positioning of women suggests an identity i) inessential 
to the progression of time as universal and teleological, and so to the 
formulation of ethical agendas, and ii) essentialised, in the figure of the 
maternal woman, given an ideal, whole identity, but as such seen as a
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symbolic object and frozen in this role. What this sugests is that if 
space and time are already conceptually outlined as neutral (even though 
this neutrality is elided with the social and psychical significations of 
masculinity), there can be no such thing as 'women's time', except within a 
hypothetical space outlined by feminist speculations. The implications of 
this hypothetical space will be developed in later chapters.
Kristeva's identification of these 'alternative' modes of time is 
b o m  of a quite specific analysis of cultural formations and so does not 
echo a victimology of women - it does not deny that women can and do accrue 
power in the symbolic realm, but that a deeper level of exclusion and 
censorship operate to recuperate any such gains. It is the models of 
exclusion which need to be analysed and identified to negotiate such 
recuperations. The establishment of such models is an historical process, 
an accretion of meanings which can be subject (and subjected to) immanent 
disruptions of their determinations.
Kristeva articulates this question for women: 'What can be our place in the 
symbolic contract?' Or, to put it another way, 'How can we reveal our 
place, first as it is bequeathed to us by tradition and then as we want to 
transform it?'^®^
She analyses the establishment of the social contract as a violence; 
demanding the sacrifice of women. In this she shares the perspective
of Irigaray who also characterises the present economy as a sacrificial 
one; what is sacrificed is a certain potential for creativity 
metaphorically expressed in the relations between mothers and
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daughters. (^0) The sacrificial order, which has hitherto driven women to 
be 'nostalgic, ecstatic or mad', is now the subject of feminist analysis.
The new generation of women is showing its major social concern has 
become the socio-symbolic contract as a sacrificial contract.. .women of 
today are affirming... that they ..are forced to experience this sacrificial 
contract against their will*'21 ’
Kristeva argues for the necessity of 'active research' on the part of women 
which is 'hesitant but undoubtedly dissident' to 'break the code, to 
shatter language, to find a specific discourse closer to the body and 
emotions'.(22) The nature of this 'specific discourse' will be examined 
shortly.
Kristeva makes explicit connections between the 'feminine' conceptions of 
time she outlines in contrast to 'the time of linear history', and 
'mystical' notions of time in other civilisations and experiences, 
characterised as other to Western traditions. (^3) In this respect feminine 
time is much more convergent upon a kind of 'space' than an order of linear 
clock time. This 'other' time is
... the problematic of space, which innumerable religions of matriarchal 
(re)appearance attribute to woman', and which Plato...designated by the 
aporia of the chora, matrix space, nourishing, unameable,.anterior to 
the One, to God, and consequently defying metaphysics.
This alternative notion of space/time, which corresponds to an encounter 
with otherness, is Kristeva's attempt to reconceptualise women's relation 
to the social contract in other than a sacrificial way. She argues that in 
order to understand such a possibility it is necessary to examine religious
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discourses, not only because, as in poetic discourse, there is a moment of 
excess and transgressive jouissance, nor even that as part of her analysis 
she is impelled towards those ' mythico-religious threads that have woven 
our loves'^5) £n order to dissect the Judaeo-Christian tradition as a 
patriarchal network of power. I think it is primarily a search for a 
counter-balancing discourse to sacrifice which will herald new and less 
violent relations which propels her to look again at the processes of 
idealisation and the means of codifying ethical possibilities. 'We thereby 
find ourselves in face of a religion that is no longer essentially premised
on sacrifice'.(26)
Although Kristeva expresses fears that the development of a 'feminist 
variant' of such languages may be exposed to the same risks of 'violence' 
and 'terrorism' as its preceding (masculine) forms, as well as the 
ossification of an Ideal in the persona of a kind of Woman goddess, she 
also sees it as presenting a real challenge to the ordering of social 
relations. This is because it could occasion not only an enrichment of the 
relations of sexual difference, but also a 'space' which could be other 
enough to allow difference to be creative in generating 'aesthetic 
practices'. Such enriched understanding and creative practices could also 
stave off increasing tendencies towards uniformity and the circulation of 
information in increasingly technological forms. Kristeva sees the radical 
possibilities she outlines as a means to combat sexism as well as 
combatting the anthropocentric tendency which sees sexual difference as a 
problematic of materialism alone. If sexual difference denies such a 
possibility it is relocated in the impasse of the same, and will 
reduplicate the role of 'scapegoat victim as foundress of a society and a 
counter-society'(22) which is given to women. Kristeva writes:
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The fact that (this possibility) might quickly become another form of 
spiritualism turning its back on social problems, or else a form of 
repression ready to support all status quos, should not hide the 
radicalness of the process. This process could be sunmarised as an 
intériorisation of the founding separation of the socio-symbolic 
contract, as an introduction of its cutting edge into the very interior 
of evejr^g^dentity whether subjective, sexual, ideological or so
Kristeva is gesturing here towards an understanding the formation of the 
individual in respect of a notion which exceeds such a process and yet is 
itself in constant process. In proposing an understanding of the 
individual which she has attempted to free from the repressive stranglehold 
of totalising thinking, (which has often taken extreme measures to prevent 
what it sees as the anarchy of relativism), a return to the anomic 
individual is not necessarily implied. Instead, the singularity of 
disparate and diverse persons is given expression in a dimension at once 
fluid and responsible. It is fluid because it is dissected by 
heterogeneity, which opens it up to otherness, and responsible, because 
such otherness precedes and provokes the 'demand for a new ethics', as 
Kristeva writes.(29)
However, despite outlining this possibility, we are faced with more 
questions; is Kristeva's formulation of this notion too heavily reliant 
upon the narrative of psychoanalysis to allow its elaboration? Is this 
notion given prior to sexual difference (in which case it may be 
neutralised and undifferentiated once again)? If it is not prior to sexual 
difference then it is part of the formation of 'the divine' in the image of 
the hunan (whether this is male or female) and so may fall prey to the 
dangers of representational thinking, a mirror held up to the blind face of 
humanism. Can we negotiate this either/or question in terms which will
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successfully convey its radicality in a political sphere as well?
Tales of Love offers a provocation to those who characterise post-modernist 
thinkers as irresponsibly celebrating the crisis of metanarratives;
Kristeva agrees that this is an epoch which is in crisis, witness to the 
loss of amatory discourses in its abjection of the sacred and its 
consequential 'abolition of psychic space'. Kristeva does not restore the 
sacred in the name of uninterrogated humanist values, but she does identify 
a requirement for a language in which we can more adequately characterise 
sexual difference, and account for the need for idealisation and 
identification.
Wyschogrod's separation of aesthetic and moral discourses was based on a 
characterisation of the aesthetic as fundamentally irresponsible, in 
contrast to the 'seriousness' of moral discourse. This division cannot be 
upheld, since the kind of radical ethicality she is seeking cannot remain 
ensnared within orthodox canons of morality. The ethical codes premised on 
the refusal of embodied ecstasy and the censorship of aesthetic desire are 
merely duplicated again if Wyschogrod seeks to maintain this kind of 
absolute boundary.
Despite the dangers inherent in the conditions of representation, without 
some form of representation, this dimension of Otherness outlined by 
Kristeva runs the risk of being 'cut off' from the world, exiled from 
intruding at all. Therefore it must be constantly engaged, with the 
disappearing possibility of its own (non)presentation. The claim to 
domination over the notion of otherness and the relation from this 
otherness in the name of truth is also another mode of excluding the
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feminine. The characterisation and means of such relations are what is at 
stake in a feminist critique, an awareness of the process of 
'constitutional inhibition' which corresponds to the establishing of the 
socio-symbolic in western cultures, at the expense of 'rhythms, intonations 
and gestures which as yet have no significance'
The symbolic order functions in our monotheistic West by means of a 
system of kinship dependent upon transmission of the father's name and 
a rigorous prohibition of incest, and a system of verbal communication 
that is increasingly logical, simple, positive, and stripped of 
stylistic rhythmical 'poetic' ambiguities.'■31’
If this is coded only as the relations between men, there is no room for 
the inscription of the feminine as a relation, thereby writing out any 
equivalent possible representations of the mother/daughter relation. Such 
exclusion prompts Irigaray to 'rescue' this relation;'the least cultured 
space of our societies'.(32)
The 'bringing into existence of subjective relations between mothers and 
daughters' is, for Irigaray, a form of therapy against the dereliction of 
relations. She makes 'practical suggestions' as to how this could be 
symbolised, without specifically listing the particular forms this process 
would take. This would be to pre-empt the work to be done by women 
themselves. In addition, her sustained critique of psychoanalytic 
orthodoxy leads her to broaden the notion of therapy away from its 
exclusive domain. Her whole philosophy may be said to conduct a 
psychoanalysis of the bases of philosophical rationality, uncovering what 
is repressed in order to allow it to be spoken. Her work develops 'a cure 
of the cure' addressing the discipline of psychoanalysis too, as part of 
her strategic reconstruction of a history 'the same'.
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But despite this proviso, she does discuss the specificity of an analytic 
situation in 'The gesture in psychoanalysis'/33) where her aim is to 
consider the experiential dimensions of the situation as well as the 
emphasis on discourse (the speaking as well as what is said, gestures and 
movements as well as discourse). She is at pains to resist the construal 
of the analyst as all-powerful, and to avoid breaching the confidentiality 
of the analytic situation.
Kristeva also links this understanding of otherness and the space opened by 
unconditional and unconditioned otherness, to a form of therapy, bringing 
to the fore those relations which are 'lost' or suppressed.
Initially, this seems a suspect move into what is generally conceived of as 
a situation of power. As John Lechte^3^  makes clear, the analytic space 
is seen to be based on
- the divulgence and exposure of meanings most hidden even to the 
analysand, in the presence of an analyst who remains sovereign
- the analysand is observed, the analyst the observer; the analysand 
speaks, the analyst remains silent.
- the analyst is not open to question as the bearer of authority, the 
analysand seeks/desires approval or clarification.
The question remains as to the extent this picture of an analytic situation 
is the 'real' representation of the power relations which apparently drive 
its concerns. For Kristeva and Irigaray it remains fundamentally an
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encounter with the other in a dialogic setting. If it seems that the 
analyst is claiming a meta-status then we must be reminded of the Lacanian 
insights into language and identity once again; the analyst cannot have 
knowledge and objective observational powers in respect of the analysand if 
there is no position from which to assert this. Lacan writes: 'il n'y a 
pas de métalangage', but, as John Lechte writes, this could turn out to be 
'a final grab for mastery - hence the double-edged title of Kristeva's 
essay: 'll n'y a pas de maître à langage''(33^. Kristeva challenges the 
'masterful' position from which Lacan could make this assertion and the way 
this could lead to 'a mummification of transference'.(36) without this 
challenge, Kristeva asks, does analysis not 'run the risk of becoming set 
within the tyranny of idealisation, precisely? Of the Phallus or of the 
superego?'.(^7) Or, if non-meaning is already inherently there in the 
situation, neither the analyst nor the critics can legitimately claim to 
'know' what is the truth of the situation. But the loss of a transparent 
claim to truth would not necessarily lead to an abdication of 
responsibility, although perhaps a reconceptualisation of the whole notion 
of 'therapy'. Therapy in this respect would neither be a papering over of 
the cracks of identity in order to return a subject to a normative world, 
nor reconciliation to and affirmation of a fundamentally tragic 
fragmentation. This kind of therapy could become political in that it 
would involve an acknowledgement of the silence and non-mastery of the 
situation.
The analyst must be, for Kristeva, an ethical and enabling figure, whose 
concern is not to put back a 'proper' self, but to give the analysand a 
space to 'Help them... to speak and write themselves in unstable, open, 
undecidable spaces. A work in progress.'(38^
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Irigaray also considers the ethicality of this enabling process, when she 
writes; 'Clearly it is not a question of teaching the subject a new code or 
doctrine, for instance; rather, it is a question of helping him or her to, 
in Heidegger's words, build his or her house of language'
Kristeva echoes this metaphor: 'Are we not concerned with building their 
own proper space, a 'home' for contemporary Narcissi?
But dangers lie in construing the analytic situation as the sole site of 
healing and construction, since it becomes a very narrow base upon which to 
try and build a largescale change in the conditions and possibility of 
relations with others. Questions as to the access and availability of 
therapy, cost and institutionalisation are not solved by arguing for its 
value.
Another danger is in collapsing the unfigured, unrepresentable love of the 
pre-given into the figure of the analyst. Although this gives an 
incarnation of unconditional love into a sensible dimension, the givenness 
of listening without judging ('a simple listening, lovingly 
absentminded... there is a risk of seeing the analyst as God.
Kristeva tries to argue this is a stage in transference which allows for 
amatory discourse, opening and facilitating a psychic space.
The analyst thus temporarily stands in the place of the Great Other in 
as much as he [sic] is the metaphorical object of idealising 
identification. It is in knowing this and doing it that he creates the 
space of transference.
(But) the analyst must in addition let it be known...that he is a 
fleeting, failing or even abject subject of desire. He will then 
trigger within the psychic space his love has allowed to exist the 
tragicomedy of life drives and death drives...
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Kristeva indicates how her more complex theorisation of the relation to and 
from metaphoricityf the analyst and the pre-oedipal opens an articulation 
of the space of the semiotic, although she is cautious about this too 
(perhaps the poetic side of 'Stabat Mater' is meant to count as her own 
rendering of this p o s s i b i l i t y ) . B u t  she is clear that she sees her 
understanding of the Other as 'not a "pure signifier" but as the very space 
of metaphorical shifting; a condensation of semantic features as well as 
the non-representable drive heterogeneity that subtends them, goes beyond 
them, and slips away', as an access to more fluid possiblities than are 
presented by Lacan.
...by stressing the partiality of the 'unary feature' during idealising 
identification, Lacan located idealisation solely within the field of 
the signifier and desire; he clearly if not drastically separated it 
from narcissism as well as from drive heterogeneity and its archaic hold 
on the maternal vessel. To the contrary, by emphasizing the 
metaphoricity of the identifying idealisation movement we can attempt to 
restore to the analytic bond located there its complex dynamic..
In 'Women's Time' Kristeva writes;
I call 'religion' this phantasmic necessity on the part of speaking 
beings to provide themselves with a representation (animal, female,, 
male, parental etc.) in place of what constitutes them as such...'a-
In this echo of Feuerbach, 'perfecting' of representations constitutes the 
fertility of future h o r i z o n s . F e m i n i s t  theory, she goes on to say, is 
beginning to provide such resources. The fact that this is in danger of 
replicating a traditional religious attitude - unquestioning worship (this 
time of 'matriarchal' beliefs and godesses) - should not overshadow its 
radical novelty. Kristeva indicates this when she writes 'What discourse,
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if not that of religion, would be able to support this adventure which 
surfaces as a real possibility?'(^7)
In this sense, we are seeking a mode of identification which could be 
fulfilling rather than oppressive. However, it is clear that the kinds of 
'representation' that might be occasioned do not have the backing of any 
kind of guarantee as to the directions they might follow, nor is it clear 
the extent to which they are free of the determinations of 'what 
constitutes them as such', other than a notion of responsibility which must 
bear the weight of further investigation.
Similar problems are raised in the context of Irigaray's notion of the 
female imaginary providing the resources for a 'feminine' genre/genus; this 
notion begs the question of the conditions of representation once again. 
Irigaray can negotiate this problem by claiming she is collecting up 
residual conceptions of the feminine/matemal which are already present, or 
as Margaret Whitford characterises it, 'scraps or debris of what might be 
an alternative female imaginary (and) an anticipation of a more fully 
deployed female imaginary which might exist in creative intercourse with 
the male'.(48>
In Éthique delà différence sexuelle Irigaray plays upon the notion of 
enveloping body/enveloped body (envelopper/enveloppe ) to indicate how the 
closed nature of such a relation, which could stand for the relation 
between the sexes, is endangered by its very closure. The envelope is the 
identity we occupy as well as the relation demarcating identity, an 
activity of desire indicating an interval or spatialising in the action of 
enveloping or being enveloped. The process of such a relation has involved
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a defining placing of woman as mother, providing a 'sense of place for 
roan'»(49) thus functioning as a limit to a sense of identity. This has 
also meant
the mother woman remains the place separated from its 'own' place, a 
place deprived of a place of its own. She is, or ceaselessly becomes, 
the place of the other who cannot separate himself from it.^50'
As a means of negotiating this symbolisation as destruction, the 
threatening aspect of the woman who 'threatens by what she lacks, a 
'proper' place't another relation to the Other has to be sought, to 
negotiate 'a relationship with the divine, death, the social and cosmic 
order' which could function more productively.
Echoing Derrida and Levinas, she suggests we are living in an age when time 
must redeploy space, particularly when the subject has become 'the master 
of time' and 'femininity is experienced as a space that carries 
connotations of the depths of night (God being space and light)'.(^D
She also indicates the need for 'intervals' (or enter-vals) within the 
topographical envelopes of identity, spaces within space to interrupt the 
constitution of identity as homogenous and whole. Thus on one level the 
figuring of woman as mother (who also represents death, or dispersal, since 
she has no place,) is interrupted by the introduction of a third term for 
women which could function as a limit or horizon as a means to understand 
(their) identity. On another level the notion of interval interrupts the 
illusory notion of any full, exclusive or complementary consuimation 
between the sexes, since it heralds 'self-interruption', and so a constant 
residue or excess to the self and in its relations.
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Thus the notion of limit, defining oneself against the infinite which 
allows identity to take place, becomes a necessary innovation for women, to 
compensate for the lack of subjectivity which they have experienced. Yet 
the means by which identity has been achieved in the past has been 
precisely at the expense of a notion of woman construed as negative, 
silence, non-placed. Neither the infinite as a negatively feminine other 
nor the other as woman provide a space sufficient for women to 
conceptualise their own desire adequately, let alone a desire for more 
adequate conceptions of sexual difference. The spaces hitherto marked out 
for relations - ethical, sexual, divine have been ostensibly neutral, tut, 
Irigaray suggests, must now be exposed as organised according to the 
masculine and hence guaranteeing its continuity upon what it (necessarily) 
represses - alterity, diversity and femininity.
What poses problems in reality turns out to be justified by a logic that 
has alrea^^^1^ 1^  reality as such. Nothing escapes the circularity of
But if nothing can be sought outside this logic then where and how is 
Irigaray's attempt to articulate her impossible otherness to be located? 
Her response is to focus upon a heretical notion within the Lacanian 
orthodoxy; the notion of a specifically feminine jouissance. Feminine 
pleasure in any kind of specificity is heretical in this system for a 
nunber of reasons. According to the organisation of the economy of desire 
the precondition for the appearance of identity is the submission of 
heterogeneity and multiplicity, (hence symbolically also the feminine), to 
the structuring of the Symbolic; that is the cultural and social meanings
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of difference. Such meanings are not neutral but already aligned, in 
patriarchal cultures, to the masculine. Thus the feminine is not only 
suppressed or repressed but lies elsewhere to the circuit of symbolic 
meaning and linguistic conceptualisation. Any expression/conceptualisation 
of pleasure takes place according to the masculine, since it is this realm 
which characterised, described and prescribed what was to count as pleasure 
at all, relying on the outlawing of what it was not, to set up this 
definition.
If feminine pleasure is allowed to exist at all, it is, as Lacan implies in 
'God and the jouissance of (Hie) Woman',(53) on t^e level of silent, 
excessive experiential bliss, a transport of joy glimpsed on the transfixed 
face of Bernini's St. Theresa, but a pleasure 'beyond the phallus', so 
beyond 'knowing' in any communicative way.
Pleasure without pleasure; the shock of a remainder of "silent" body 
matter that shakes herJJYnthe interstices, but of which she remains 
ignorant. "Saving" nothing of this pleasure, after all, thus not 
enjoying
In Irigaray's figuration of 'La My s tér ique ', ( 55 ) t^e female mystics 
experience irradiation by the flames of the divine, the mildness which 
'slips away unseen from the eye of reason' into an experience of the soul's 
night, to be illuninated by a different blaze of light. The mystic is a 
'burning glass' which refracts the loss of subjectivity in a luninous 
fluidity.
Fire flares up in the inexhaustible abundance of her underground source 
and is matched with opposing but congruent flood which sweeps over the 
'!' in an excess of excess. Yet, burning, flowing along in a wild spate
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of waters, yearning for even greater abandon, the 'I' is empty still, 
ever more empty, opening wide in a rapture of soul.'5”'
The experience of the female mystic has been validated and envied; one 
historical moment when 'the poorest in science were the most eloquent, the 
richest in revelation' It represents the hysterical mimicry of
suffering and pleasure to excess - subjectivity 'undone by being 
overdone'.(58) This displacement and subversion at the very heart of the 
onto-theological is, for Irigaray, the way to a provisional articulation of 
language in the feminine, a feminine position to speak from.
The articulation of such a concept (feminine language) has to be undertaken 
with extreme care. It often appears to be akin to a mystical language of 
the female body; and in fact this is one aspect of Irigaray's work which 
has led to her being described as essentialist or biologically 
reductive. (59) seems as if she is outlining a specificity to the female 
body which duplicates the kind of binary sexual difference she has already 
been concerned to put into question. Is this a return to the 'essential' 
woman, mother - metaphysical and ideal?
Firstly, the description of Irigaray as a feminist of difference indicates 
her resistance to the kind of equality premised on sameness - the 
suppression of otherness between men and women as well as the suppression 
of difference within. Some notion of the specificity of the sexes is 
politically required. But it must be a specificity which is open to 
social, political and cultural forces as well, to allow for change in its 
inscription and signification.
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The experience of fluidity and the surrender of subjectivity in the 
tradition of the female mystics is, it must be stressed, a metaphorical and 
hypothetical language - the feminine body nominated as the model for this 
experience of otherness is already symbolic. It is an enactment of a 
complex fusion of meanings of difference. Irigaray is careful to write of 
a morphologic^understanding of the body, meaning the way the body is 
topographically and culturally understood, rather than the biological 
'reality' of its anatomy. By this means she hopes to provide a non- 
reductive sexualisation of the space of the body.
Lacan would deny the possibility of any representation of this specificity, 
since it would require a polarisation of libido, and/or suggest an 
alternative symbolic order, almost a parallel universe, which 
representationally must be disallowed. Irigaray's defiance is to 
historicise psychoanalytic terms, to point out the way its narrative still 
falls prey to the culture-specific manifestation of masculine organisation. 
Even at the moment psychoanalytic discourse seeks to explicate psychic 
space, it is subject to a censorship of its own terms of reference, 
symbolically ordering libido around, for Freud, biological difference, for 
Lacan, the phallus. Irigaray mimics this narrative, duplicating and 
displacing it, thereby indicating the extent to which the Symbolic is not 
an iimtobile edifice, but a process of fixing and unfixing meaning. She 
also indicates, through her mimicry, that she is not referring to a body 
reductively real, but a morphological space as an intersection of 
crosscurrents of meanings. Such a space conveys not only the reproduction 
of power relations and the most cliched symbolism of the body, but also the 
resistances which undermine and rework such symbolism.
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So, importantly, it is not so much an uncovering of a forgotten feminine 
pleasure which is required, but the exposure of a framework which could 
outlaw its very existence in the first place, thereby creating a space of 
possibility. So it is not making anew, but nor is it merely repeating the 
same. What this amounts to in her work is, in defiance to the monological 
and mono theological structuring of the Symbolic, a co-operation in the 
attempt to develop a 'feminine genre'•
For Irigaray this defiance deserves to be called ethical in that it throws 
into question the fundamental identity of any neutral ethical agent, as 
well as the drawing up of future ethical agendas.
The double vision of a feminist perspective is to acknowledge the extent to 
which a site of alterity makes possible an understanding of sexual 
difference - the notion of a feminist ethics is made possible by a notion 
of what ethics might be in the first place - but the refusal of neutrality 
intervenes to throw back questions as to the production and representation 
of that site. The nature of the subject is thrown into question, 
expressive and experiential and yet not epistemologically ordering in the 
same way. Similarly, notions of space and time are strategically 
reconceived in terms of equations with the 'otherness' of the 
f eminine/matemal.
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CHAPTHI POUR: PHENOMENOLOGY AND PBODDgNr
If the codification of the erotic, desire and physicality is equated with 
that which is dangerous to ethicality, which must be suppressed or 
excluded, (and by extension given a feminine symbolism), then it is also 
accorded a powerful negative aspect. As Plato, Kant and Descartes^) 
exemplify, in the increasingly intensified attempts to keep contingency and 
the vicissitudes of bodily experience under control, in the interests of 
producing ethical certainties, the suppressed force becomes more difficult 
to contain. Attempts to establish an ethical principle which is free of 
the contingencies of situated existence, but which can then be reapplied 
back into the space of such experience in order to judge it, already finds 
what it has attempted to contain as guilty in advance.
If ethics is constructed as the enemy of desire and the erotic, then it 
becomes the shape of repression, setting up for itself the very grounds and 
possibility of transgression of its most central precepts, in its own 
construction. Therefore, it is pre-disposed to failure as an ethical 
absolute, or else it is driven into increasingly violent efforts to 
maintain the boundaries of its sanctity.
But rather than tentatively reintroducing physicality and contingency back 
into the same framework of ethics, Kristeva and Irigaray take the risk of 
placing embodiment at the centre of this theorisation, risking the erosion 
of absolute ethical principles in order to emphasize sexual difference. So 
far, their theorisation has involved using psychoanalytic theories of 
sexual identity and the symbolic representation of the feminine. This
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version of embodijnent should be understood as stressing difference and 
divergence, implicitly calling more orthodox ethical theories into 
question. Instead of seeing identity as essence or essentialism, they 
theorise the subject as a complex site of desires and determinations. Such 
an understanding resists the prioritising of rationality as the capacity 
for ethical action. It also suggests a way of negotiating the splits 
between autonomy/heteronomy, masculine/feminine, flesh and spirit, the 
carnal and the divine, divisions which are detrimental to women, placed as 
they are on the 'wrong' side of the divisions. Such divisions characterise 
the sacrificial nature of the socio-symbolic order. The ethics which 
Kristeva and Irigaray suggest encompasses a critique of such determinations 
and attempts to think 'otherwise' to this conceptual schema. The ethics 
they propose will be an ethics of love or of the passions, characterised by 
Irigaray as 'carnal ethics'.
In order to place such theories more certainly in the context of the 
discipline of philosophy, it is now my intention to show the connections 
between this feminist perspective and the phenomenological theories of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emnanuel Levinas.^) The purpose of this 
connection is to show the convergence of a re-thinking of embodied 
existence and its possibilities for ethical theory.
Both phenomenology (as it is interpreted by Merleau-Ponty and Levinas) and 
psychoanalytic theory concern themselves with an intentional analysis of 
desire, which is to say both recognise sexuality and the active 
constitution of a life world to be mutually implicated.
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What both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas bring to the fore in the intentional 
relation between consciousness and objects or others in the world in 
Husserlian phenomenology (■*) is the implied eroticisation of this movement 
of desire. If the phenomenological possibility of describing lived 
experience in various regional ontologies is pursued, we may develop a 
constant recollection of the situated and sexualised signification of 
existence. But further, this possibility of re-description is not a 
reductive stabilisation of the erotic into a physicalist analysis, or a 
prelude to a purified transcendental consciousness, but rather presents the 
various meanings of the lived body as a constantly regenerative 
possibility. Such meanings may be activated in different ways but are kept 
open as a process of signification. Intentional!ty as desire is dynamic, 
refusing the closure of objectification and resisting the fixture of the 
other as object.
In addition, the impingement of the erotic acts as an interruption to pure 
consciousness and self-presence. The erotic insists on a return to the 
situated and contingent, the carnal dimension.
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ^  Lacan makes several 
references to the impact of Merleau-Ponty's post humously published 
manuscript, The Visible and the Invisible^ )  on his own thinking. This 
work is significant in drawing Lacan's attention more specifically to the 
topology of the body, the boundaries of 'inner and outer' and the modes of 
understanding this spatiality as it is experienced in the process of 
existence. Such a shift is a development of his implicit and explicit 
criticisms of the dominance of the visual in psychoanalysis. Lacan had 
already developed this critique in response to Freud, in his shift to the
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signifying process which allowed the recognition of sexual difference to 
occur. The refusal of this 'visibility' is accompanied by a refusal of an 
underlying 'biological' account of drives. Lacan suggests instead that 
meanings are fundamentally obscured by the ambiguities of the signifying 
process, thereby denying a closure of the body as object of desire and as 
site of meanings. This is also a resistance to a causal account of 
meaning.
Lacan finds in Merleau-Ponty a modification of the phenomenological 
framework which concurs with his own 'freeing' of desire from these 
determinations, but which does not relinquish the attention given to the 
form and topologies of the sexualised body and intersubjective space.
...of course, I have my ontology - why not- like everyone else, 
however naive or elaborate it may be. But certainly, what I try to 
outline in my discourse - which, although it interprets that of Freud, 
is nevertheless centred essentially on the particularity of the 
experience it describes - makes no claim to cover the whole of that 
experience.. .the maintenance of this aspect of Freudianism, which is 
often described as naturalism, seems to be indispensable, for it is one 
of the few attempts, if not the only one, to embody psychical reality 
without substantifying it.'®-'
This 'embodiment of psychical reality without substantifying it', is then 
comparable to Merleau-Ponty's revaluation of form for Lacan. '(It) brings 
us back, then to the regulation of form, which is governed, not only by the 
subject's eye, but by his expectations, his movement, his muscular and 
visceral emotion - in short, his constitutive presence, directed in what is 
called his total intentionality'.(7)
But intentionality is already intersected by the enigmatic conditions of 
perception, the'strange contingency'^®^ which for Lacan is the lack or
split manifest at the heart of the scopophilic field. This disruptive 
effect maintains a disturbance in the signification of otherness as well as 
in the structure of perception.
Phenomenology provides resources for a re-description of the lived 
experience of the body, a means of examining not only the erotic structures 
and significations of situated existence, but, more specifically for this 
study, the implications of sexual difference in this context. What are the 
conditions under which an other becomes constituted not only as an object 
of erotic fixation through the specular and optical perception, but is 
recognised as sexually differing? Is it possible that such recognition 
could be ethical? Is such recognition automatically bound by the 
structures of perception, an epistemological conquest of the other? 
Although this question is taken up in the work of Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas, this chapter will explore the initial implications of sexual 
difference in this context.
A 'phenomenology of carnality'^ appears in both Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas, but it is not the possibility of mastery of the visible/erotic 
realm which interests the two thinkers, but the way that such carnality 
interrupts and undoes any claim to mastery, in its equivocation.
Merleau-Ponty's concern is to re-explore the familiar yet mysterious 
enigma of reflection and intuition, if possible, in a way that does not 
prejudge the issues. Thus his phenomenology attempts to think in a way 
which can negotiate the categories of understanding and perception that 
have been philosophically established, so lending new resources to the 
philosophical project. Like Sartre, he is still concerned with the
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vicissitudes of the lived experience of the individual, but his concern 
with carnal embodiment as a disruptive force and his increasing 
disaffection with the limitations of phenomenology mark out his work as 
having significant implications in a feminist context. As Simone de 
Beauvoir recognises in quoting Merleau- Ponty in The Second Sex;
♦
1. The lived body is a field of possibilities and «not merely a basis for 
transcendence which will be superseded in the process.
2. The determinations of the visual metaphor can be shown to have 
historical assunptions underlying them which a) undermine ontological 
claims for their supreme validity; and b) raise questions about the 
sexualised nature of bodies and the way in which they are perceived.
De Beauvoir quotes from The Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty 
writes: 'So I am my body, in so far, at least, as my experience goes, and 
conversely my body is like a life model, or like a preliminary sketch, for 
my total b e i n g I n  the context of de Beauvoir's project, Merleau- 
Ponty emphasizes the ambiguity of existence: to be embodied, but in such a 
way that embodiment is constantly being revised or reworked.
Merleau-Ponty challenges the basing of the phenomenological method in 
perception and intentionality by questioning the presentation of the 
visible to consciousness; objects are not presented as scientific and/or 
empirical data, nor is the observer in a privileged role as interpreter. 
Instead, he suggests meaning emerges in an 'ambiguous corporeal knot'.(^) 
In this way the meanings of the body are not wholly free, in that we
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inherit certain sets of historically constituted meanings, but these do not 
bind us absolutely as they are available for re-interpretation. We are not 
wholly determined by the material body, nor by cultural stereotypes.
In The Visible and the Invisible we can begin to see the sketched 
implications for this reading of phenomenology in the context of 
intersubjective relations. The subject/object distinction may be 
retained, but it is traversed in a deeper, 'hypercritical' fashion, with 
morphological, dimensional and graphical axes, across the lived experience 
of the body. Rather than coming to rest on a side of any divide, Merleau- 
Ponty is acknowledging distinctions and differences, but attempting to 
develop the conceptual fluidity with which to unsettle them.
If we could rediscover within the exercise of seeing and speaking some 
of the living references that assign them such a destiny in a language, 
perhaps they would teach us how to form our new instruments, and first 
of all to understand our research, our interrogation, themselves.'12'
In his attempt to return to the fundamentals of philosophical methodology, 
he problematises the visible and the seer by suggesting a world in which 
vision is intersected by the constant refusal of horizons receding into 
obscurity, where the possibility of recognition is clouded in a field of 
uncertainty. In this way he puts into question a Kantian understanding of 
the organising force of the categories - no longer prioritised as the 
crucible of sense data, the seer does not construct or constitute the world 
of phenomena in recollection, but is impinged upon by depths of what 
Merleau-Ponty calls 'wild being'. This reassessment does not, however, 
lead to a position of negativity for the seer, as in Sartre,which would be
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to accord plenitude to the objects of perception (the distinction between 
the for-itself and the in-itself). Merleau-Ponty argues we cannot have 
access to this plenitude either - phenomena are obscured from us, 
dissected by 'the invisible' which exceeds our every attempt to cognise 
them. This is what places the seer in the world, not above it or in a 
relation of absolute negation.
This reconceptualising of space is matched by that of time - he negotiates 
any essential immediacy of the experiential moment by indicating this 
moment too is invaded and intersected. 'What is present harbours an 
immense latent content of the past, the future and the elsewhere, which it 
announces and which it conceals'.(*3)
As Levinas comments on Merleau-Ponty:
As Merleau-Ponty has shown, the I that constitutes the world comes up 
against a sphere in which it is by its very flesh implicated; it is 
implicated in what it would otherwise have constituted and is so 
implicated in the world. But it is present in the world as it is 
present in its own body, an intimate incarnation which no longer purely 
and simply displays the exteriority of an object. 'A*-'
In situating existence in relations of equivocation, Merleau-Ponty 
describes the experience of the body as 'a corporeal knot of being'.
The articulation of this experience will, he hopes, negotiate a series of 
dichotomies; bodily/mental, inner/outer and presence/absence. The world is 
lived as this intertwining, the chiasm is the figure of the DNA structure 
which separates differences at the same time as interrelating them, the 
whole being maintained dynamically.
So despite the fact that most of Merleau-Ponty's work is concerned with
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developing an ontology, he moves away from notions of otherness caught in 
the solipsistic domain of subjectivity, and away from the standpoint of a 
rational, selfknowing subject. He also moves from characterising otherness 
simply in terms of epistemological adequacy; where previously the other 
could be characterised as a problem of presentation and access to an 
other's interior, Merleau-Ponty places the other in a situated and embodied 
domain, which includes the aesthetic, moral and religious practices bearing 
on that domain.
The body is no longer understood as mere matter in a material world, but 
rather a matrix of expressive gestures, sexuality and other significant 
meanings. The body is seen as a site of expressivity which can engender 
more significations through variations of posture, position and meaning.
In this sense, as Merleau-Ponty writes, 'it is open and incarnate 
expression'.
The possibilities of this 'incarnate expression' are characterised by 
Merleau-Ponty as 'the flesh'; a dimensional field or space', 'an element, 
general thing', 'an incarnate principle of a style of being'.
Merleau-Ponty thus gives an account of the body as open yet corporeal 
sensibility, an account of embodiment which strives to maintain the 
distinctiveness of an existent, but prevents it being resolved into a 
duality by stressing fluidity and depth - an adhesion across divisions 
according to the general element of the flesh. He illustrates this by the 
example of two hands.
...when my right hand touches my left hand...the touching subject 
passes over to the rank of the touched, descends into the things, such 
that the touch, is formed in the midst of the world and as it were in 
the things.
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This relation is one which Merleau-Ponty further characterises as 
'reversibility',^^ a criss-crossing which is the interrelation of two as 
unfamiliar, even as their relation of connection is being articulated. The 
process by which such a relation is articulated is a signification of 
bodily space. There is 'already' a language of the body which is a mode of 
signification, this time of movements and gestures, as well as speech and 
writing. But this is meaning understood as on the borders of sense, those 
which emerge and fade away, which include silence, absence and shadow, the 
form, touch and scent of a body. This is a deepening of the dimensions of 
meaning, giving it an opaque and uncertain aspect.(20)
The signification of the body does not point to an underlying biological 
body though, upon which signification is imposed or elaborated. Rather, 
Merleau-Ponty (and also Levinas) suggest that the body emerges through and 
with the possibilities of signification.(21)
Two points can be noted from this suggestion.
1. Meaning is not seen as a derivative and secondary representation of 
experience, but arising simultaneously in the nexus of body and 
language.
2. The transmission and exchange of meanings, including those of the body, 
take place in an intersubjective realm.
The signification of the body is seen as a textured and dimensional range 
of depths and possible styles, which can be dramatised and enacted in many
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different possible ways. For Merleau-Ponty this is made possible by the 
historically sedimented discourses of the body. The previous meanings 
which have already been established in the context of the body will shape 
to a certain extent the emergent sense of the lived body. Experience is 
then 'a sort of archeology structured by a language already spoken'.(22)
The pre-established ranges of experiences and styles we inherit allow such 
meanings to be articulated, but also allow them to be re-worked. Merleau- 
Ponty writes; 'Sedimentations of language weave past and future and my 
actual words are rooted in the already said*. The task is then '...to 
restore a power to signify, a birth of meaning or "wild meaning", an 
expression of experience by experience, which in particular clarifies the 
special domain of language' .(23)
However, certain problems arise in articulating relations in terms of 
'reversibility'. This notion is in danger of repeating a certain kind of 
duality or symmetry implied in reversal. It appears to indicate a balance 
or dialectic of two terms, which is reinforced by Merleau-Ponty's 
characterisation of this move as two hands touching each other, two maps, 
two halves, two leaves of being.(24) In The Visible and the Invisible, 
reversibility is a development of the relations between subject and object 
in The Phenomenology of Perception, looking at its consequences for 
ontology, and seeking to establish the connectivity as well as the 
divergence of seer and the visible. Reversibility in this context 
elaborates the uncertainty inherent in the relation, allowing both 
differentiation and divergence; the separation of the seer from the other's 
body, but also the means by which they fuse. Merleau-Ponty expands his 
notion of the flesh as fundamentally ambiguous; the self is already divided
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in being in language, in the world and in history because it inherits 
certain conceptions from elsewhere. It is marked by non-coincidence; even 
the two hands are figuring otherness when they touch each other as both 
mastery and passivity, toucher and touched.
The first problem concerns the extent to which Merleau-Ponty is still in 
the sway of a predominantly visual mode of perception as explicated within 
phenomenology. He evidently distanced his work from that of Husserl but 
remains committed to the framework of perception - in the sense that he 
prioritises the body as fundamental in his theory perhaps this commitment 
is understandable. But it also raises questions about 'the limits of 
phenomenology' too; how far is this framework able to provide the kind of 
radicality of otherness which can rupture the structures of seeing, without 
splitting apart itself?
As a philosophical framing, the dominance of the visual mode is not only a 
route back to, if not attempts at mastery and control of the visible 
through a totalising move of perception, then to a connectivity established 
in the anonymity of equal symmetries of vision.
The second issue concerns the extent to which reversibility is a relation 
which is equivalent when operating to and from objects and to and from 
other persons. Is the enigma of otherness just an extension from the 
ambiguity of objects and their dimensions of alterity, or do other persons 
present a wholly different kind of ambiguity? Merleau-Ponty gestures 
towards the problem, but it seems in danger of being swallowed up by the 
'intercorporeal' which gives a sense of a shared comprehension subtended in 
the 'primordial property which belongs to the flesh,.. .being an individual,
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being also a dimension and a universal'. (25) if otherness is contained in 
this horizon, it seems to allow a levelling of difference into universality 
and the anonymity of 'wild being', a reciprocal relation when it is 
situated in the realm of intersubjectivity.
Levinas' two essays on Merleau-Ponty, 'Intersubjectivity' and 
'Sensibility' ,(26) follow a similar pattern; they outline with the
text the moments of agreement before broaching the fundamental divergences 
of the two thinkers. Levinas sees Merleau-Ponty' s theorisation of 
otherness as still based in knowledge, albeit an unconventional conception 
of otherness which fights off a thematisation of the other. But for 
Levinas Merleau-Ponty sustains a positive connection with the 'knowability' 
of the other in connecting him or her to a shared horizon of being.
But Levinas begins by noting that Merleau-Ponty' s notion of embodiment does 
present a challenge to the domination of consciousness, since the flesh is 
not a presentation of the body anterior to consciousness, but the refusal 
of this ordering of knowledge and consciousness. The notion that a 
transcendental reduction can become 'purely' theoretical occludes the 
irreducibility of flesh as material and yet simultaneously signifying. 
Levinas writes:
Consciousness is in a situation of having already called upon what it is 
only supposed to constitute. This is a curious anachronism! This 
anachronism is precisely incarnation, in which the belonging of spirit 
to flesh, which, as body, it constitutes, is not reducible,to the 
noetic-noematic correlation, to the purely theoretical.''
For both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, the irreducibility of this 'older' 
synthesis, the 'original incarnation of thought*, the flesh, is a mode of
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experience in situ and never wholly intentional. Instead it is movement, 
expressive, a sensibility. Levinas describes this as Merleau-Ponty's 
uncovering of the 'unthought' (impense) in Husserl's thought, the point 
where 'the felt' is also 'a feeling'.(^8) Such a mode of experience is not 
then manifest as a merely sensate formulation of experience in congress 
with sensed objects in the world. Rather, the carnal is equivocal and 
uncertain - the 'double touching' which accounts for a certain openness to 
the phenomena of touching while being touched.
But, as Levinas points out, this move also corresponds to anti-hunanist 
thinking which manifests a certain indifference to 'the drama of persons' 
(and hence for him a erasure of the possibility of ethics).(29) jn t^ e 
flight from the hunan as centring subject, the danger is a fall into 
anonymity. This is particularly the case when Merleau-Ponty locates the 
emergence of meaning in an intersubjective realm where the other and 
subjectivity surface in 'one single intercorporeality'.(30)
So despite theorising a 'pre-theoretical' realm which supplies a challenge 
to the ego of intentionality, this realm is then subs lined into the notion 
of a community of shared, intersubjective relations, a comnunity in some 
agreement about the dimensions of 'feeling' and 'felt'. Such a notion 
allows Merleau-Ponty to keep a certain historical dimension to his theory 
(the body is 'an historical idea'),(31) but in so doing he joins back up 
with the problems of historical analysis and 'mutual knowledge' in the 
domain of sociality. For Levinas, this sharing of intercorporeality leads 
Merleau-Ponty back to a constituting of the other through knowledge, even 
if it is a 'deficient knowledge'.(32) Levinas proposes his own account of 
otherness as radical separation, gesturing to an otherness more
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'primordial' than a hypothetical intercorporeality. It is this otherness 
which provides the very precondition for ethicality for Levinas.
It is a possibility that does not borrow its excellence from the dignity 
of the One, the sociality of which may already seem compromised in 
multiplicity, but a possibility that is rather like a completely new 
modality that certifies, in and by the hunan, its own specific goodness. 
In its excellence, which is probably that of love, it is no longer 
simply the laws of being and of being's unity that rule. The 
spirt t u ^ ^ y  of the social signifies precisely an 'otherwise than
So for Levinas, an entirely different modality is suggested by the meeting 
with an other, which cannot be subsumed under a more general category, 
whether this is 'being' or 'the flesh'. This modality of meaning allows 
Levinas to say there is something irreducible about the difference of 
others, about the proximity of the neighbour, and that such irreducibility 
is ethical in and of itself. This ethicality is announced in the sensate 
experience for Levinas, not antecedently imposed upon it.
The handshake is not simply the notification of agreement, but prior to 
that notification the extraordinary event itself of peace, just as the 
caress, awakening to.the touch, is already affection not information 
about the sentiment.^'
The receptivity Levinas entwines with this notion of sensibility indicates 
this is not an 'intercorporeal' realm of exchange, but an asymmetrical 
relation, which, in making the self passive, disallows the kind of mutual 
knowledge Levinas finds as a supposition in Merleau Ponty. While 
affectivity is ambiguously situated in and through contact for Levinas, it
-99-
is cut across by force of otherness. In this way, he thinks a more radical 
and hence more ethical notion of the other is broached.
Should we say a waiting for God in this anticipatory feeling of the 
absolutely other? Not at first or imnediately a call for help, but a 
pathway leading to the other, leading to the human. In the touch 
itself, the possibility of a helping hand. Or the possibility of the 
caress, the kiss, the erotic.
Levinas is arguing for a 'prior' responsibility which arises in the context 
of irreducible difference. He argues this because he sees certain dangers 
in the duality of the subject/object division, the model of perception as 
visibility, and the universal aspect of the flesh as a 'general element'. 
Levinas argues Merleau Ponty is unable to articulate a theory of ethics 
because he remains conmitted to perception and to the horizon of history - 
that the flesh leads back to the embodied historical body which constrains 
it in a dialectic of reciprocity. For Levinas, this commitment fails to 
break with the thinking of being as neutral.
Instead, Levinas seeks a mode of otherness which could fracture this 
relation, which could have a more profoundly disturbing effect.
He indicates the need in Merleau-Ponty's work for a notion of 'the third', 
a force which could fracture the dualisms and totalising moves threatening 
the borders of his work. The danger of relativism in Merleau-Ponty is for 
Levinas a threat to ethicality. Levinas points to a mode of otherness 
which would have the power even to disturb the limits of historical 
analysis and its totalising process. However, in later chapters it will be 
necessary to question whether this means that Levinas seeks a mode of 
revelation which 'prejudges' the way in which phenomenological
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interpretations of the body might be fulfilled. If Levinas is unwilling to 
relinquish this process to the vicissitudes of history, does his thought 
deny the possibilities which a feminist perspective might wish to raise?
Is there a way to articulate a feminist perspective in the light of 
Levinas' thought?
The resources of phenomenology have been utilised by feminist theorists in 
the past and within recent Anglo-American feminist writing; most notably to 
argue for the experiential status of the body and the embodied nature of 
existence, as we have seen in the work of Simone de B e a u v o i r . ^ )
The perception of the body's dimensions and topography are seen to have 
implications for the structuring of experience, which should be taken into 
account in assessing that experience. There are two main implications for 
feminist thought. Firstly, sexuality is intertwined and activated as a 
dimension of one's existence. From a feminist perspective, the experience 
of the body becomes a field of possibilities rather than a fixed sexual 
category, and therefore (hypothetically) allows for the reconstruction of 
identities along less rigid lines. Secondly, it makes it possible to argue 
for the validity of women's experience in the context of such 
possibilities.
However, phenomenology's preoccupation with the visual and the visible in 
notions such as intentionality, description and categories of experience 
mean it is destined to work dangerously with the replication of certain 
philosophical moves identified as problematic by feminist theory. Even the 
re-exploration of the relations of consciousness and the world of 
experience may unwittingly fall into aligning the perspective of the seer 
with the masculine and the visible world of 'objects' and 'things' with the
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feminine.
A feminist appropriation of phenomenology may duplicate the categories of 
subject/object in this context, this time arging that women should have 
access to the role of 'observer' too. This reproduction of the dominant 
imagery of specularity/speculation, the reflexive metaphors of mirrors and 
light which have shaped certain philosophical enquiries, may either leave 
certain essentialist notions of subjectivity uninterrogated, or fail to 
explain how the conditions which have positioned woman as other are to 
addressed, such that any projected change in the conditions of 
representation could take place.
In two feminist essays on Merleau-Ponty included in the anthology The 
Thinking Muse^?) for example, certain problems for a feminist perspective 
in the context of phenomenology become apparent.
Iris Marion Young's essay 'Throwing Like a Girl; a phenomenology of 
feminine body comportment, motility and spatiality' is based on the 
perceived difference 'between "masculine" and "feminine" comportment and 
movement' .(^8) She argues that if women seem less 'open' in their 
movements it is due to their historical situatedness which inhibits them 
from utilising bodily space to its full potential. The extent to which a 
"feminine" motility corresponds to Merleau-Ponty's ambivalent 
characterisation of bodily consciousness, 'inhibited intentionality' and 
'discontinuous unity with its surroundings'^9  ^is noted. However, she 
seems to be arguing for a positive validation of feminine motility in its 
own right without questioning her categories of 'openness', the extent to 
which observation of difference is a reliable methodological approach in 
itself, and she seems to assune we might have an unmediated and true
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perception of bodily consciousness, direct access to motility and 
comportment. Thus she reinforces the notion of sexual difference as 
visibly perceived, and different characteristics of the sexes as 
empirically observable. In assuming we have direct access to perceptions 
of consciousness about the body, she implies an essentialist notion of 
subjectivity.
Judith Butler's essay 'Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description, a 
feminist critique of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception' is more 
sophisticated on the question of identity. She argues that all sexuality 
is socially/historically constructed, a result of certain sedimented forms 
of difference which are both conditioned into and appropriated by an 
individual. Thus she agrees with Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of 
Perception when he writes that 'the body is an historical idea' and that 
sexuality is enacted in and through existence. She believes that existence 
is a process, and the extent to which this process can be intervened upon 
depends upon one manipulating and parodying the inheritance of received 
notions of sexuality, and so opening up the rigid categories of difference 
into a multiplicity of differences and positions. Hence she takes up the 
notions of intentionality and motility to stress the constant regeneration 
and renegotiation of given terms, playing at the margins of what is coded 
as natural to produce creative variations. She is critical of Merleau- 
Ponty for reduplicating the determination of woman as other.
But again, there is an implication that a rational and self-conscious 
subject can knowingly manipulate cultural constructions. She does not 
accede to any notion of the unconscious in ideological constructions; but, 
as I have argued, it is not clear to what extent we have unmediated access
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to the forms of cultural symbolism encountered. Further, how can we judge 
objectively which culturally symbolic forms are restrictive and which 
liberating, if ideology has such a determining effect on our perception as 
to throw into doubt this objectivity? Finally, her position seems to be a 
form of political individualism since all negotiation takes place on an 
individual and relativistic level, with no attempt to generalise different 
forms of renegotiation, and yet she seems to have an implicit feminist 
programme which rests on women 'recognising' open forms of sexual symbolism 
as being preferable to more stereotypical ones.
So far, we have seen that some of the significance of Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas' work for a feminist perspective in philosophy lies in the 
importance attached to sexuality and the body, topics which, as Sartre 
agreed, had been neglected philosophically. The introduction of the sexual 
dimensions of bodily existence into the philosophical arena is the 
beginning of questions of sexual difference taken up by feminist theory.
As this work maps on to contemporary philosophical enquiries regarding ways 
of theorising otherness which are other than colonising or intentionally 
constituting, it may provide a significant opening of the thinking of 
difference. In the next two chapters, I will examine the work of Merleau- 
Ponty and Levinas concerning the phenomenology of the body in more detail, 
to see if these possibilities may be realised. This examination will be 
conducted in the context of Irigaray's reading of phenomenology for 
feminist philosophy.
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CHAPTER FIVE; 'THE INVISIBLE OF THE FLESH* :PHHOCNObOGY AND THE FEMININE
In the previous chapter I outlined some of the implications of the 
phenomenological situating of lived experience in the work of Merleau-Ponty 
and Levinas. Embodiment is the key issue which will now be pursued in more 
detail, in the light of the erotic dimension included in the structures of 
perception and experience. The re-working of the subject/object relation 
in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty has opened possibilities for reconceptualising 
topologies of the body and allowing differences to be recognised. However, 
certain questions remain for the feminist perspective I am developing in 
this study. To what extent does the phenomenological framework replicate 
the structures it is supposed to unsettle? Is the feminist re-thinking of 
sexual difference possible in this context?
This chapter will examine Irigaray's detailed reading of Merleau-Ponty's 
essay in The Visible and the Invisible, 'The Intertwining - the Chiasm'.
By focussing on this encounter, some of the positive implications of 
phenomenology for feminist theory will emerge, as well as critical points 
of departure.
Merleau-Ponty's essay begins as follows:
If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be 
reflection or coincidence it prejudges what it will find, then once 
again it must recommence everything, reject the instruments reflection 
and intuition had provided themselves and install itself in a locus 
where they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have not 
yet been "worked over", that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both 
"subject" and "object", both existence.and essence, and hence give 
philosophy resources to redefine them.'1'
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Opening her reading of this piece in Éthique de la différence sexuelle with 
this quote, Irigaray comments;
My reading and interpretation of the history of philosophy accords with 
that of Merleau-Ponty. It is necessary to return to a pre-discursive, 
experiential moment; everything recaptured, all the categories of 
apprehension of things, of the world, and of the subject/object 
division, all recaptured and arrested at "a mystery as familiar as it 
is unexplained, of a light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its 
source in obscurity"...This operation is absolutely necessary for making 
the feminine-maternal appear in language. (2)
As in Derrida's work, Irigaray's method is to work sympathetically with a 
text in order to tease out some of the hidden implications of the text.
This is indicated in the title of her piece, where 'The invisible of the 
flesh' refers to her main criticisms of Merleau-Ponty. She will argue 
there is ultimately an 'invisible' sublimation of the flesh to the visual 
and to signification at the end of his piece, at the expense of the 
feminine. The feminine becomes the invisible which 'supports' the seer in 
the world of phenomena. Irigaray wants women to be allowed to be the seer 
too, and not just positioned in the realm of the visible. But this will 
involve an opening, interruption or 'interval' in the understanding of 
such dualities. It is not enough to argue for the sexuate difference of 
seers, but also for a re-assessment of the whole notion of division and 
difference itself. And it is this notion, Irigaray argues, which is not 
broached sufficiently in Merleau-Ponty's essay.
There is a certain elaboration of the carnal. But always in solipsistic 
relation with the maternal. There is no trace of the carnal idea of the 
other woman, nor the sublimation of the flesh with the other.
The phenomenology of the flesh which tempts Merleau-Ponty is without 
question(s); without space or interval of free questioning between two. 
Without other or Other, keeping the world open. Without genesis,
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without grace. Man become god, working and playing with the world 
until it is worn down?
Therefore, Merleau-Ponty will provide us with a means to approach questions 
of ethics and sexual difference but also indicate important issues in the 
consideration of otherness which need to be examined in further detail.
We can divide Irigaray's concerns in her essay into four areas, although 
they are thematically interwoven in the text.
1. What allows the visible/invisible distinction to take place? A certain 
'matemal/feminine' fluidity seems to underlie these distinctions, 
which is suppressed as an 'unconscious', although it can be identified 
through its workings. However, there is a danger in celebrating this 
notion too, as it corresponds to the equation of matemal/feminine “ 
Nature.
2. Is touch a strategic way of undermining the dominance of the visual 
paradigm? As part of rethinking the divisions and distinctions of the 
perceptual framework, Irigaray suggests that touch could be employed 
to question specular obsessions. ^
3. Irigaray considers the association of the divine with the invisible.
If the divine is characterised as invisible, it becomes entrapped in 
the dichotomy of visible/invisible. As part of the reconsidering of 
such divisions, could the divine be associated with touch as a radical 
conception of the divine, which will give access to a mode of
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representation for the feminine, a 'divine' for women as well as 
fracturing the divide of spirit/flesh (transcendent/cama 1) ? ( ^ )
4. Irigaray also considers the relation of the networks of signification 
in the context of the above themes. This question is crucial if a 
feminist re-working of the philosophical framework is to take place.
If the socio-symbolic system has already invested divisions, objects 
and experience with prior meanings, to what extent is any intervention 
possible?^)
In the first instance, Irigaray is reading Merleau-Ponty strategically as 
part of that philosophical tradition which does not - cannot - acknowledge 
the feminine/matemal as its hidden assumption. Perhaps what makes the 
visible possible at all is that 'invisible of the invisible', the 'intimate 
pre-natal life' of fluidity, coded as the space beyond the visible and the 
speakable, the mother who must be unspoken and yet provides the grounding 
for a masculine subjectivity? Here also we can note certain 
correspondences with Kristeva's semiotic maternal heterogeneity, only 
discernible through its effects. Irigaray indicates that the extreme 
proximity of the intertwining of mother/child appears to be superseded in 
Merleau-Ponty by the exteriorising of objects of attention, as they are 
made distant and unfamiliar. The movement of extériorisation is necessary 
for some form of recognition to take place. Although Merleau-Ponty 
problématisés this relation, Irigaray argues he is still bound by this 
structure.
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If it was not a question of the visible, it would be possible to think 
that Merleau-Ponty was making an allusion to the intra-uterine life.
He employs "images" of the sea and the sand (la mer et la plage). Of 
immersion and emergence? And he speaks of. the risk of the 
disappearance of seeing and the visible.^8'
However, the counter objection to Irigaray's criticism is the danger of 
reassigning women an equivocal relation with the natural realm, the 
'invisible' of culture. If women become wholly other, they cannot see for 
themselves. 'If the mother, or the woman, only has a perspective on the 
world from the maternal function, she sees nothing. Apart from that zero 
of the infant's nocturnal sojourn?'. So part of Irigaray's project will 
be to bring forth the possibility of the matemal/feminine from its 
'unspeakable' association with nature. In revaluing this 'pre-discursive, 
experiential moment', the possibility of women speaking from their own 
symbolism might appear, 'making the feminine/matemal appear in language'. 
In other words, if women could work from a genre (genus/gender) of their 
own, they might negotiate being positioned as other in the visible realm 
against the masculine seer on the side of culture. (10)
In the second concern, Irigaray takes up some of the possibilities 
suggested by Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh, raising the possibility 
that touch could be a 'prior' experiential moment to seeing, and therefore 
act as a critical 'turning back' upon the dominant imagery of Western 
philosophy. Touch becomes that which is 'too close for discrimination, 
distanciation, mastery', suggesting the potential for a 'carnal ethics'.
As an apparent 'supplement' to sight, touch may seem secondary - do we need 
to see what we touch before we can fully recognise it? Again, Irigaray 
evokes the symbolically feminine proximity of the intra-uterine touch to
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question this notion. She agrees with Merleau-Ponty that the 'double and 
crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in the 
visible' (H) interrupts the scopophilic gaze.
Merleau-Ponty writes of the strangeness of one's hand touching the other 
hand in the act of touching, and compares it to two halves of an orange, or 
the criss-crossing of two maps.
...when my right hand touches my left hand when it is palpating the 
things, where the 'touching subject' passes over to the rank of the 
touched, descends into the things, such that the,touch is formed in the 
midst of the world and as it were in the things.
The beginnings of an interrelationship of two which yet preserves their 
unfamiliarity articulates a different understanding of this 
interrelationship. It is both an adherence to, but also a loss of mastery 
over, that which is constituted as other. However, as Irigaray points out, 
Merleau-Ponty falls back into a dualistic notion of inner and outer which, 
as it makes one commensurate with the other, fails to interrupt itself. 
Curiously, he refers to the two lips of the body, as its inner sense and 
its outer openness.
The body unites us directly with things through its own ontogenesis; by 
welding to one another the two outlines of which it is made, its two 
lips; the sensible mass it is and the mass of the sensible wherein it is 
b o m  by segregation and upon which, as seer, it remains open.'1-3'
In this context Irigaray refers to her own notion of 'auto-affection of the 
two lips',(1^) silently and intimately together. For her, the two lips 
refer to a specificity of the symbolically feminine which precisely 
unsettles this distinction of inner and outer, and refers symbolically to 
the intervals, spacings and divisions of the 'inner' self. Morphologically
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'neither one nor the other' (and undecidable too, if this notion of the 
lips refers to speaking or sexuality), the two lips provide a way of 
giving women an articulating 'identity' of their own (in touch with 
themselves constantly).
But paradoxically, the fusion of one to the other, an inability to separate 
and distinguish differences, is also highlighted by this notion.
In relation to Merleau-Ponty, this criticism concerns what Irigaray calls 
his 'animism', the dispersal of the seer into the realm of the visible, 
which threatens to collapse and (con)fuse differences into the anonymity of 
matter. it will be important to allow space and interruption to
prevent this fusion, 'bathing in the amniotic fluid' of enjoyment which 
inhibits a more ethical recognition of the other. In fact, Irigaray also 
links this kind of fusion to a mirroring of the same, a circularity of 
mirrors which must be broken into in order to give the mother back a 
mirroring of her own, bo cut the cord which keeps the maternal in the 
natural and so denies her any possibility of transcendence and becoming 
divine.<16>
If the child only sees itself in the mirror, how can it differentiate 
from its mother? He [the child or Jacques Lacan?] risks redoubling, 
creating the (con)fusion with the mother in birth and the mother in that 
other world.
If there is no cutting of the cord and the osmotic exchanges of the 
maternal world and its substitutes, how can the sublimation of the flesh 
take place?(17)
Irigaray has referred to Merleau-Ponty' s reliance on a distinction between 
seer and visible as a dangerous maintaining of dualisms, and now she seems 
to be critical of the dispersal and loss of such distinctions into the
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'leaves of being' which constitute the phenomenal world. We can see
the ambiguity of her position is in fact already present in Merleau-Ponty's 
work, but in her reading these ambiguities are situated and questioned in a 
particular feminist context.
As Margaret Whit ford points out, separation and spacing is a necessary 
process, for Irigaray, in forging a relation to space-time and forging a 
genre for women of their own. Auto-affection provides a means of 
articulating a specificity of feminine identity, but it is in danger of 
closing upon itself unless it is interrupted by a horizon of otherness 
beyond this particularity. This horizon must be sufficiently other to 
maintain a space of openness, 'fertility' (in the sense of creativity) and 
prevent the sterility of 'paralysis' which inhibits. Irigaray 
characterises this horizon as the divine or the infinite which is unclosed 
and uncompleted (inrfini).(20)
This brings us to the third aspect of Irigaray's essay; the connection of 
touch/camality and the divine. Irigaray is seeking to question the 
situating of the divine within the visible/invisible paradigm; placed in 
opposition to the fleshly carnality and defilement of the body the 
spiritual dimension is based on a model of exclusion and exclusivity. We 
may see this process in Kristeva's theorisation of abjection, which 
indicates the links with purity and the sacred against the debasement of 
the heterogeneous other, necessarily caught up in a move to expel, repulse 
or reject. But in this move to abject, we also note the connectedness it 
establishes with the abject - symbolised as the mother, animality (flesh,
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faeces, the unclean) and death. It becomes impossible to establish these 
borders of demarcation with the clean divisions which are sought. Hence 
the abject is re-inscribed back into the process of the body, blurring the 
distinction between inner and outer.(^2)
The attempted abjection of the mother as symbolically associated with 
otherness means that sexual difference is implicated in the process; women 
become aligned with with the abject. Kristeva notes the codifying of this 
move in Biblical traditions of purity and defilement.
The process of desire for the other interrupts the attempt to sustain these 
boundaries and bleeds into them once again, repulsion held in fascinated 
thrall.
We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, 
while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off what threatens it 
- on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual 
danger.. .Thus braided, woven, ambivalent, a heterogeneous flux marks out 
a territory that I can call my own because the Other, having dwelt in me 
as an alter ego, points it out to me through loathing.
Kristeva accounts for the process which leaves the matemal/feminine in 
this ambiguous state, which also means it is coded as what is outside or 
beyond the symbolic, necessarily repressed such that signification can take 
place. It is only from the subject's signifying position in the symbolic 
that recognition of the abject can take place.
...the heterogeneous flow...already dwells in a human animal that has 
been highly altered (altéré; altered, made other to itself). I 
experience abjection only if an Other has settled in place and stead of 
what will be rtme,,...an Other who precedes and possesses me and through » 
such possession causes me to be. A possession prior to my advent... ' '
Irigaray attempts to re-trace the process of this alignment of the abject 
and the feminine, and attempts to open a means of signifying what is 'lost'
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in this process with more positive meaning. She is seeking an eroticised, 
sexuate notion of the divine, a transgressive relinking of the 
matemal/camal and the dimension of spirit which will rewrite both. It 
seems that in her reading of Merleau-Ponty, the 'intra-uterine' (25) 
functions as critique of the visible/invisible paradigm in having material, 
tangible associations; undermining the division of inner/outer in being 
positioned within the body, and yet also forming a boundary between the 
internal body and its external topography. This notion of the 
undecidability of bodily boundaries and the mediating role of bodily fluids 
(mucous) is important to Irigaray. Ihe thresholds of the body are more 
fluid in this respect than the face or the eyes.
...an other threshold of the passage from inner to outer, outer to 
inner, between inner and outer, the inner and the outer...Like, but 
different to, my face, the mucous tissues escape mastery.'"'
The connotations of bodily fluids, which are part of the subject's self 
identity and yet are also repulsed by it and from it, maps on to the abject 
in this sense.
Finally, the metaphoric association with a body constituted as feminine 
points to the omission in Merleau-Ponty's work of the situated body which 
is also gendered.
Irigaray points to the way Merleau-Ponty is outlining a phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity in the passing between interior and exterior, and 'the 
double crossing of the two maps', which might lead to an ethical 
acknowledgement of otherness. But she argues that a forgetting of 'the 
sensible mediun' (in an echo of her notion of the sensible transcendental)
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in and through which such passages are effected, is a forgetting of 'the 
mucous of the carnal*. (^7) implicit in this amnesia is a closure of 
questions of sexual difference and the horizon of the 'becoming divine' for 
women.
She suggests the (feminine) body is doubly written out, since on one level 
the body to which the divine is placed in oppositional relation - when this 
is constituted as the homogenous, inquiring subject - is masculine, 
privileged with access to transcendence. Irigaray sees this too as a 
paralysing confinement and seeks to open up these relations between the 
sexes, across their diagonal relations to a divine site of alterity, as 
well as to each sex's own ideal.
Does a theology, an affirmative ontology, signify, otherwise to their 
negative connotations, the advent of either the parousia of God or of 
the other? Are these two parousias inseparable? Traversing the neutral 
space-time of the unremitting polemic - is this the solicitous return or 
reappearance of God and/or the other?
Another dawning, new parousia necessarily accompanying that of an 
ethical God. Respecting the difference between him and her, in 
generation and creation, cosmic, aesthetic.^®'
To sunmarise, Irigaray intends the notions of the divine and sexual 
difference to effect the following changes;
- a possibility of respect for the other in creative/camal dimensions
- an understanding of the way the divine works as an ideal for each sex 
but also across the two sexes. This demands 'keeping all the senses 
in openness...being attentive carnally and spiritually'(29)
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- a way of understanding the processes of idealisation such that the 
divine will no longer be separable from the carnal, as a division 
of body/spirit or imnanence/transcendence.
- such a move will also disrupt specular imagery via 'the sensible 
transcendental'; 'a theology inscribed in the flesh'. 'Must god 
always remain inaccessibly transcendent and unrealised -here and now­
in and through the body?'(30)
- a different kind of access to alterity will invest these 
crisscrossing relations with greater intensity, passion and creative 
potential.
Merleau-Ponty is not unaware of the ethical implications of his project; he 
writes that his philosophy is not an expedient to solve the problem of the 
other, but to transform the whole problem.
The other is no longer so much a freedom seen from without as destiny 
and fatality...he is caught up in a circuit that connects him to the 
world as we ourselves.are, and consequently also in a circuit that 
connects him to us -
There is a generality of the visible by virtue of the primordiality of the 
flesh. Signification is produced in dimensional gestures; the caress is 
not an act of will or mastery but a 'giving' or emergence of sense. But 
the moment of signification is still characterised by connectivity between 
beings. Merleau-Ponty writes of the 'strange adhesion' which binds beings 
together. There is a level of duality of consciousness and world, despite 
an embodied consciousness, despite a givenness to the world.
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He describes 'reversibility' as 'a phenomenon which sustains perception and 
speech and manifests itself by an almost carnal existence of the idea as 
well as by a sublimation of the f l e s h ' . B u t  reversibility is in danger 
of resurrecting the very relation of fixity which he was concerned to 
rework ('any problems that remain are due to the fact that I retained the 
philosophy of consciousness',)(33) if there is no interruption of this 
process it returns again to the same. Is the schema radical enough to 
effect new possibilities?^^)
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived body draws upon a historically 
sedimented discourse of the body - 'a sort of archaeology structured by a 
language already spoken' ^ ^ )  which, if we accept the notion of the symbolic 
as a'mono-sexed discourse', is codified as masculine. In addition, if 
language is a pre-existent structure which shapes the reception and 
duplication of the 'emergent sense ' of the lived body, and each act of 
speech 'is offered to a universal word' as Merleau-Ponty suggests, it is 
indeed impossible to intervene on the process of signification in the way 
Irigaray wants. The circuit is closed again. 'Sedimentations of language 
weave between past and future and my actual words are rooted in the already
said1. < »)
I will suggest the way out^this impasse is to examine again 'the obscure 
region' Merleau-Ponty claims is the projected origin or locale of the 
'universal word'.
At the end of 'The Intertwining - the chiasm', Merleau-Ponty writes:
...the whole of philosophy... consists in restoring a power to signify, 
a birth of meaning, or wild meaning, an expression of experience by
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experience, which in particular clarifies the special domain of 
language*
This promise of a birth of wild meaning may lead us to examine the notion 
of pregnancy in Merleau-Ponty' s work, prefiguring an understanding of 
Levinas' notion of maternity and the connection of this moment to a 
threshold of ethicality. In the notes for the remainder of the text we 
find quite extensive reference to pregnancy.
Merleau-Ponty characterises it symbolically as 'an orientation towards 
possibility'. The notion of orientation negotiates a conception of 'being 
that would be a cause of itself, identical and objective' and logical 
possibility in a Leibnizian sense, 'as that which is necessary'.(38) By 
this route Merleau-Ponty seeks to avoid a structure of identity as self­
identical (something overflows it, there is an excess and a dimension of 
hiddenness), and also the strict chronology of cause and effect as giving a 
certain inevitability to an unfolding of experience, time and space.
To clarify this further we should explore his notion of Gestalt. He writes 
of Gestalt as a moment of the lived body, not an immediacy of experience, 
but 'a heavy signification, it is flesh...a bound and not free 
possibility...it is ready to integrate itself into a constellation that 
spans space and time' (but with a weight and fixity Merleau Ponty calls 
region or domain, as it is not free with relation to space and time but 
rather free from space and time considered as independent events in 
themselves). This moment of the lived body is not to be epistemologically 
trawled in depth nor constrained in the instant although it is intersected 
by these forces, and intersects them in its relations. He writes that
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'pregnancy will show that since the gestalt arises from polymorphism, this 
situates us outside the philosophy of subject and object'. (39)
We may see how this radical splitting which is yet a situating and 
experience of the body is taken up to provide a means of 'thinking 
otherwise' to philosophies of dichotomy.
Merleau-Ponty further relates this discussion to transcendence. The 
Gestalt moment of the lived body is a heteronomous experience, 'not a pure 
agile nothingness but an inscription in an open register, in a lake of non- 
being, in an Erbffnung. in an offene' . ^ ^  But this open structure is 
precisely opened by a structure which 'pre-figures' it, and gives onto an 
instantiation, which will be an intrinsic regulation. This is what Merleau- 
Ponty calls empirical pregnancy.
It consists in defining each perceived being by a structure or system of 
equivalencies about which it is disposed... It is a question of that 
logos that pronounces itself silently in each sensible thing, inasmuch 
as it varies around a certain type of message, which we can have an idea 
of only through our carnal participation in its sense, only by espousing 
by our body its manner of 'signifying' -or that logos uttered whose . 
internal structure sublimates our carnal relation with the world.' '
There is a certain structuring to meaning which shapes and allows the 
comprehension of our carnal embodiment, which is referred to in that such 
carnal moments are 'pregnant' with the ciphers of transcendence - they 
allude to the rupture and division of the conditions of their possibility 
as they signify. Pregnancy is thus a power to break forth, productivity 
and fecundity - as excess and possibility, as well as 'typicality' - a 
certain fulfilment of its own type. 'It is the form which has arrived at 
itself that is itself...identity in depth (dynamic identity) transcendence
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as being-at-a-distance'. (^2)
The anticipation and expectation of excess infiltrates containment, yet 
also acts as an intensification of that moment or threshold, intensifies in 
this form with reference to a prior network of meanings which can generate 
and guarantee that intensity. As the symbolic structure of this notion 
also connotes its sexuate and experiential dimension we can link it to a 
search for a feminist 'vocabulary' of the body.
The whole body becomes a sensorium, inscribed with an open weave of textual 
and semiotic possibilities, a materiality of signs which might be 
corporeally realised.
But there are only hints of a development of this possibility in Merleau- 
Ponty's work. In considering what is at stake in the phenomenological 
shaping of such a notion, Claude Lefort (the editor of Merleau-Ponty's 
posthumously published notes) presses the issue with regard to the 
political and historical dimension of signification and the framework of 
psychoanalysis. In his view, the question of pregnancy in Merleau-Ponty's 
work is crucial, because it raises the question of the origins of the 
existent and the pre-reflective dimension of experience. His challenge to 
Merleau-Ponty is couched in terms of a questioning of the limits of 
phenomenology. What is it that allows for Merleau-Ponty's thought? For 
Lafort, this issue is taken up in respect of genesis or origin. Where does 
the flesh emerge from? In Merleau-Ponty's work sensibility seems to emerge 
in a gathering or concentration of forces equivalent to a 'self-begetting'. 
Lefort writes:
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Einergence, coming of itself to itself, coiling up, reversal, 
homogeneity, resemblance, doubling, divergence from the inside to the 
outside: each of these images is bound to clarify the description of 
the flesh. And such a description tends to be that of a genesis...a 
question of a bizarre begetting. A singular sensible emerges from the 
mass of the sensible by,a sort of coiling up, and through redoubling, 
turns back on itself...*^'
Lefort points out that this image of birth as self-begetting is a way of 
questioning the self as an image of singular origin, and also allows the 
possibility of reconceptualising the self-present notions of time and 
space. But, he argues, Merleau-Ponty still emphasises the 'external' 
relation of subject/object in his obedience to the visual mode of 
perception. In writing of vision as 'adherence', the self may be strange 
and other to itself, but its connection to 'the mass of the sensible' 
remains in the representational mode. Merleau-Ponty characterises this 
connection as 'the hinges of being', which is to say, it is a connection 
still available for presentation to consciousness.
But Lefort finds suggestions of a different approach in Merleau-Ponty's 
texts too:'a new type of being, being by porosity, pregnancy, 
generality'. This approach would open up separation and the
'dehiscence' of others, rather than the fusion and adherence which stress 
the other as placed in a pre-determined framework. Lefort acknowledges the 
relation of ambivalent asymmetry exemplified in the experience of the 
child. But like Lacan, he argues the child comes into a world already 
'tamed' in its m e a n i n g s a n d  is faced with the name and the law as 
encounters with the Other. The child's relation with the mother's body is 
sensate 'prior' to vision, already intersected by sensibility, but without 
a perspectival relation to meaning. It is the structures of signification
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which will provide the perspective. Merleau-Ponty attempts to deny the 
determinism implicit in this, arguing against a coherent historical 
narrative, transparently representing social relations to itself, in his 
critique of Marxist theory. He also argues against a view of signification 
as rational and self-present.
But Lefort argues that such internally divided meanings require the 
intervention of 'the third', the dimension of historical meaning as 
grounding, to allow for the possibility of justice and judgement. If 
Merleau-Ponty wishes to condemn totalitarian thinking and to argue for 
anti-colonialism, Lefort suggests, he must retain a notion of the 'real' of 
history as the framework for this ethical position. For Lefort, only the 
acknowledgement of such a perspective protects Merleau-Ponty's view from 
collapsing into the relativism of 'the observance of difference in the web 
of social r e l a t i o n s ' a n d  the endless circulation of signification. 
Otherwise there is only the 'reversibility' of subjects interpreting their 
own embodiment immanently. There could be no indication that the already 
'tamed' arena of meanings into which the child enters presents any 
possibility of justice to counter totalitarian thinking, whether this is in 
intersubjective relations or in the wider political arena.
In her discussion of Merleau Ponty and Levinas in Saints and Post­
modernism. Edith Wyschogrod points to a notion which she terms 'carnal 
generality' present in both thinkers. This is a notion prior to 
conceptualisation, a mode of meaning which is not yet ossified into a 
restrictive universal. It becomes exhibited in 'carnal generals', the 
'context specific complexes' which incarnate this prior meaning. Although
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characterised as an experiential matrix which precedes conceptuality, this 
matrix does not fall into an unrestricted idealism, because it is already 
itself indicative of a 'trace' of significations. Carnal generality is 
'placed' prior to conceptualisation to give it the radicality of a kind of 
primordial responsibility. Although it intersects in and through 
signification, it signifies itself as a corporeal language, or rather a 
kind of musicality, that 'vibrates as it disjoins'.(^0)
We can note certain parallels with Kristeva's notion of the semiotic here, 
described as an oralising pulsion regenerating through and across the 
phallic economy.
Oralisation is a re-union with the mother's body which is no longer 
viewed as an engendering, hollow and vaginated, expelling and rejecting 
body, but rather as a vocalic one - throat, voice and breasts;, v 
music,rhythm, prosody, paragrams and the prophetic parabola...' '
The difference is that Kristeva and Irigaray attempt to activate the 
associations of this 'carnal generality' with the feminine/matemal 
symbolisation to use it as a strategic political device. This strategic 
possibility is not so explicit in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, although it 
can be expanded upon as an interpretative possibility.
The 'carnal generals' are not material essences which would be the 
reconstitution of bodies as objects. Mortality and sexuality are not added 
on to a pre-existent figure. Rather, the experiential dimension coincides 
in the matrices of the lived body, indicating the trace of 'carnal 
generality'.
However, for Merleau-Ponty this notion is still connective and adhesive.
As Alphonso Lingis writes;
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• •.for Merleau-Ponty carnal Intimacy Is the locus of emergence of sense.
The inner configuration of the other is captured in one's corporeal 
axes and one's own dynamic diagram is exposed in palpable reality.(52)
It is suggested that Merleau-Ponty's desire to maintain the materiality of 
excess forecloses on a recognition of the other who really differs. As 
Wyschogrod writes;
Levinas and Merleau-Ponty agree that the psycho-physical primordium that 
is the incarnate subject is a primordial expression of generality. 
Universals and essences are abstractions derived from this more 
primitive experiential matrix...
Merleau-Ponty argues, however, that generality is more primordially 
exhibited in the incarnate subject, an ensemble of self-transcending 
acts and lingual capacities. Levinas too seeks a more primitive locus 
for generality and finds it not in the subject butvin the alterity of 
other persons as the Other impacts on the self.'->J'
She adds that Levinas recognises an irreparable breach of difference 
between self and Other, whereas in some senses Merleau-Ponty is still 
concerned to heal that breach. 'Even if Merleau-Ponty has grasped the 
significance of prediscursive corporeality for the emergence of generality, 
he has suppressed the condition of difference between self and Other 
that makes moral relations possible'.(54)
In order to develop this approach to the other in an embodied 
phenomenology, it is now necessary to consider whether Levinas provides an 
alterity which is radical enough to acknowledge difference, but also 
whether this does not involve the cancellation of difference in the level 
of carnal generality. Levinas has recourse to an alterity as an 
asymnetrical revelation of difference. While he resists the revelatory
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aspect of an absolute alterity as God, it must still be questioned whether 
his notion of alterity does not return a universality to questions of 
otherness and ethics. In the context of sexual difference this would 
correspond to the subsuming of difference under a generalised ethicality.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CARESS: LEVINAS. IRIGARAY AND TOE EMICS OF SEXUAL
DiFragg
In the previous chapter, the relationship between phenomenology in the 
context of erotic relations and Irigaray's feminist perspective on 'the 
feminine/maternal' in philosophy was examined. Certain distinctions 
between Merleau-Ponty and Levinas have already been noted. In this 
chapter, the phenomenological perspective on touch and 'the feminine' will 
be explored further, this time in the context of the work of Levinas. 
Irigaray and Levinas take up some of the possibilities suggested in 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of 'the flesh' and in his attempt to rework the 
experiential dimension of intersubjective relations. But both question 
whether his reliance on the networks of signification offers a sufficiently 
radical version of alterity to be called ethical.
Irigaray's project to 're-interpret the whole relationship between the 
subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the 
cosmic, the microcosmic and the m a c r o c o s m i c s h o u l d  be recalled.
The project of reinterpretation of these structures agrees with Levinas' 
attempt to 'recomnence' philosophy in order to stress the primacy of the 
ethical. Both agree that ontology and rationality have been symbolically 
characterised as masculine; Irigaray writes 'all theories of the subject 
have always been appropriated to the masculine' and Levinas writes of 
'the virility of the force of B e i n g ' B o t h  agree in addition that the 
recognition of the excluded 'feminine' presents an ethical challenge to the 
structures of philosophical discourse. Levinas writes: ' ...the feminine
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is not merely the unknowable, but a mode of being which consists in 
slipping away from the light'...'the feminine is described as the of itself 
other, as the very origin of the concept of alterity'.^)
Two criticisms levelled at Irigaray and Levinas in the context of this 
immense project are that it is essentialist, already carving up the world 
in terms of sexual difference, or it is utopian, positing a place beyond 
discourse where otherness could be developed into a (feminine) radical 
alterity. (5) But we see t^ s yoj-fc as a project which seeks to critique 
the edifice of Western rationality, the path of ontology and the impasse of 
the legacy of Enlightenment humanism, which has effectively effaced the 
question of sexual difference, it becomes difficult to speak of a starting 
point or a final goal. It is an attempt to set out a mode of thinking 
which is precisely begging the questions of origin (a starting from sexual 
difference as essentialist) and of telos (as part of an unfolding story).
To begin elsewhere would require a transformation which does not seek the 
security of a teleological inquiry. Therefore it would be a reiteration or 
repetition of the same, to name sexual difference as the cause, or name 
utopia as the outcome.
Like Levinas, Irigaray attempts to re-conceptualise the very terms of 
thought, with our most basic framework of cause/effect, subject/object and 
chronological order. Both seek an 'otherwise',^) which would be a way of 
articulating a space significant enough to be called ethical. And both 
hope to express this space via some notion of irreducible difference, the 
very possibility of ethicality arising through a different understanding of 
otherness.
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If the process of signification is constantly referring elsewhere in its 
general economy of proliferation and decay, it seems there could be no 
meaning without the structures which are meaning; in other words (if there 
could be other words!), no excess, except the endless replay of the 
circuits of signification, itself a generative and regenerative 
possibility. But Irigaray and Levinas detect in this move to signification 
(in the name of a move away from the constrictions of onto-theology as 
metaphysical identity), a possible abdication of ethicality and any basis 
for judgement at all. Instead of returning to the solid basis of identity 
thinking, previously a grounding for discussing agency and ethical will, 
they precisely seek to sketch an excess, not as a wholly metaphysical 
otherness, nor as something which originates egotistically and 
idealistically from the self. For Levinas, the permanent openness to a 
dimension of otherness is a perspective which can open onto the 
transformation to an ethical mode, but one which requires the feminine as 
facilitating such a transformation. Although the feminine hereby is 
written into the scheme of philosophy at its heart, inscribing what has 
been most left out, there is a danger that the feminine, despite becoming 
intrinsic, is also instrunentalised.
Having explicated the first steps to a possible morality as the forgetting 
of the prioritising of self, instead to allow the world to become enjoyment 
and nourishment, Levinas goes against a morality which begins from the 
self, and so must see the world as temptation to sin, or as something to be 
endured. The notion of enjoyment situates human life in the practicalities 
of work and life, where we are. For Levinas, any morality of 
otherworldliness, death or privation is meaningless. However, the
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mysterious dimension of otherness does break into our lives, not as 
absolute absence, but through the other.
In contrast to a Platonic world of light where everything is theoretically 
graspable, visible, but also blindingly beyond our reach, a world where 
corporeality is subordinate to ideality, Levinas expresses the erotic 
relation as sensually immediate, the 'originary' place of alterity. The 
proximate relationship is the place of ethics, and one which refuses to 
discuss relations in the abstract, as merely beings carelessly close to one 
another. The neighbour is 'pressed up against me' in a difference which is 
a'non-indifference to the other
For Levinas, the relation of lovers is not as complementary forces, as this 
would suppose love as a fusion between two equal beings, and a prior whole: 
'...two complementary terms presuppose a pre-existing whole. T o  say that 
sexual duality presupposes a whole is to posit love beforehand as 
f u s i o n ' . F o r  Levinas, the pathos of love is an essentially 
unreconcil ed difference. The relation to the other is with an alterity 
which 'always slips away'.^^ Further, the mode of the absolutely other is 
coded as the feminine.
...the 
its terms
absolutely contrary contrary..., the contrariety that permits 
 to remain absolutely other, is the feminine.
Levinas tries to extricate this characterisation of a 'mode of being' from 
'any romantic notions of the mysterious, unknown or misunderstood woman' we
might find in Dante or Goethe, or the cult of Woman in chivalry or modern
society, descriptions of otherness which, by their distanced idealism,
merely replicate the category of Woman as Other and do not realise the kind
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of alterity as a dimension Levinas is trying to describe. He agrees in 
this respect with the criticisms made of the freezing of mobility in the 
Ideal Woman, and he also accedes to 'the legitimate claims of the feminism 
which presupposes all the acquired attainments of c i v i l i s a t i o n H e  
makes it clear that we are supposed to recognise the symbolic connection of 
otherness and Woman he is activating, which recalls the equation of Woman 
as Other (person), but which also recalls a more mysterious otherness (the 
'feminine' as e^dvocation). In order to approach the question of ethics in 
a different fashion, Levinas is taking on the whole symbolic network of the 
equation of Woman as Other. This approach is a difficult enough 
undertaking, but one not wholly alien to many feminists who recognise the 
necessity of facing up to this symbolic network in order to understand and 
therefore challenge its intricacies, rather than denying it.'^)
Levinas describes the feminine at the edge of (Platonic) light, a drawing 
away. For Plato, according to Levinas, the feminine is 'thought within the 
categories of passivity and activity and reduced to matter'. There is no 
specificity accorded to men and women in this respect; the feminine is 
merely an illustration of a distant Idea. Thus others are all identified 
with each other, a collective with a shared quest for truth. Levinas 
opposes this side-by-side with an other addressing the self, face-to-face 
without intermediary, without an appeal to the kind of truth which would 
otherwise come between them. This direct iimediacy, avoiding any certainty 
of truth, will then take place at the edges of uncertainty, where 
signification is about to break down. 'What one presents as the failure 
of conmunication in love precisely constitutes the positivity of the 
relationship'.
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But despite Levinas' characterisation of the feminine as privileged event, 
access to the kind of alterity which is an exceptional relation, if the 
feminine is equated with the edges of the breakdown of meaning, where does 
this leave women? It seems to place them back at the borders of 
signification, as providing the missing mediation between the infinity of 
otherness and the subjectivity as ego. If this is so, then they will find 
it difficult to be ethical since they are what makes ethics possible 
already.
If the feminine is seen as a mode of being available for both men and 
women, its symbolic connection with women and the breakdown of 
coranunication still remains. It gives men the edge, as the feminine 
remains other to their identity, allowing them to take on feminine 
equivocation while retaining a privileged relation to signification. But 
Levinas also explicitly denies this separation of qualities from 
identities. He writes: 'the feminine is not added to an object and a Thou 
antecedently given or encountered in the neuter (the sole gender formal 
logic k n o w s ) s o  he wants to maintain a necessary connectivity 
between symbolic and corporeal figuration (the feminine as absolute 
alterity is not just symbolic, but must have some connection with women 
positioned as other).
This ambiguity is precisely what provokes the dizzying, difficult spirals 
of feminist readers of Levinas. Levinas says Freud identifies the ego's 
search for pleasure but that he doesn't seek for the significance of this 
in 'the general economy of being', meaning that Freud still assures 
pleasure as originating in some sense in the libido of the self, and caught 
in an economy of desire emanating from the self. Levinas says he wants to
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account for its exceptional place, as a voluptuousness which precedes and 
questions even these categories of self-hood, as 'the very event of the 
future'. The move he makes is a radical claim otherwise to a difference 
based in biological sex.^1^) But this may also be a return to the 
questions of philosophy, albeit of a different order, in a search for the 
ethical/metaphysical site of otherness, and a move away from the 
historically diagnostic possibilities of psychoanalysis for sexual 
difference. Although Levinas stresses the way that the erotic is a kind of 
'failure' in the domain of knowing, grasping or possessing - a reproach to 
the demands of subjectivity to be in control, which corresponds to the 
notion of the unconscious in psychoanalysis - he also seeks to recollect 
his explosive otherness for a project of generalised ethicality. This is 
effected through his recognition of the importance of the philosophical 
questions of transcendence, ethics and time, which seem to deny the role of 
historical contingency (for example, in changing conceptions of sex roles). 
And yet, he also recognises the networks of signification and exteriority, 
the effective 'constraints' of language which enforce - provoke - him to 
speak as a man for whom the feminine is 'essentially other'.
His characterisation of 'feminine' alterity exemplifies his equivocation 
between sexual difference as the recognition of otherness, and the ethical 
impact of absolute alterity. He has tried to characterise such 
equivocation as the undecidability which could resist a straightforward 
duality, whereby the feminine would be secondary. Equivocation is intended 
to resist, move away and oscillate on the wavering boundary where 
comnunication is just about to break down.
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Nevertheless we might still recognise the 'story' of philosophy, the 
conversation of philosophers about 'the feminine'. For example: the debate 
between Derrida and Levinas on this question of otherness and the feminine. 
In 'En ce moment m&ne dans cet ouvrage me voici',^) Derrida takes on the 
voice of the feminine to address the otherness of Levinas's writing on 
alterity and the femininity; placing himself in the fictional role of 
Woman/writer as other, in order to consider alterity with E.L. ('elle').
The dissemblance allows him both to encounter the slipping of meaning and 
sexual identity where the pronouns he, she and I are in flux, and to 
participate in the discursive structures which allow him to speak (write) 
of such slippage. Like the Song of Songs, the exchange of voices is an 
access to that desirable loss of the identifying marks of sexual 
difference, but unlike the anonymous Biblical author, it is precisely 
Derrida's assured (masculine) identity which allows him to play this game.
If what I say remains false, falsifying, flawed, it is within the 
measure whereby disymnetry (I speak now from my position of woman, 
supposing she be definable).can also reverse the perspectives, while 
leaving the schema intact.^18'
Where is this voice coming from? The disembodied feminine voice in the 
text is still philosophy's feminine; the mysterious, veiled, posited voice 
which speaks with the voice of metaphor which might not be the voice of 
8peaking women. As Rosi Braidotti writes:
Isn't it strange that it is precisely at the time in history when women 
have made their voices heard socially, politically and theoretically, 
that philosophical discourse -.a onale domain par excellence - takes 
over the feminine for himself?'19''
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Reading within and against the philosophical tradition, Irigaray also 
recognises the specular logic which places women as absence, hence outside, 
or 'beyond' representation. The castrated woman is the aberration,
'nothing to be seen' means she deviates from the norm, and what she doesn't 
have, guarantees for the man the security of having, as well as the fear of 
losing. Conmentating on the history of philosophy from the 'outside' (from 
where she is also able to analyse its attempted exclusion of women), she is 
also demonstrating her rejection of a position beyond representation. Her 
reading of Levinas demonstrates this plural position. Largely sympathetic 
to a project seeking an alterity 'otherwise than being' which yet demands 
the attention of the philosophical tradition, a project which profoundly 
recognises sexual difference, and the relation of masculinity with the 
desire for singular truth; still, she is reading from the position of a 
woman and recognising her relegation to the feminine, wondering what, if 
anything, can be salvaged for herself and other women.
So in reading Levinas in her essay 'The Fecundity of the Caress',(21) she 
picks up a difference within the feminine difference, between the feminine 
lover (amante, active) and the loved one (aimée, passive), a strategic 
linguistic difference which allows her to speculate a kind of masculine and 
feminine in the feminine. The Lover remains masculine. (22)
L'aimée, one aspect of the feminine, is the oppositional otherness, 
represented as absolute fluidity. In the relations between the lover and 
l'ainee, he loses himself in that abyss of difference (is she the abyss?). 
'Both of them lost, each in the other, on the wrong side, the other side, 
of transcendence'.(23) Dangerously, she is bidden to 'freeze into the
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shapes that separate her from herself'. Thus formed, she can either become 
'a night more primaeval than the night' (silence, darkness, loss of 
connunication), or find herself 'dispersed in the shards of a broken 
mirror' (fragmented, reflected in the image the lover has made for her). 
Either way, she is frozen into an image made for her, which constricts her 
inward movement and constrains the fluidity of difference as a creative and 
dynamic relation. This otherness is also, however, the otherness which 
attunes her to the cyclical/generative pulse of a mysterious relation to 
the cosmos, a time and space codified as 'other' to the world of 
responsible ethical subjects in self-conscious agency. This otherness is 
more like nature, the hidden and inaccessible symbolism which nevertheless 
is supposed to ground subjectivity. This otherness is not merely the 
physical corporeality of 'infancy, animality or maternity', but rather the 
relation to gestation, 'participation in the construction of a world that 
does not forget natural generation and the human being's part in the 
preservation of its efflorescence' .(24)
So the different aspects of feminine alterity are 1) as a reflection or 
complement of the lover, a relation which opens up difference in the erotic 
realm but is in danger of recuperating differences if it is not 
interrupted, or 2) the connection to a certain mystic relation to the 
cosmos which presents the possibility of absolute difference in its 
unlimited multiplicity, but which may also be emprisoned as such, in 
lacking access to the world of linearity and chronology.
The woman lover, l'amante, is 'not subjected to alterations of fire and 
ice'. Her activity gives her back to her own movements; 'she also revives
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herself in the warmth and does not simply receive it from the other...she 
tends towards her own fulfilment, already unfolds herself to gather in 
more'. So l'amante takes on her own fecundity to be regenerated, a 
possibility Irigaray calls blossoming or efflorescence. (25)
We must question whether a woman is both 1'aimSe and l'amante, an 
oscillation in herself of active and passive, such that women could have 
some space to move in these identities? Or does Irigaray suggest both 
could already be interpretation of the woman who has no identity as such?
If Irigaray means the latter, then women find themselves already named, 
either as passive, oppositionally feminine, or active within the prescribed 
terms of masculine subjectivity and therefore left with no opportunity to 
intervene in the terms of identity.
This difficulty is suggested if language is the difficult network which 
inscribes both L'aim&e and l'amante. Irigaray describes language as 
annexing, capturing and captivating the other.
Deployment of a network that extends over everything and deprives it of 
its most intimate breath and growth. A garment that first and foremost 
paralyses the other's movement.. .Even if she plays, within this male 
territory, at disguising herself in nunerous displays... she remains 
without an identity or rassport with which to traverse, to transgress, 
the lover's language.
The difficulty of working through a different kind of relation to 
signification leads us to question how flexible the relation between 
otherness as possibility of signification and the subject can be. It seems 
that Levinas is concerned to open a different kind of relation. The
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apparent privilege of the lover and his relation to God (as aspect of the 
mystery of alterity) is certainly disrupted in Levinas' insistence on the 
feminine, but if she is not to be merely instrumental, we must question her 
own relation to alterity. For Irigaray, it is the feminine 
(lfaim§e/l'anante) lover's relation to the future of fecundity^'O which 
permits regeneration, the 'not yet' opening on to the future. In rejecting 
the light which is the light of truth, of illuninating vision, returning 
into darkness to re-emerge and wait for 'the light that shines through 
discourse, that filters through words, that bestows a sense of the cosmos', 
she too has access to 'contemplation prior to any vision'. (^8)
This recalls the characterisation of the female mystic saints, in Lacan's 
terms, the women who experience a 'jouissance that goes beyond'; the 
beginnings of a description of women's experience as that which can be 
experienced but apparently remains unrepresentable. The impossible 
relation to language relegates the mystic saints to inexpressible, 
irreducible jouissance. Lacan adds;
Might not this jouissance which one experiences and knows nothing of, 
be that which puts us on the path of existence? And why not interpret 
one face of .the Other, the God face, as supported by feminine 
jouissance?' 29 ’
Indicating a feminine facet to the place of God draws attention to the 
equivalent mystification of Woman, the negative role which props up the 
truth of man's relation to God and to his own self-knowledge. She is the 
Other, a fantasy projected as elsewhere to protect such truth. As such, in 
the beyond where meaning falters, the question of women's sexuality is
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precisely the one which cannot be asked, since it is both the ground (as 
undisclosed fantasy) of truth, and void of otherness (as slippage of 
language). So, according to Lacan, Woman is the other with no essence, no 
essential subjectivity.
However, the moment of ecstasy, loss of the self, provides a momentary 
place of fluidity, orgasmic, outside the stasis of sameness. The etymology 
of the Greek word: ek; outside, histemi; place, is taken up in Irigaray's 
texts as ex- tase. In the most passive, abject acceptance of a mystic 
experience which inscribes her into the patriarchal logic, the female 
mystic mimics Christ's silent suffering and imitates God as that which 
exceeds all representation...here, perhaps, opening a facet enough to begin 
her own self-representation...?
Irigaray's suggestions here go against the received wisdom (Lacan, Derrida) 
of the Law of the Father as guarantee of subjection (hence subjectivity) 
to/in language, and the no-where else of that system. Irigaray sketches a 
heretical, because symbolically pre-linguistic, otherness. The prior, 
undifferentiated fluidity is intended to restore a specificity to 
femininity which would accord a subjective unity to women. 'The privileged 
relationship of women to that origin gives them access to an archaic form 
of expressivity outside the circuit of linguistic exchange'.(^0)
It is the potential of the maternal body (fecundity) which provides this 
symbolic fluidity. The woman is both undifferentiated (as prior to the 
splitting effect of entering language), but she is also plural, 
experiencing herself as other (the child within the mother but also part of
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her). The symbolic function of the maternal body is this self-eroticism 
which means the woman is in touch with herself, with the other in herself. 
Simultaneously, she is 'prior' to language and so, Irigaray implies, has a 
privileged relation to touch.
Irigaray and Levinas agree on the importance of touch in that it expresses 
the potentiality of reconceptualising a relation to the other, suggesting a 
different mode of alterity (Levinas terms it a 'regime of tenderness') 
though erotic relations 'otherwise' to the mastery and self-possession of 
the subject. For Levinas, non-signifyingness in Eros clouds the clarity of 
vision. The caress goes beyond the sensible, but not further than the 
senses.
The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what 
ceaselessly escapes its form toward a future never future enough, in 
soliciting what slips away as though it were not yet. It searches, it 
forages. It is not an intentionality of disclosure but of search; a 
movement unto the invisible.. .what the caress seeks.is not situated in 
a perspective and in the light of the graspable.'
For Irigaray, the caress indicates this distinct relation with the other's 
alterity; it is the 'touch untouched by mastery', by which the schema of 
control and the fixity of subject/object is altered. Possession is 
suspended. It is
A new birth, which deconstitutes and reconstitutes contemplation by 
returning it to the source of all the senses - the sense of touch. 
There is no longer any image there, except for the letting go and 
giving of self. With the .hands, among other ways. Sculpting, shaping, 
as if for the first time.^32'
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Here it appears that the conditional 'as if' is essential. Irigaray 
indicates the suspension of conditions expressed in the 'not yet', a 
hypothetical future understanding of difference, as yet unrealised. But it 
is also a recollection of that which is inevitably past.*35)
When Irigaray reintroduces the conditions of difference in her re-situating 
of the caress between masculine lover and feminine (l'aimee/l'amante), the 
distinction between her position and Levinas' is made explicit. She seems 
to warn of the risk that the feminine could continue to be the means by 
which the lover guarantees his own maintainance of the same. This would 
happen through the lover's refusal to recognise the woman as precisely more 
than animality or as facilitating access to God.
The act of love would amount to contact with the irrationality of 
discourse, in order to send the loved one back to the .position of 
fallen animal or infant, and to man's ecstasy in God.'34'
ihe masculine lover may fall into the separation of the erotic from his 
'ethical responsibilities', the separation of body and spirit, thereby 
denying the space of alterity. This duality of transcendence/immanence 
produces a totality which cannot allow a 'porosity' of difference, the kind 
of interval which would facilitate a more ethical relation of the other. 
Until this is developed in the new birth of sexual/ethical relations, the 
relation to transcendence remains codified in masculine terms. Hence, the 
relation of paternity as an open dimension to the infinity of futures still 
endangers the place of the feminine and of women and 'puts the other at a 
permanent risk of loss of self in the wrong infinity'.(35) 'The son 
becomes the lover's ornament and display of the same as self, the position
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of the lover's Identity in relation to and through paternity...as the 
lover's means of return to himself outside himself, the son closes the 
circle'.(36) Contrary to Levinas, Irigaray suggests that the son does not 
open up a relation with infinity, but closes it off in repetition. This is 
because both sexes have not had the opportunity to work out their relations 
to difference and to the divine in a less destructive way.
Equally, God could become 'the guarantee of a deadly infinity' if the 
relation is used to obliterate respect for the other, used as 'a prop on 
man's ethical journey'.(37) irigaray is not denying the place of a divine 
relation, which in fact is characterised as that which can 'aid and further 
the fulfilment of the other...The transcendence of "God" can help in the 
dicovery of the other as other...'.(38)
The danger is the neglect of the feminine lover's (l'amante) return to 
herself, the responsibility of both masculine lover and feminine. He, if 
he encounters only himself in the other, uses her for his own ends, and 
thereby returns any possibility of a different conception of ethical/sexual 
relations back into 'the abyss'. And she, if she 'lets herself be taken 
but does not give herself...quits the locus of all responsibilities, her 
own ethical site'.(^)
By using terms like respect and responsibility in the context of the 
erotic, Irigaray aims for a different order of ethicality, a potential she 
expresses as 'the song of the beloved', and elsewhere as 'carnal ethics'. 
The possibility of this song opens onto an as yet unknown future.
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Manifest in and through writing. Absent and awaited in spirit. Whose 
voice would have been silent for a long time. A seriousness that is 
hard to maintain, .which history would try and rediscover, uncover 
through the text.
For Irigaray then, this is the opening where a 'feminist ethics' could 
begin, although it is an ethics which is no longer 'ethical' in the
traditional western philosophical sense. It is a potentiality which has
recourse to dreams, the subjective world of desires, poetic and mystical
discourse. But it has at heart a 'political' aim (if it can be called
such, since it implicitly calls for a revaluation of these terms), since it
is specifically a feminine 'song' which is to discovered and developed.
Levinas' project seems to return respect and responsibility to a 
generalised ethical project at this point since he would not (or could not) 
subscribe to the political implications of Irigaray's project. There is no 
suggestion that the feminine in Levinas ever could - or should - change its 
status, or how its relation to women-as-such operates.
However, it is still necessary to suggest how Irigaray may be called 
political, against the charge that she falls into an ahistorical 
essentialism, and that her temptation to begin outlining 'the song of the 
beloved' is impossibly, inevitably utopic.
The problems of beginning to outline a feminine otherness which could be 
related to a female subjectivity re-collected as whole are those occasioned 
by describing the structure of language as masculine in the first place.
For Lacan, certainly, this feminist enterprise is doomed to failure. The 
specificity of a female jouissance, (which he seems to hint at, albeit on
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an experiential level only), is disallowed, firstly because the subject can 
have no imnediate access to the body as such, once the entry into language 
effects the separation of immediacy. The relation is thereby rendered 
imaginary. Secondly, Lacan states it is language which places the feminine 
as other, not because there is an essential difference. Any assertion of 
essential difference therefore can only take place through language, which 
returns any assertion of female jouissance under the male term, already 
recuperated.
Irigaray's defiance is an attempt to make space for an incomprehensible 
voice which cannot speak. She wants the impossible dream; the phallic 
mother, the woman who maintains a specificity at once fluid and multiple, 
but with the powerful logic of a symbolic order 'of her own'. This desire 
is nowhere prescriptive, but manifest in the painstaking analysis of the 
hidden (fantasmic) feminine unconscious of the story of philosophy, a 
desire to uncover, expose, question. The defiance of critique is a 
procedure of 'jamming the theoretical machinery, of suspending its 
pretension to the production of truth' * gpj in such a way that the old 
logic (such as the question 'what is woman?')is disrupted by excess on the 
feminine side. Indicating the underside of this logic exposes the extent 
of its delusion; things which seem utterly real are shown to be part of a 
fanatical protection of fantasy. Therefore the reiteration of questions 
which are asked about the relation of symbolisation and the lives of women 
in social situatedness are the most provoking. The felt experience of 
symbolisation as other is an imposition when women actually live and 
participate in the complex arrangements of social structures. Once we 
recognise the contingency of such social structures and the relative
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contingency of symbolic 'realities', the possibility of change must be 
allowed. Irigaray is accused of ahistorical description, as if the 
organisation of sexual difference has remained unchanging through 
centuries. But the process of uncovering the structures which govern 
social and symbolic does point to change, in the very understanding of its 
systematic denial and exclusion.
If Irigaray confines herself largely to the analysis of the story of 
philosophical rationality, then perhaps she recognises its own situating of 
itself as the master discourse on such subjects. The place where 
rationality comments on itself is the place to begin looking for 
repression. As Andrea Nye conrnents(^), feminist practice can still 
subvert, even those philosophies which appear most benevolent to the 
feminine, by still asking how the language games (she names Derrida, Lacan, 
Foucault) which have 'split textuality from a world in which rape, abuse 
and murder still take place', relate to women's lives. A feminist 
perspective can highlight some of the blindspots in the philosophical 
enterprise, in its attempts to stress a more versatile philosophical 
practice which is open enough to speculate on its countless exclusions and 
excisions.
The relation between Levinas and Irigaray is haunted by the following 
question, as formulated by Tina Chanter; 'Which comes first, the ethical 
relation or the feminine relation?•• .Which relation,if one can put it thus, 
is more transcendent, the feminine or the Other?
The terms of this question are further complexified by Levinas' resistance 
to choosing either way. Nevertheless, this cannot prevent the pursuit of
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the implications of the two accounts as they are found in his work, nor the 
implications of the option of equivocating between the two.
In Totality and Infinity we are presented with an erotic relation which is 
already ethical; the realm of sensibility as an encounter with the other is 
to be thought indispensably as a relation of responsibility. The 
insistence upon keeping the ethical and erotic in conjunction serves a 
double purpose; not only is sensibility emphatically positioned in 
embodiment - a challenge to any ethics of the mind or consciousness, which 
seeks to put the will of the rational agent as the main concern of ethics 
at the expense of the body, but conversely the realm of the erotic is not 
situated 'outside' or beyond the concern of ethics.
Levinas has another reason for maintaining ethics and the erotic together. 
He attempts to rethink ethics other than as a relation to death or non- 
being (as it is, he implies, in Sartre or Heidegger). The negativity of 
this construction, while it establishes death as a horizon to being, does 
so in a way that positions ethics as fundamentally in a tragic role, as 
keeping together what will fall apart at the horizon of being and the 
margins of existence. Levinas also indicates that a preoccupation with 
death tends to make awareness of one's own mortality the place of morality, 
rather than first and foremost any concern for the other. If death and 
non-being are the only spurs to ethical action, I am mindful of my own 
demise and its relation to lived existence before a relation to others, 
even though my situation among them is required such that ethics can take 
place at all.^*^
In contrast, Levinas focusses on the erotic, pleasure and enjoyment, to 
redress the balance. If ethics is only connected with death, either as
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contrasting from death or as made possible by its horizon, we run the risk 
of occluding the strands of sexuality and pleasure implicated in the 
picture too, which by extension may also lead to an exclusion of 
difference. Without pleasure, the process becomes another way of writing 
the body out of ethics.
This is not to say that the relation to death is obliterated from 
Levinasian ethics, although he makes constant provisos to separate his work 
from Heidegger.
1. Death cannot be approached with lucidity and hence with 'supreme 
v i r i l i t y ' _ it cannot be known as an experience, except insofar as it 
is unknowable, so it cannot be known as an utmost possibility of freedom, 
or as making 'the very feat of grasping a possibility’. Levinas writes: 
'Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me the subject 
seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering...It is not with the 
nothingness of death of which we know precisely nothing, that our analysis 
must begin, but with the situation where something absolutely unknowable 
appears'.<«)
2. Death announces passivity and suffering, and this can be seen as an 
undergoing, the surrender of claims to mastery. This description of those 
modes of being which do not duplicate domination and the 'virility' of 
being foreshadows the discussion of passivity as the deepest form of 
responsibility in Otherwise Than Being.
One advantage of prioritising the horizon of death in ethics is the means 
by which this horizon negotiates the problems of sexual difference which 
Levinas must tackle in re-introducing the erotic. What specifically marks
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the erotic is the encounter between sexuate bodies, which is precisely what 
draws Irigaray to the philosophy of Levinas, since it is an opening of 
questions concerning sexual difference. Of her two pieces on Levinas, 'The 
Fecundity of the Caress' is far more equivocal, allusive and eliptical 
than the later 'Questions to Enmanuel Levinas'. On the surface, it would 
seem that a feminist reading would always maintain that sexual difference 
must be the first question, since it is only if this difference is seen to 
penetrate to the most hidden levels that it can resist being conscripted 
back into the neutral again. But Irigaray is equivocal herself on this 
fundamental question; she writes of 'a caress that precedes every caress' 
and 'a becoming in which the other gives of a space-time which is still 
f r e e T h i s  hint of a prior relation to a horizon which, in its non­
determination, could provide a way of referring difference into a different 
mode of understanding, in the future which is yet to come. This possible 
new relation would be 'bathing in a horizon that goes beyond intention, it 
says what is hidden without exhausting it in a meaning 
She is preoccupied, in this essay, by the problem of a 'remembrance' of 
what has not yet taken place, which would be the birth of new relations and 
possibilities of difference.
'The memory of the flesh as the place of approach...the memory of 
touching? The most persisting and the most difficult to make comply 
with memory...Memory of the flesh, where what has not yet been written 
is inscribed, laid down? What has no discourse to wrap itself in? What 
has not yet been b o m  into language? What has a place, has taken place, 
but h^g ^o language. The felt, which expresses itself for the first
This memory is a horizon of 'the already and the not yet'. Irigaray is 
alluding to the figuration of the symbolic feminine/matemal, prior to
-147
birth and not yet given expression. In order to write of this possibility 
at all, she has recourse to something like Levinas' notion of the trace, 
which is like a fissure of that which is unrepresentable and only comes to 
be known as the third which has passed, and surpassed, the conditions of 
representation. To avoid being con trued as an essential otherness, we must 
also recognise the extent to which it interweaves in the present moment as 
well, establishing difference in the heart of 'the felt', the moment of 
experience and the erotic dimension. For Irigaray, this is the divine, 
which will engage the possibility of future reconceptualisations of 
relations of difference.(52)
'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas'(^3) presses further on the above issues.
The decidability of this question does not correspond to a straightforward 
dilenma between feminist (material sexual difference) or non-feminist (a 
neutral notion of alterity) positions. Both positions provide a convincing 
way of articulating difference for feminism; the first in its direct and 
imnediate experience of embodiment which stresses the materiality of bodies 
and their meanings; the second in providing access to another dimension of 
otherness which can escape the circularity of dual difference. And 
Irigaray has recourse to both these positions in the course of her work. 
These positions correspond to a phenomenological dimension; the face to 
face encounter of difference, and the metaphysical relation to that which 
lies 'other' to otherness. Irigaray does not attack either of these 
positions in favour of the other; rather she uses the phenomenological 
dimension to explicate a theory of sexual difference, but she also 
elaborates the metaphysical dimension as that which will allow women to 
'become divine for themselves'• But she also has criticisms to make of
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each of these positions; the phenomenological dimension traps women in the 
visual mode as always other to the intentionality of perception, and the 
metaphysical dimension generally figures transcendence to and from a 
monosexed God.
Irigaray's criticisms may be summarised in two points:
1. She notes that Levinas opens the feminine in philosophy and yet still
seems to 'write out' the feminine; 'the caress, that "fundamental disorder" 
does not touch the other'. Perhaps we should recall Derrida's note
here, to the effect that Levinas is explicitly writing as a man, and will 
not or cannot embrace the political dimension which Irigaray passionately 
seeks. 0 5)
2. Her second critical point is that we have not yet reached the safe 
haven where we can consider the age of onto-theological concerns from the 
moment of a post-modern approach to subjectivity and identity (including 
that of the notion of God); there are still areas of 'radical 
interrogation' which need to be addressed.
-149-
CHAPTER SEVEN; THE FBflMME/MATERNAL AS NATURE
So far, the disruptive effects of a force codified as feminine has been 
explored in the context of philosophical-phenomenological accounts of the 
lived experience of the body. The disruptive effects of otherness have 
been strategically linked with 'the feminine' as negativity, and with the 
identity of Woman as Other in the dual marking of sexual difference. The 
ambiguity of these two aspects of 'the feminine' is taken up for a feminist 
perspective, to try and analyse this notion as the repressed or unspoken 
dimension of philosophy. Developing this ambiguity and attending to it 
constitutes an attempt to engender an 'ethics of sexual difference'.
In the following chapters, the strategic appropriation of otherness 
codified as feminine will be developed. If such a codification borrows 
from the marking of Woman as sexually specific, an additional aspect of 
this marking may be explored. This is the metaphoric link of otherness 
with the maternal. In Chapter Two, Kristeva's symbolic linking of the 
semiotic with the maternal was noted, and in Chapter Five, Irigaray's 
analysis of Merleau-Ponty's 'invisible' coincided with the maternal. I now 
intend to explore the maternal as another way of articulating the symbolic 
otherness in the context of philosophy.
As with 'the feminine', the maternal has an ambiguous character when 
understood symbolically; it is simultaneously the unbounded heterogeneity 
which threatens every stability, the 'void' of non-representation or the 
uncontainable processes of signification, or, it is the serene icon of
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identity, the idealised perfection of Woman as Mother, or the woman as the 
'maternal sex'. The ambiguity of these two characterisations is not to be 
resolved; rather, it is my intention to examine such ambiguity for its 
negative connotations (where the maternal appears as a foundational ground 
as Nature, and/or as an on to-theological Ideal). From a feminist 
perspective, these connotations act as repressive constrictions on the 
figuring of the feminine/matemal. In Irigaray and Kristeva's readings of 
philosophical/cultural texts, they critically identify the moments when the 
maternal is associated with an archaic past as 'the natural realm', origin 
and ground for existents, but then superseded to allow the emergence of 
existents as separate identities.^' They also criticise the deifying of 
the maternal into an Ideal, as the 'fundamental fetish, phallus-substitute, 
support for all transcendental divinity' as Kristeva puts it, or the
of
projection onto the figure of the mother^ideal qualities, using this 
representation as a symbolic binding or repository for otherwise dangerous 
forces. This process may act to freeze women into this role, and also to 
deny them access to other possibilities of representation.
However, Kristeva and Irigaray also examine the maternal for its 'positive' 
connotations, whereby the maternal can appear as strategically disruptive, 
and/or as one possible aspect of specifically women's experience. This 
aspect of their work constitutes the attempt to revive or re-engage aspects 
of the maternal which have been occluded. In discussing this aspect of the 
maternal, I will raise the following questions: To what extent does 
identity rest upon the repressed and elided 'feminine' which can also be 
described as maternal? Can the character of the feminine/matemal be 
articulated in such a way as to avoid its repressive connotations, in order 
to present philosophy with a feminist perspective, and with a more
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productive understanding of its own methodology?
The implication is that while Western metaphysics may possess a necessarily 
foundational character, the extent to which such foundational thinking is 
aligned and implicated with metaphors of the maternal may be further 
explored from a feminist perspective.
In The Visible and the Invisible. Merleau-Ponty writes: 'Do a psycho­
analysis of Nature; it is the flesh, the mother'.^)
The analysis of the philosophical conceptions of nature also indicate its 
elision with conceptions of the maternal. Levinas' thought bears witness 
to some of the ambivalences I outlined above, in that he wishes to separate 
his ethical thought and its associations with the feminine maternal, from 
the foundational aspects of Western metaphysics which he sees as 
totalising. And yet, there is an implicit realm of the 'natural' which 
also has implications for a feminist reading of his thought and also for 
any attempt to revalue the metaphor of maternity as ethics.
If it is the case that Levinas' work demonstrates a progression in the 
course of its development - not necessarily a revision of his earlier work, 
but certainly an intensification or elaboration of some points - then we 
need to establish the consequences of this progression.^ This may be 
suimarised as a shift from the language of Totality And Infinity which is 
perhaps bound by its preoccupation with phenomenology and ontology, to the 
more pressing ethical engagement of Otherwise Than Being. This move 
corresponds to a shift from a concern with the feminine and the erotic, to 
a development of the notion of maternity as vulnerability, suffering and 
passivity.
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There are immediate and obvious objections to these notions which, it 
seems, rather than instigating the feminine into emancipated ethical 
relations, merely serve to bind it back even more firmly into the images 
and representations of long-suffering motherhood, the patient expectation 
of exploitation in the name of unconditional love. This accusation 
remains on the level of empirical representation, and does not tackle the 
very conditions and possibility of such representations, the means by which 
such equations are maintained. It is part of Levinas' project to give an 
account of these conditions. However, if Levinas' project is to be 
evaluated as an attempt to deal with the very structures of ontology and 
totalising thought which will continue to reproduce the equations of 
representation, we must retrace the steps of his thought which lead him to 
his characterisation of maternity as the fundamental ethical condition.
In Levinas' characterisation of the 'il y a' (there i s ) ^  certain 
questions concerning the origin, or emergence of the existent may be 
raised. For Levinas, the'il y a1 corresponds to being - supposedly not 
returned to absolute or total chaos - but beingrithout differentiation. 
'One cannot put this return to nothingness outside of all events. But what 
of the nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and the 
silence of nothingness'.^
The 'il y a' is a force field, it is a plethora of formlessness which is 
still something like sensoriun, but without any possibility of 
distinguishing between the experiential forces.
The indeterminatenesss of this 'something is happening' is not the 
indeterminateness of a subject and does not refer to a 
substantive...This impersonal, anonymous, yet indistinguishable 
'consummation' of being, which murmurs in the depths of nothingness 
itself, we shall designate by the term there is.* '
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So the anonymity of the'il y a'corresponds in some ways to Kristeva's realm 
of the semiotic, an initial signifying realm which is positioned prior to 
the emergence of the existent. the points of nocturnal space do not
refer to each other as in illuminated space; there is no perspective, they 
are not situated. There is a swarming of p o i n t s ' . L i k e  the realm of 
pulsions in a provisional ordering in Kristeva's chora, 'it is full, but 
full of the nothingness of everything' In order to enter into
exteriority and the possibility of ethics the existent must emerge from 
this realm of darkness.
The realm of the anonymous also corresponds to the metaphoric fluidity of 
the maternal realm, the mother who is the continuity of natural flux, an 
experiential profusion of forces; 'an ocean (la mer) which beats up 
against (being) on all sides'.^®) Kristeva characterises this process in *- 
similar way: '...no one is present, within that simultaneously dual and 
alien space, to signify what is going on. "It happens but I'm not there".
"I cannot realise it, but it goes on".^11  ^ Despite its apparent 
positioning prior to the emergent existent, the positioning of such a realm 
is only conducted from a place already 'delivered' from it; there is no 
unmediated access to the'il y a‘, but this does not mean that it is wholly 
inacessible. Rather, a dislocation between the time and space of the 
maternal and the placing of the existent in individuated time is effected. 
'To be conscious is to be t o m  from the there is...';^^ 'Instead of 
serving as our means of access to being, nocturnal space delivers us over 
to being' •(13>
Topologies of the existent, its capacities to live and work, are engendered 
by its birth into a sensate realm. This is a realm of immediacy and
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enjoyment, but it also begins the establishing of positionality, through 
separation and distinction, a certain relinquishing of indeterminacy. The 
world is a givenness to the existent which establishes the topography of 
inner/outer, work and the home interior and exterior etc. The theorisation 
of this process can be found in its various forms in Rousseau, Marx and 
Freud/Lacan, for example. The process is both tragic in its loss of an
origin and yet also establishes an awareness of the loss of origin for the 
existent. Levinas is seeking to instantiate ethics from the very 
comnencement of his thought in this context.
As many critics i n d i c a t e , d e s p i t e  Levinas' attempt to distinguish his 
position from a Heideggerian ontology, it is by no means a straightforward 
separation. Although the relation beween Levinas and Heidegger cannot be 
dealt with in detail here, we can note a few key points.
Levinas characterises the experiential response to the*il y a* as one of 
horror and repulsion, one which provokes a sense of existence not away from 
death, but from the endless continuity of being. Thus the existent is 
impelled into contact with distinctions and discriminating separation, not 
by the fear of an end to existence but by a fear of its never ending.
...nothing approaches, nothing comes, nothing threatens; this silence, 
this tranquility, this void of sensations constitutes a mute, 
absolut^^indeterminate menace...The rustling of the there is... is
This is intended to act as a corrective to Heidegger's horizon of 
m o r t a l i t y , which Levinas sees as provoking the existent into a 
solitudinous existence, and initiating the relation to being as a relation
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of 'virility', and also to the generosity of the 'givenness' of Being, 
which Levinas thinks cannot explain why the separation of beings from Being 
should ever take place .
The experience of 'no exit' from being is, for Levinas, far more compelling 
than the horizon of death or a vibration of being as immersed enjoyment. 
Here we can note that the sense of being 'submerged by the night, invaded, 
depersonalised, stifled by it'^®^ is given a different experiental 
approach than the bliss of unmediated jouissance which Kristeva and 
Irigaray characterise as the realm of ambiguous, undetermined being.
For Levinas, one is impelled away from this experience, towards the 
enjoyment engendered by separation. And yet, Levinas seeks enjoyment of 
the elemental, once separation is effected, as the possibility of ethics 
for the existent.
Sensibility is not a blind reason and folly. To sense is precisely to 
be sincerely content with what is sensed, to enjoy, to refuse the 
unconscious prolongations, to be thoughtless, that is without ulterior 
motive (afterthought), unequivocal, to break.with all the implications - 
to maintain oneself at home with oneself
This empathy of enjoyment is supposed to guard against the 'mastery' of 
domination which might be the outcome of thinking being as power. Such an 
approach would correspond to the uprooting and promotion of the hunan into 
its privileged position which goes on to desecrate that which is other. He 
locates the violence of totality and identity in a repulsion or 'allergy' 
to otherness. But his early characterisation of the il y a* is precisely 
one of an uncontrollable realm from which the existent emerges, such that 
enjoyment can come to be understood as such, and the emergence can only be 
a sense of relief in an escape from the suffocation of fear.
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Levinas also wants to separate his position from the Heideggerian relation 
to the natural. He sees Heidegger's views on technology as a will to 
return to 'a pagan existence', 'a peasant rootedness', a philosophy of 
blood and soil which is 'a rule of power more inhuman than technology'.(21) 
Such an attempt to recollect the question of being in this form may be 
contra the onto-theology of Western thought and a critique of rationality, 
but for Levinas it is not only a disguised form of religious thinking but 
one which has politically suspect implications. Apart from being 'anti- 
Biblical', in Levinas' terms, it returns violence in a more virulent form 
and now in the name of 'mother earth'. In writing on Heidegger, he states:
Being directs its building and cultivating, in the midst of a familiar 
landscape, on a maternal earth. Anonymous, neuter, it directs it, 
ethically indifferent, as heroic freedom, foreign to all guilt with 
regard to the other. Indeed, this earth maternity determines the whole 
West^j^civilisation of property, exploitation, political tyr ny and
Levinas wishes to avoid the problematic relation to the natural as a 
version of paganism. He backs off from what he sees as the unacceptable 
forms of mysticism and the divine, but there is a danger that he is once 
again then drawing on a repulsion of the natural to found his righteous 
defence of the ethical. This time it is the anonymous *il y a which is to 
be mastered. He refuses the characterisation of consciousness of itself 
reacting against itself as bound within ontology, so there must be a 
givenness of otherness to found the existent. But the givenness which is 
sacrificed here is not inseparable from the maternal realm.
In this sense, we can note Levinas' debt to the notion of a birth from the 
primordial, from the constrictions and suffocations of a motherly touching
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which is continuous and entwining, without a space of separation. The 
claustrophobic closeness of this intra-uterine dimension is nocturnal and 
terrifying, it conjures up the paralysis in which one is unable to breathe, 
so close that the amniotic fluid surrounds and liquifies all boundaries. 
And yet this is a form of breathing even in non-separation; the paradox of 
a symbolic undecidability concerning the boundaries of self and other. It 
is characterised as both separation and continuity.
But the gathering up of an existent in this respect cannot strictly 
speaking be described as a repression of the otherness of the il y a* or 
anonymity; it has to be there already in the existent. Since it has 
provoked or provided the very boundaries of the initial topography, such 
boundaries are already like a porous membrane which must allow the 
transmission of forces in, through and across them. The rupturing of a 
notion of 'before' and 'after' prevents a division of being into regions 
which correspond to pre-conscious and conscious. We might understand the 
porosity of beings as constantly intersected by the unruly equivocation 
which stops them from completion as essential and discrete identities.
The incessant murmur of the there is strikes with absurdity the active 
transcendental ego, beginning and present. But the absurdity of the 
there is , as a modality of the one-for-the-other, signifies... In this 
overflowing of sense by nonsense, the sensibility, the self, is first 
brought out, in its bottomless passivity,,as..pure sensible point, a dis­
interestedness, or subversion of essence.'-^3'
In this sense, the 'signification' of this realm corresponds to Kristeva's 
suggestion that the semiotic can be understood as persisting through into 
the understandings of the symbolic. The archaic maternal jouissance is the 
condition for identity formation, but remains residually in such identity.
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The residues of such forces subvert a hunanist subject and prevent it from 
being essentialised. However, it seems that the renunciation of this realm 
in favour of the socio-symbolic positions it as irredeemably other. For 
Kristeva, it is through the signifying practices of art and religion that 
such forces find their expressivity, harnessed back into a means of 
representation which does not fully exhaust them.
In returning, through the event of death, towards that which produces 
its break; in exporting semiotic motility across the border on which 
the sy^j^ic is established, the artist sketches out a kind of second
In Kristeva's work it seems to be the avant-garde artist who provides the 
locus of the transformation of such forces, 'asocial' negativity 
constituting a revolutionary inscription of the fluid and heterogeneous 
realm into the socio-symbolic. For Kristeva, the feminist direction of 
this project is less explicit or perhaps, less revolutionary, since it is a 
project which rests upon the uniqueness of the individual's capacity to 
transform these forces. The question remains; how are the traces or 
residues of this realm to be called up or re-interpreted, in such a way 
that the maternal element is not just continually superseded?
It is difficult to determine if Levinas is wholly guilty of the elision of 
the maternal element, the suppression of otherness which he is concerned to 
avoid, or whether he is sufficiently aware of the dangers of repressing or 
colonising this symbolic otherness. Irigaray expresses her hesitation on 
this issue in her 'Questions to Bimanuel Levinas' when she asks if Levinas 
is sufficiently attentive to the 'natural universe', or whether he locates 
otherness and ethicality in the realms of signification and the social, at
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the expense of this r e a l m . L e v i n a s '  attempt to realise the maternal 
representationally will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.
Irigaray suggests it might be possible to identify two notions of birth in 
the Levinasian text; one which is the 'good' birth; the attempt to rethink 
sexual relations and the understandings of the body which could result in 
new approaches to these questions, the other is the wresting free of the 
dangerous paralysis of maternal suffocation in the endless continuity of 
being, at the expense of the natural realm, coded as maternal.
In her own work, there is a marked concern to examine the 'elemental', 
firstly as providing a reminder to philosophy of this under-explored ' pre­
rat ional' world view, and secondly, to develop a vocabulary which might 
articulate this otherness. Irigaray writes: 'I wanted to go back to this 
natural material which makes up our bodies, in which our lives and 
environment are grounded; the flesh of the passions',(26) In this sense, 
her 'elemental' texts deal with air, earth, water and fire, as a re- 
invention of the material origins of philosophical thinking and of sexual 
divisions, which is also symbol ically maternal.(27) This is to be a means 
of drawing attention to the hidden or silent debt owed to this realm.
Does not being find its foundation in a sensible imnediacy as yet 
unspoken? In a silence upon that which secretly nourishes thinking? 
The unspoken or inexpressible of a relation of man to nature which 
escapes his logos. Which gives (of) itself in the unnamed site where 
the organs' contribution to their meaning is gathered. A givenness 
which is re-projected into a world and its objects. Thus recreating 
the whole, and making of each one whole, and of the whole each.one, 
without ever making the secret of this production apparent.' >
For Levinas, femininity is located within the economy of totality, yet with 
a fundamental otherness. Levinas writes of 'atheism' being the fundamental
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situation - it is the hunan condition to exist in enjoyment first, only to 
encounter otherness not as a shock from elsewhere, but as a gentleness, as 
a disturbance within the economy where work and labour already take 
place. (29) in this sense it is an inmanent disruption, since this feminine 
mode of being is a gentle and harmonious intemality, not one which comes 
to impinge from outside. We can also see Levinas' resistance to dualities 
in his characterisation of dwelling^3®) - the notion of being at home does 
not stand in opposition to the public realm as it does in Hegel, the 
private sphere which must be subordinated to the public in order to keep it 
under control. ^3*) Rather, the home or habitation describes a situatedness 
which is already part of work and life. It is presupposed by these 
structures. So rather than present two spheres fundamentally at odds with 
each other in what they seek to achieve, Levinas is trying to establish 
peaceable relations - not subordinate to a fictitious unity of the state 
and a universality which is masculine in its universality, but a 
preservation of differences in the acknowledgement of immanent otherness.
The situation in the world as enjoyment is not, however, a complacent lapse 
into a comfortable disregard, but it does indicate Levinas' attempt to 
question the notion of anxiety which often accompanies situatedness. (-*2)
The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of 
human activity but in being its condition and in this sense its 
comnencement... Simultaneously .without and within, (one) goes forth 
outside from an inwardness.
Life in this sense is concerned with enjoyment and agreeableness, not 
negativity. Thus the breach of inferiority as a dimension is through
'the primordial phenomena of gentleness'.^35) In this way alterity is
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already presented as a mode of welcome and peace, not as a violent 
confrontation. Levinas hopes to introduce a fundamental ethicality, 
simultaneous to but not collapsed into the revelation of the Other.
Levinas is explicit that such a moment is feminine.
In founding the intimacy of the home the idea of infinity provokes 
separation not by some force of opposition,and dialectical evocation, 
but by the feminine grace of its radiance.^'
So Levinas suggests instead of the virility of totality and the violence he 
identifies in dualistic oppositions, the gentleness of an alterity already 
implicit, coded with femininity. And rather than aligning the feminine 
with death and negativity, it is here used to invoke a different mode of 
relations, ones concerned with love and the erotic. But this is not merely 
figured as a safe haven of calmness, since the feminine is also the 
dimension of absence, withdrawal and alterity; in other words, of 
transcendence. This relation is both intimacy and an imnediate welcome, 
but also a 'lapse in being', - a non-present otherness, 'the very essence 
of discretion... the presence of the Other must not only be revealed in the 
face which breaks through its own plastic image but must be revealed, 
simultaneously, with this presence, in its withdrawal and absence'
Femininity, thus figured, is meant to play havoc with the structures of 
intentionality and identity. On the one hand, it is not supposed to be 
reducible to Woman in the home, since it disturbs even the domesticity of 
this arrangement with the strangeness that the 'feminine-as-other' 
announces. In this sense, Levinas uses the symbolism of femininity as 
gentleness and a welcome in the home (a risky undertaking) in the familiar 
equation of comfort and ease with the world. The hints of the maternal
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metaphor as homely care Is also lingering around this account of dwelling. 
But he seeks to overload the metaphoric structure in such a way as to 
exceed its constraints. However, in that femininity is the encounter with 
the other in difference, it indicates a) that Levinas is still entranced by 
a structure of intentionality in casting the feminine as 'the threshold of 
the real', objectifying her as phenomenal, and b) if the feminine is that 
which already at home in the dwelling, an existing equation of ethicality, 
domesticity and femininity seems to be reinforced. This creates a problem 
for women's relation to this equation. If she is that mode of 
signification, in order to encounter it as her other she must either become 
masculine (as the one to be addressed or commanded by the other who is not 
the same as her), or else be able to separate herself from the feminine in 
order to be able to encounter this dimension of alterity.
To put it in Irigaray's terms, if the feminine is providing a dwelling for 
man, she lacks a home for herself and must be in effect 'homeless'. She 
lacks a way of coming and going, to and from, for herself.
That house of language which for men goes so far as to supply his 
dwelling in a body...woman is used to construct it, but, then, it is 
not available to her.*38'
Irigaray suggests that if women are to find a way of 'dwelling' in language 
they cannot wholly live in the role of 'philosopher's wife'. They have to 
recognise the extent to which something is kept in reserve in that role, 
always 'elsewhere', and yet only emerging through the mimicry of such a 
role.
To go back inside the philosopher's house requires, too, that 
she be able to fulfill the role of matter - mother or sister...
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Irigaray suggests the 'nomadic' element of the feminine as 'outside' the 
house of language and dwelling, be brought into conjunction with the 
'furnishing' role of the feminine/matemal as it provides such a dwelling, 
to expose the equivocal relation of these two metaphors. For Irigaray, 
such a conjunction ^rovokes " rethinking of sur' equations, but for her 
this rethinking is an explicitly feminist project rather than a generally 
ethical one. 'For (Levinas), the feminine does not stand for an other to be 
respected in her human freedom and human identity. The feminine other is 
left without her own specific face. On this point, his philosophy falls 
radically short of ethics. '(^0)
In the previous chapters, the attempts to characterise the 
feminine/matemal within the context of phenomenology has been examined.
The radicality of this approach presents certain feminist potentials, in 
that a non-totalising and descriptive methodology is a challenge to 
metaphysics, and so to the emergence of existents as essences or 
essentialised identities. However, it also seems to present a problematic 
failure to account for the feminine/matemal adequately, in returning to 
the mimetic structures of representation as visibility, or to an 
unacknowledged reliance upon a feminine/matemal realm as foundational. 
Whether this notion is given the figuring of 'the natural' or 'the 
dwelling', the phenomenological framework seems bound to reinscribe the 
feminine/matemal in dangerous ways. Although Kristeva and Irigaray seem 
open to this charge as well, what would mark a specifically feminist 
direction to this project would be a more insistent vigilance to the 
appearance and discussion of such notions in the philosophical context.
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In her 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', Irigaray identifies 'two levels' to 
Levinas' discourse. The first is the appropriation of the phenomenological 
approach, 'in particular through the caress, to the carnal relation, to the 
alterity of the feminine, to the unseen of the flesh', which constitutes a 
challenge to metaph sics. However, this seems in danger of falling back 
into 'the boundaries staked out by the philosophical constitution of the 
masculine subject...it is submerged in animality, perversity, childhood 
(which/whose?) of which the feminine is the condition of representation.' 
For Irigaray this amounts to the abandonment of the feminine other, which 
'leaves her to sink, in particular into the darkness of a 
p s e u d o a n i m a l i t y ' W e  have examined this charge in the context of 
Levinas' writing on the level of the elemental.
The second 'level' in Levinas' work is the Other on a metaphysical or 
theological level. For Irigaray, the aspect of the texts 'belongs to the 
imperatives of the metaphysical tradition', the revelatory aspect of the 
other. She notes that 'Levinas (usually intentionally) fails to 
distinguish between the foundations of philosophy and the foundations of 
theology'. In the next chapter, I will explore the implications of a 
'divine' in the context of Levinas' ethical philosophy, and further examine 
its implications for a feminist perspective.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE FBttNINE/MATERNAL AS DIVINE
In the following chapter the conception of the feminine/matemal as divine 
will be discussed. In the first instance, this can be read as a 
divinisation of the feminine/maternal as Ideal, the perfection of Woman as 
Other into Woman/Mother. Critical analyses of the socio-symbolic 
representations of 'divine' motherhood which correspond to this notion 
point out its negative connotations. In this sense it is restrictive for 
women, corresponding to the projection of 'desirable' ethical qualities of 
patience and nurturance onto the symbolic figuring of the mother. Whether 
such totalising representations are found in religious discourse or in 
secular variations, they are intended to act as ethical ideals, and hence 
as founding principles, but seem to re-fix women as other and to establish 
impossible paradigms.
Nevertheless, it is clear that because feminist thinking is still concerned 
with ideals, with ethics, and with seeking more productive versions of 
representation, it is still implicated in the structures of metaphysics, 
and in seeking the 'other' woman who may come to exist in the future. If, 
as Irigaray, Kristeva and Levinas suggest, there is an 'other', more 
obscure or darker region to philosophy and to ethical thinking, it cannot 
be 'seen' clearly in the terms of representation, presence and truth, but 
yet it can perhaps voiced or exposed in a way which acknowledges the unpaid 
debt which is owed to it. One version of this obscure region is the 
'matière première' or 'mother-matter',^1  ^ the unevoked ground of 
metaphysics as the matemal/feminine. As I suggested in the previous
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chapter, the foundational aspect of ethical thinking may be inescapable, 
but it will still be important in this context to re-examine the 
characterisation of such foundations or ideals, and the very means by which 
their construction or revelation takes place. This is particularly 
pressing, in the context of this study, when the 'hidden' element coincides 
with the matemal/feminine. However, if the processes by which such 
constructions take place are left unexamined, not only will the repetitive 
and destructive circuits be repeated, but such processes may reappear 
anyway in the feminist positions which attempt to challenge them. The 
processes will appear as feminist attempts to articulate new forms of 
subjectivity and more fruitful ideals to aim for, or as the mysticism of 
female goddesses, for example, as ideal symbols, when such symbols are taken 
to signal a wholly alternative mode of signification for women. The 
problem here is how to articulate such expression if it has already been 
shown to be 'elsewhere' to the systems of signification. An approach may 
be suggested as follows:
1. A critique of the onto-theological nature of metaphysical thinking, when 
the notion of the subject and the divine are articulated in terms of 
presence. From a feminist perspective, this means a critical 
examination of representations of the divine which are restrictive for 
women and for the 'feminine/matemal' otherness we have identified.
Such notions may be restrictive either in deifying Woman or in denying 
their reliance upon the symbolic feminine/matemal as the hidden ground 
of their structures.
2. An acknowledgement that in order to think the problematics of ethics,
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some way of articulating possible alternatives is required. This seems 
to demand a version of a ground, space or realm from which to reveal 
such alternatives. The key issue is the way that such a notion is 
understood. For a feminist philosopher, such a notion seems to suggest 
the effaced 'other' of the matemal/feminine, the possibility of a lost 
or as-yet-not-existing realm of 'dark' meanings and the 'mother-matter' 
of archaic origins.^
3. An attempt to rethink this notion in a way that negotiates the
restrictions of previous ways of thinking and opens up more fruitful 
potentials. This moment of 'exposure' or revelation is already 
compromised by the initial critique of such structures, and so must be 
expressed indirectly, in mimicry, irony, poetically or obscurely. Such 
strategies will draw attention to their own strategic positioning.
In what follows, I intend to examine Irigaray and Levinas' attempts to 
bring to light the obscure or hidden otherness of a different 'form of 
truth'. The revelation of such hiddenness corresponds to a Heideggerian 
revealing-as-concealing, and indeed it is Heidegger who is the shadowy 
figure who lies in the background for both Levinas and Irigaray in this 
context. However, for both Levinas and Irigaray, it is not the 
neutrality of Being which is at stake in this unveiling, but a maternal 
conception of unlimited jouissance, equivalent to the semiotic space, or 
the fluid heterogeneity of the feminine/matemal, a dark and divided notion 
of truth to be 'revealed'.
This strategic positioning of the feminine/matemal is a deliberate attempt 
to intervene in the philosophical occlusion of sexual difference. While
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Heidegger's notion of Being as obscure absence and the project of re­
thinking such a notion correponds to Irigaray and Levinas' thinking to some 
extent, they seek to once again re-mark this approach in an immanent and 
sexualised mode.(5)
In orthodox versions of Christianity, the name of God is seen to be tied up 
with wholeness and presence. This characterisation of the divine is 
entwined with a particular notion of perfection and existence which belongs 
to a specific Western tradition, coinciding with the versions of 
subjectivity and being which have been brought into question in previous 
chapters of this study.
The fact that such static or unified notions of subjectivity are 
representations of unquestionable presence can also be seen in the parallel 
perfections of God as supreme and ineffable being, and Woman as ideal icon 
of subjectivity. The phantasmic projection of oneness, perfect unity, 
places Woman and God in a parallel structure of idealisation, raised to the 
status of absolute purity. The place occupied by both in such a structure 
is as something 'outside' or beyond the speakable. The unspeakable 
perfection of the eternal origin guarantees the conditions and possibility 
of speech at all, and yet at the price of silence. God is absent, 
withdrawn or excluded, as is the ideal Woman, (The) Woman, such that the 
space of desire can take place. In such conditions, a space of 
metaphysical, ardent desire which can never defile its target is set up.
In This Sex Irigaray writes;
... does not that ineffable ecstatic pleasure take the place for men of 
a Supreme Being, whom they need but who ultimately eludes their
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knowledge. Does it not occupy - for them - the role of God? With the 
requirement - for them - that it be discreet enough not to disturb them 
in the logic of their desire.
For God has to be there so that subjects may speak, or rather speak 
about him. But "He" has, for "His" part, nothing to say on this 
subject/to these subjects. It is up to men.to enact his laws. And to 
subject him, in particular, to their ethic.'''
Here she suggests God acts as a narcissistic perfecting and projection of 
the subject in the masculine, a God of man who keeps silent - withdraws - 
such that ethics can be formulated. As part of the formulations of the 
concerns of Western metaphysics, the formulations of God are in keeping 
with the masculine bias she has identified. This also applies to the 
aspects of religious discourse which touch upon the ethical. Ethics in and 
through God makes a place for man.
Equally, the ideal Woman occupies a negative site of origin as the 
transcendental mother figure and as 'excess'; the otherness of feminine 
jouissance. But the price to be paid here is a sacrifice of access to 
otherness, since such formulations are at the cost of one of the elements, 
notably the feminine/matemal.
There is nothing to be desired about being the term of the other. This 
paralyses us in our becoming. Divinity and goddess for and of man - we 
are deprived of our goals and paths.'8'
But while she is critical of the structure of this idealising metaphysical 
desire, (in the sense that it projects an ideal), Irigaray also recognises 
its necessity for the development of future feminine subjects, 'it is 
indispensable for us to be God for us, so that we can be divine for the 
other \ < 9>
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This will involve reading religious aspirations as originating in the 
human, in anthopologising religion in order to question its necessity, or 
re-locating such aspirations back in a material realm. This approach is 
intended to problematise the divisions of camal/spiritual and of 
masculinQ^eminine. It corresponds to the historicising of that which is 
seen to be a timeless ideal, in order to divest it of any eternal fixity 
and give it a relativism which will also be to open it up to futural 
change. God has been 'made' in one sense - the articulation of alterity 
has taken cultural shape as the Father and Son, with the relationship of 
the Holy Spirit between them. This articulation has specific conditions, 
as Irigaray, following Feuerbach, i n d i c a t e s . G o d  acts as a perfecting 
element for man, man withdrawn from the world into a concentrated 
abstraction, a concentrated accomplishment of aspirations. As we have 
seen, the Virgin Mary is coded as a cipher through which the divine spirit 
may pass, and in her very instantiation as mother is reduced to an icon of 
stasis, mother of suffering and self-denying love. Any dynamism she might 
present on her own terms is covered over in such representations.
The strength of giving a history of this conceptual progression is to 
indicate its roots in the hunan. It points to a materialist understanding 
of religious concepts, by showing their relation to the conditions and 
determinations of their time, and so provides the grounds for a critique of 
such a metanarrative, showing it to be contingent.
But by this critique Feuerbach does not intend to abolish religion, but 
rather to understand and so improve it. Religion is, for Feuerbach ' a 
relation based on the affections which until now has sought its truth in a 
fantastic reflection of reality'/12  ^ For Feuerbach, sex love will become
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the material realisation of this relation, and it is through religion that 
these relations will come to their fullest realisation, in accordance with 
the etymological connotation of the word religare, a bond.(13) jn other 
words, the love relation between the sexes, more productively idealised, 
will reflect down again and make the bonding of humanity even stronger. 
This is Feuerbach's hope for the effect which a consciously directed 
spiritual dimension can produce. By intervening on the mechanisms of 
perfection, we could produce the kinds of gods we most desire. This 
corresponds to Irigaray's project of problematising the divisions of 
spiritual/camal, to illustrate such divisions as destructive, and then 
attempting to develop an ethics of the passions. For Irigaray, a similar 
process might be employed in the understanding of sexual difference.
But Engels and Marx's criticisms of Feuerbach are timely in this context, 
in that they point out the essentialised and de-historicized notion of the 
hunan this produces. Desire and spirituality are an unquestioned pre­
condition of the hunan element; a certain self-consciousness which can 
cognise its own teleology, independently of history. Feuerbach wants the 
sensuous material form but abstracts an idealised content - a human 
essence. This is what makes revolutionary upsurges in representations 
possible, but it will fail to alter the very conditions of representation 
unless it is able to recognise their contingency too. The framework is to 
be brought into radical doubt just as much as the content of its 
productions.
Irigaray shows that she is aware of this problem of essentialising or de- 
historicising desire. Rather than rely upon the existing framework of
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representation and the mimetic structures of consciousness, Irigaray has 
recourse to an 'indirect' means of revealing this concealed aspect of the 
divine, which also draws attention to its own strategic (mis)- 
represen tat ions. She is not just arguing that women need access to a 
feminine kind of divine too, in order to balance out the injustice of 
excluding (for example)goddesses, witches, priestesses etc. This argument 
for balance seems to be equalising; there could be a whole plurality of 
possible gods and goddesses in this fluid conception of the divine. But it 
could be in danger of falling into a form of reconcil iation which covers 
over those fundamental disparities, faults and fissures in subjectivity 
which her careful use of psychoanalysis has provided. In arguing that the 
'creation' of a divine for women might be possible, we have to avoid 
construing such a process as self-conscious and involving a rational, 
objective assessment of the requirements of feminist futures. This would 
be to pre-empt the very openness which the divine is to maintain, the 
horizon of non-completion, and to fill in, in its place, a deterministic 
narrative. It is also to fall back into the patterns of metaphysics 
already problematised.
Instead, Irigaray has recourse to the 'figuring' of Woman as the non- 
figurable, the incomplete form of otherness as undecidable, neither one nor 
the other. This takes different forms in her work; the mother, jouissance, 
the female sex organs, etc/15) Irigaray constantly refers to the 
morphological body as a social/historical construction, which she sees as 
part of the social imaginary - the whole realm of social nelahos which may turn 
out to be just as prey to delusion and paranoias. What appear to be 
'essentialised' components of her thinking are intended as strategic
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hypercritical devices, adopted to act as material interventions on the 
ideological production of meaning. In order to consider if she negotiates 
this problem we should look at her tentative outlines for the creation of a 
feminine genre in the divine.
What she suggests is that if the site of religion has been 'made' in one 
way then perhaps it can be 'made' again - 'theology in the feminine' would 
seek to articulate relations between mothers and daughters perhaps.
Our theological tradition presents a serious difficulty when it comes to
God in the feminine. Woman becomes divine through her son. There is no
woman God. No feminine trinity; mother, daughter, spirit.
She indicates an interrogation of this parallel idealisation might begin a 
search for 'the "elsewhere" of feminine pleasure, (which) might be sought 
in the place where it sustains ek-stasy in the transcendental, the place 
where it serves as security for a narcissism extrapolated into the "God" of 
» « • . (17)
Significantly, the place where a God in the feminine might be realised is 
insistently left open in her work. She suggests it is up to women to 
realise feminine divine alterity for themselves, to work out what such a 
space or mythology might mean. Her refusal to elucidate on this question 
is partly a refusal to speak on others' behalf (to speak as a man). It is 
also to leave such a revealing open-ended, incomplete and uncertain.
But she does indicate it is not meant to be a repetition of what has gone 
before, nor necessarily a female deity/deities. We are not being induced 
to 'continue a process of deification on the pattern of our ancestors and 
their totem animals...(to) make a regression back to the siren
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goddesses...'(*®) she adds:
There is no great advantage in resisting the man-woman hierarchy, woman- 
State, a certain woman-God or woman-machine, only to fall back under the 
power of nature-woman, animal-woman even matriarch-woman or women- 
women.'
So she is proposing yet another act of mimicry; this time to play upon the 
equation of God and the feminine for its radical and mysterious dimension. 
Both Lacan and Levinas identify the dimension of the feminine/matemal with 
a certain dimension of the divine, but neither do so with any of the 
urgency of Irigaray's politically motivated texts.(20) j suggest she 
recognises that the divine must be relativised to allow women their own 
relation to the divine in the feminine. This will open up potential and 
various feminine version of deities, perhaps, mothers and daughters. But 
this process must itself be intersected by a conception of the divine as 
the very possibility of difference itself, to stop such creativity merely 
replicating the myth of masculine self-construction, the same. In other 
words, to maintain the dimensions of openness and non-completion, any self- 
realisation (even of the feminine) must be interrupted from a teleological 
hunanism by a dimension more radically other, itself already interrupted.
Lacan resists the identification of the Other with God, since the implied 
objectification of this move (making God a proper name) seems to freeze the 
escaping irreducibility he wishes to maintain, turning it into an Other 
'remarkably like the good old God of all times'.^ 1 )  Lacan has indicated a 
theorisation of otherness other to the totalising moves of identity as 
positive. We have already seen the fissuring of a self-present subject by
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excess, pure self-consciousness interrupted by the residues of desire and 
difference. Such radical otherness is not reduced to the Same.
Might this irreducible and radical heteronomy also characterise the 
divine? Lacan states his resistance to the myth of the death of God does 
not imply a return to the old theology. For Lacan, 'God is not dead but 
unconscious'.(^2) The unconscious acts as a force of negativity, other to 
itself. The unconscious - of course also symbolically feminine - returns 
to haunt the margins. If there is no 'true' meaning to this force or 
process, no single representation, perhaps there is an infinite 
displacement of possible meanings - not a certain kind of representation, 
but not unrepresentable either. In addition, this version of the divine is 
established as material, partaking of the embodied existence of the beings 
which establish it.
The potential of a certain retrieval and revealing-concealing of this 
version of the divine for the feminine would be radical and heretical, 
dissenting from orthodox notions of God and the subject as masculine. In 
Kristeva and Irigaray's texts, in their notions of love, affectivity and 
the caress, this heretical ethics is opened in feminist directions.
Irigaray opens her article 'Women, the sacred and money' by declaring
'The exclusion or suppression of the religious dimension seems to be 
impossible. It reemerges in various and frequently degraded guises; 
sectarianism, religiosity.. .We do however, need to rethink the religious 
question, particularly its scope, its categories and its utopias, all of 
which have been male for centuries and remain so'.'ZJ'
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This concern with religious discourses may be contextualised in the general 
excavation and exploration of theological/symbolic formations. For 
example, Kristeva's consideration of the representations of maternity and 
the figure of the Virgin Mary, as well as her work on religious discourse 
and mystics as part of a process of idealisation in Tales of Love, 
correspond to cultural critiques of religious representations.
Irigaray's own discussion of religious figurations ranges from 'La 
Mystérique' in Speculum of the Other Woman, ('la mystérique' being a 
semantically condensed term fusing the feminine gender with notions of 
mystic, hysteric and mystery to imply a spiritual site of meaning in the 
feminine); various references to aspects of divine otherness in This Sex 
Which is not One; her 1986 essay Divine Women, her work on Levinas, and a 
paper in 1990 entitled 'Spiritual Love; passion and civility 'submitted bo the 
'Speculations' conference at the Freud Museun.(^4)
Significantly, in these feminist explorations religious discourse is not 
viewed simply as another manifestation of phalloceritric domination, a set 
of masculine practices with a male God, in complicity with male-dominated 
philosophy. Rather, religious discourse is significant for Irigaray
and Kristeva in that it uniquely testifies, for them, the price paid in 
submitting to the symbolic order - both celebrating and constraining the 
moment of submission. Socially venerated as the sacred, religious 
discourse occupies a prime site of cultural significance and orthodoxy.
Yet it is also the place where ecstatic spirituality is validated and 
theorised, a moment in the symbolic regime of order and hierarchy where 
order breaks into love or faith which potentially threatens to undermine
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that order, even when reconscripted back into central symbolic icons (for 
example, mystic saints or the Virgin Mary).
Kristeva characterises this moment as;
The sacrifice of one's identity in the delight of being swept away by 
passion and so not to exist...to be for the other, to be lost, to be 
transformed. A risk of death which is also a chance of life.'"'
At the edges where meaning threatens to break down, religious discourse 
recodes certain forces, to try and ensure their limitation and control, but 
always at the risk of a residue, an irreducible excess. Such an excess, 
which persistently escapes codification, might present the means of a more 
appropriate fulfillment of identities, the sexualisation of discourse and 
the acknowledgement of the other.
As well as marking certain sites of excess, religious discourses also give 
insights into the processes of idealisation and love or desire. As 
Kristeva and Irigaray note, such processes are those of self-realisation in 
a different mode, remaining material but transforming or re-interpreting 
the sense of self. This process of irradiation of the self is fiery and 
ecstatic, as for the female mystics, but it is also a darkly reflective 
process of distorting mirrors.
Neither God nor the subject are perhaps the most suitable places to begin 
to work on a 'feminine genre' for women, but these are the resources 
available. Can we trust the distorted reflections which are thrown off 
these mirrors to provide new means of representing for the feminine? The
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image of the burning mirror from St. Theresa, which Irigaray uses for the 
figure of 'la mystérique', suggests a certain refusal to give back the kind 
of reflection which would mirror exactly, a refusal to dutifully reflect - 
in a secondary role, whether secondary to God or to the (masculine) 
subject. It is not wholly on this side of the mirror with 'real' selves 
and identities that this new means is to be found, nor on the other side of 
the mirror, the far side, where there is the self-sufficient infinite of 
the God of men. It demands a 'crossing back through the mirror, and an 
unsettling one'.(26)
This silvering at the back of the mirror might, at least, retain the 
being (l'être)- which we have been perhaps and which perhaps will be 
again - though our mirage has failed at present or has been covered over 
by alien speculations... A burning glass is the soul (feminine gender in 
Fr. ) who in her cave joins with the source of light to set everything 
ablaze that approaches her hearth..
A feminist perspective on this process is, she writes, 'not a luxury but a 
necessity'. Here she implies a serious evaluation of radical otherness 
indicated in her understanding of sexual difference, but also the 
importance of an encounter with absolute alterity expressed by the divine. 
What is striking about her work in this area is her understanding of the 
infinite (an uncompleted time-space or space-time) as that which makes 
posssible a radical alterity. It is understanding the radical nature of 
this alterity which opens up the possibility of a feminine subjectivity and 
a feminist ethics. For Irigaray, the horizon of the divine is the only 
means by which such notions can be broached with sufficient profundity to 
bring about the transformations she hopes for.
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To have a will, it is indispensable to have a goal. The most valuable of 
which is to become. Infinitely. To become it is necessary to have an 
essence or genre (henceforth gendered) as a horizon...
Man can exist because God helps him to define his genre, to situate 
himself as a finite being in relation to the infinite. To set up a 
genre, a God is needed: a guarantee of the infinite ('unecaution de 
l'infini'j a possibility of infinity, and of non-completion or 
closure).
There has never been a construction of subjectivity or of any human 
society which has been worked through without the help of the 
divine...Only a.God can constitute a place of coming together which can 
leave us free.''*8'
What she is not concerned with is a more straightforwardly Christian 
feminist perspective which might argue for women's equal access to God or 
campaign for women priests. Nor is she advocating a mystical and essential 
female God or^xkiess. Such perspectives do not engage sufficiently with 
the framework which bring them about. Nevertheless, she has gradually 
expanded upon her interrogation of the philosophical/theological exclusion 
of the feminine element, towards developing her notions of what a feminine 
genre might mean - a creative enactment of a hypothetical space for women 
to have a place of their own, otherwise to the neutrality of Being and yet 
also enabling sexual difference to engage in a more harmonious dialogue, to 
the benefit of both men and women. This attempt to go beyond critique is a 
risky undertaking, but expresses her comnitment to positive change in terms 
of sexual relations and a reassessment of a spiritual dimension.
Thus the encounter with the divine is an encounter with absolute otherness, 
and with excess, which throws into question the constituted identity of a 
subject as homogeneous and autonomous. Indebted to the horizon which 
provides the means to create limits, the indebtedness simultaneously 
provides future transformational potentials which would not seek to control 
or deny excess, and particularly the excess which is coded as feminine. If
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women are to play more than an Instrumental role in this relation, the 
process of reconceptualising this symbolisation demands that - 
strategically or hypothetically - gender must impinge, intrude in any 
discussion of alterity and otherness. For Irigaray, this process demands 
the unveiling or unconcealing of the dark and hidden aspect of the divine 
as the matemal/feminine.
We can see a similar process in Levinas' work. In his earlier analysis 
which focussed on the erotic, Levinas elaborated two aspects of the 
feminine, namely voluptuosity and fecundity, which occur together in the 
relation 'beyond the face'.(29) Voluptuosity is the excess of enjoyment 
which can be found in the sensible realm, a provocation to phenomenological 
encounter with the other, not as object but as the uncontainable 
dissipation of the erotic, and this cannot be a falling back into the self 
qua subject, because it is already shot through with excess, overwhelming 
with pleasure and yet never wholly fulfilling as an essence.
In fecundity the possibility of transcendence is suggested, a possibility 
which opens the structure of eros on to a creative and productive relation, 
anticipating a dimension which is 'future, but never future enough'. It is 
not supposed to be confined to a biological fecundity - Levinas is 
insistent about this - but a fertility concerning potential. For Levinas, 
it is fecundity which presents us with the possibility of 'a new 
ontological principle' .(^0) Fecundity is dynamic in that it propels and 
also disrupts the futural projection. It corresponds to the structures of 
desire which can be characterised as both erotic and metaphysical, that is, 
it would correspond to a dynamism to and from a physical body as well as an
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ideal, mutually implicated, as in Irigaray's 'ethic of the passions'.
For Levinas, a Freudian analysis of desire obscures the metaphysical 
dimension of desire as transcendence in seeking a material/biological 
account, which it takes to constitute a 'real' at some level. This gives 
the structure a deterministic tendency. Levinas recognises in the absence 
and withdrawal of transcendence in the erotic realm the possibility of 
opening the structure of this relation.
...with Freud, sexuality is approached on the human plane, it is reduced 
to the level of the search for pleasure, without the ontological 
signification of voluptuosity and the irreducible categories it brings 
into play being taken into account.. .What remains unrecognised is that 
the erotic, analysed as fecundity, breaks up reality into relations 
irreducible to the relations of genus and.species, part and whole, 
action and passion, truth and error...'-31'
A Lacanian approach to desire coresponds more to Levinas' perspective, in 
shifting difference to the signifying structures which are themselves 
constantly under revision. The structure of the subject is no longer fixed 
but shown to be broken up not only by the excesses of desire, but that 
excess is to be comprehended in signification. Heterogeneity always refers 
the subject elsewhere and cannot get back to a fundamental element, whether 
that is libidinal forces or the transcendental signifier. I
I am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what 
I am where I do not think to think.'■-3^ '
Levinas agrees with the aspect of anti-hunanist thinking which causes doubt 
to the self-confidence of rationalising and totalising thinking. 
'Psychoanalysis attests to the instability and fallacious character of the 
coincidence with oneself in the cogito. ,.'^33  ^ But he rejects the
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consequences of either having recourse to a rigid structuralist view of 
signification as establishing fixed positions in language or the 
alternative of relativism, another abdication of responsibility amounting 
to another form of indifference towards difference.
Levinas acknowledges the importance of signification, but also seeks a 
deeper level of understanding of difference as responsibility. In order to 
do this, he elaborates alterity in terms of the trace and of maternity.
After Totality and Infinity, Levinas acknowledges that otherness cannot 
merely be the withdrawal of the feminine in the erotic, even if it is 
almost ungraspable in the 'clandestinity' of the caress and 
'transubstantiated' in fecundity.(^^ To characterise it as such still 
places it within the grasp of the epistemological subject, still with an 
eye to what can be known. Levinas realises that he must 'go back', or 
rather, intensify the excessive dimension of otherness, to make it even 
more excessive, if it is to resist the tendrils of phenomenology and 
metaphysics in its ethical claims. Here is the paradox; to make otherness 
more profoundly affecting, to make its impact even more traunatic for the 
interstices of subjectivity, it must be even more surpassing and excessive, 
even more other.
Levinas seeks this possibility for ethics in a past which will be an 
'inmemorial and unrecuperable diachrony', in order to orient towards a 
different kind of future. As Richard Cohen writes; 'The radical future of 
Levinas's earlier works will require the radical past of his later works'.
(35) This notion will be a disclosure of that which remains always in 
elusive self-disappearance; the very condition of meaning which can mean 
only by being excessive to origin and telos.
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Levinas is clear that this notion is not just a site of philosophy's 
inadequacy, the otherness of the Hebraic to the Hellenic, or the 
experiential immediacy which is other to theory. It is also symbolically 
linked to the maternal realm, figured once more as that which divulges and 
gives on to the 'unspeakable' and 'unrepresentable'. But for Levinas there 
is a prior ethicality connoted by this disclosure of absence. The most 
other that Levinas can find, more exterior than even the light and shadow 
face with its erotic equivocation, is not only more withdrawn, but is an 
otherness founded, intersected and scissioned by the good, or 
responsibility.
As Levinas characterises it, this otherness is a state of exposure, where 
the disorientation of time and selfhood is effected as an extreme 
vulnerability. To be so exposed in this way, a divesting of the last 
scraps of selfhood in the dislocating vortices of alterity, is for Levinas 
construed as a positivity. The loss of autonomy and any recovery is the 
undergoing of an excessive exposure to ethics. Levinas seeks to make this 
more radical than either being obliterated by the force of otherness, a 
negating of any self, or 'a generosity of offering oneself', which would 
presuppose a structure of self to offer and the cognisance of what it is to 
be generous. Levinas writes of 'a tearing from oneself despite 
o n e s e l f j n this state of exposure, Levinas locates a more radical, 
because more open, dimension of otherness, even to the very point of being 
a hostage to otherness. This is what it would mean to 'respond with 
responsibility; me, that is , here I am for the others, to lose one's place 
radically, or one's shelter in being...'.
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The 'passivity of inertia' as indifference would merely let difference 
pass by. Levinas wants to initiate the kind of response which goes beyond 
even Descartes' passion of 'admiration' (wonder) for that which is other. 
Levinas suggests, if we can phrase it thus, 'an inversion of the conatus of 
esse'; a fundamental unsettling of the being which strives or persists in 
its being, to the extent that passivity becomes an excess. It is 'to have 
the other within one's skin', a direct incamality.
The language of suffering appears at its most violent forms in this section 
of Otherwise Than Being;
The passivity of wounds, the haemorrhage of the for-the-other, is a 
tearing away of the mouthful of bread...one's own mouthful of bread. It 
is an attack made irtmediately on the plenitude of the complacency in 
oneself (the.complacency of complacency), on the identity in 
enjoyment...*39'
but it is also 'reverts from grasping to being grasped, as in the ambiguity 
of a kiss'.(^) Levinas tries to sustain the 'knot of corporeality' as the 
locale of this tunult. Thus he is driven to identify the extremities of 
involvement and responsibility for the other. It cannot be a calculated 
gift of the self, but nor can it be the willing obliteration of self in 
masochism. Both these structures assume a self and an other already in 
place. In Levinas's formulation there can be no 'cause' to be subjected 
to; he seeks to find a suffering or exposure to the other beyond or before 
any name for which one could suffer. To suffer for a cause would be a 
domestication of the suffering, suffered 'in the name of', which is to say, 
that which is already named and known.
Sensibility is being affected by a non-phenomenon, a being put into 
question by the alterity of the other, before the intervention of a 
cause, before the appearing of the other.*41'
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The 'non-initiative' of the sensibility which is an unlimited giving is 
'older than any present, and is not a passivity contemporaneous with and 
counterpart of an act. It is the hitherside of the free and the not free, 
the an-archy of the Good'.(^2)
This structure of ethicality lies on the 'hitherside' of the determinism 
which might suppose an inevit ability to suffering (like a Leibnizian 'best 
of all possible worlds'), but also other to a freely chosen suffering, 
since it is not a question of will and agency. Levinas attempts to take 
passivity 'back' to another order of time entirely, more disruptive in 
being extra-ordinary. In the process of seeking this order of time, he is 
led to activate a notion of maternity as the very spirit of the 'passivity
of passivity'.^-*)
It is a writhing in the tight dimensions of pain, the unexpected 
dimensions of the hither side. It is being torn up from oneself, being 
less than nothing, a rejection into the negative, behind nothingness; it 
is maternity, gestation of the other in the same. Is not the 
restlessness of someone persecuted but a modification of maternity, the 
groaning of the wounded entrails by those it will bear or has borne? In 
maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of 
substitution for the others...
Rather than a nature, earlier than nature, immediacy is this 
vulnerability, this maternity, this pre-birth or pre-nature in which the 
sensibility belongs. (44)
This vulnerability is not merely weakness but an intensity characterised by 
an obsessive quality, but not as the kind of obssession which can be 
'owned', as it is figured antecedently to 'representation or consciousness 
of proximity'. Levinas connects this prior vulnerability to an 
unconstrained expression of mercy, felt as deeply as a bodily empathy for 
the other. He writes;
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we are thinking of the Biblical term Rakhamin, which is translated as 
mercy, but contains a reference to the word Rekhan; uterus: it is a 
mercy that is like an emotion of the maternal entrails.'**5'
In writing of this 'groaning of the entrails', a physical undergoing is 
evoked. But for Levinas it is also linked to a notion of the divine. 
Levinas derives this connection from Jeremiah 31:20, where it is expressed 
as God's extreme suffering and mercy.^) But this is not the orthodox 
conception of God, but, as 1 suggested in earlier part of this chapter, 
seems to correspond to the mysterious otherness of the feminine/matemal. 
But Levinas does not explore this possibility in depth, reverting eleswhere 
in his texts to the (masculine) God of monotheism. This God may be absent 
and obscured, but is clearly the absent (patriarchal) Father.
Maternity is also 'other' to the erotic and its hints of specular/ ocular 
connotations. In maternity Levinas tries to find a means of characterising 
the touch which is wholly proximate, with no implications of sight, and a 
way of accounting for responsibility which even precedes any encounter.
...goodness emerges as the responsibility of the subject which has 
always already been responsible, prior to any explicit agreements, 
prior, even to the subject's ability to welcome the Other'.' '
This non-thematised proximity is maternal thus in two senses i) it is 
symbolically touch before sight ii) it is responsibility before agency. 
('Before' in this context indicating both 'prior to' and 'having priority', 
but other than chronologically, because it is meant to negotiate the 
ordering of time as sequential moments). It is explictly a sensible or 
corporeal undergoing; that is, it cannot remain on a symbolic level of 
suffering. ('The body is not only an image or a figure here; it is the
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distinctive in-oneself of the contraction of ipseity and its breakup' 
and note following: 'The body is neither an obstacle opposed to the soul, 
nor a tomb that imprisons it, but that by which the self is susceptibility 
itself. Incarnation is extreme passivity; to be exposed to sickness, 
suffering, death, is to be exposed to compassion, and, as a self, to the 
gift that costs...It is the correlate of a persecution, a substitution for 
the other.1
Sensible experience as an obsession by the other, or a maternity, is 
already the corporeality which the philosophy of consciousness wants to 
constitute on the basis of it. The corporeality of one's own body. » 
signifies, as sensibility itself, a knot or denouement of being...'->u'
If maternity is not to function as a metaphor for suffering and extreme 
responsibility, then it must refer to the otherwise silent figuration of 
the feminine/matemal haunting the text, that which only appears as 
'other'. But Levinas does not clarify if maternity forms a kind of role 
model for responsibility, or how this is to be activated. In this sense 
his text lacks the re-application of his analysis of the corporeal body and 
sensibility back to the lived experience of those who read and might learn 
from it.
Does this lead us to suspect that passivity and proximity are still based 
perhaps on an economy of sacrifice? An essential possibility of being 
wholly for the other in a surrender which can make a space for ethics, but 
still at the expense of the other/mother. The question now is whether such 
a sacrifice is a necessary function of ethics, and whether the sacrificial 
scapegoat must always take the same form (ie the feminine/matemal). Is 
the maternal acting as passive passage to transcendence, even in Levinas'
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texts? As Irigaray writes;
But is this a question of her in all this, even now? Or is it just the 
mother again?...In the last analysis, isn't this a return to the 
mother's milk, to the generosity of her blood, to the richness of her 
womb, with its. specifically territorial connotations? Is this 
regression?'51'
Despite the parallel attempts in Levinas and Irigaray to find a way of 
illuninating the dark and obscure region of otherness as maternal, Irigaray 
still raises objections to Levinas. Her main objection is that Levinas 
does not clarify the relation between his notion of the 'maternal' as 
ethical and even imperative, in its pre-ontological responsibility, and 
the, for example, women readers of his text. His project is not a feminist 
one, so does not develop the possible problems or connections of this 
relation. As such, his thought is still in danger of returning to the 
neutrality of ethical responsibility, or utilising 'the maternal' as an 
illustrative device at the expense of women. She is also concerned that in 
this failure to interrogate sufficently deeply what is at stake in making 
this connection, he reinstates the figures of the feminine or the maternal, 
and does not stress that the 'space' he is drawing upon for such notions, 
is itself a distorting representation of the otherness of the other. 
Irigaray also questions Levinas' resort to God as the masculine and 
patriarchal God of the Old Testament, suggesting Levinas is not prepared to 
go far enough in his questioning of the frameworks of ethics.
Monotheistic religions cannot claim to be ethical unless they submit 
themselves to a radical interrogation relative to the sexual 
attribution (cartactère sexué) of their paradigms, whether these be of 
God, the ways in which God is referred to (in particular the masculine 
gend^ç^when God is not referred to pictorially), God's commandments,
-189-
In the final part of this chapter, I will indicate how, although Levinas 
provides an opening of phenomenology for a feminist understanding of the 
body in philosophy, his attempts to sustain ethical responsibility as 
absolute, in fact lead him back to a conception of God which closes off the 
possibilities he had raised. Even though Levinas takes pains to show how 
his notion of God is not commensurate with God as presence and patriarch, 
the overall impression is that of a masculine God who provides the 
guarantee of ethicality.
In Derrida's discussion of Levinas in 'Violence and M e t a p h y s i c s ' h e  
suggests that in thinking by metaphor Levinas has 'forgotten' to consider 
the metaphor 'as such'.(^) In other words, that Levinas neglects to 
consider the processes of signification which have allowed him to advance 
concepts such as 'infinity' and/or 'totality' in the first place.
Derrida's challenge provokes Levinas to develop his notion of 'the trace'. 
The trace is an 'undecidable' in Levinas' texts: sometimes it seems to be 
an alternative version of God, the nomination of ethical responsibility, 
and sometimes it seems to figure as a more linguistic phenomenon (although 
Levinas insists that it is not a concept as such).
In his book The Trespass of the Sign,^^^ Kevin Hart notes the similarity 
of Derrida's 'difference' and Levinas' notion of the trace; that is, as a 
function of 'faulting' in any text or experiential moment of presence. 
There is no origin of the sign of the trace which could be identified and 
so spark subsequent representations. The trace does not stand prior to 
representation but is disruptive of it, and as such is disclosed as a kind 
of 'overprinting', in that every sign betrays its excess. Thus each sign
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'stands in' the trace, although every sign is also a trace itself, marking 
that which has passed absolutely. If the trace is not a concept as such, 
(ie. it is not strictly a sign itself, since it is absent), then it works 
as an unceasing function in signification to interrupt by non-coincidence 
and mis-matching. Signification here is not just the spacing effect of 
language, but also the disjunction between signs and their expressivity, as 
in Levinas' characterisation of the Said and the S a y i n g . T h i s  
disjunction is a spatial and temporal process, setting up signs which are 
porous and incomplete in character, to be effaced and dispersed again.
Like Derrida's ^ differance'which differs spatially but also defers 
temporally, this process is also disruptive of an unfolding of time.
Levinas describes it as:
...the very passing toward a past more remote than any past and any 
future which are still set in time - the past of the other, in which 
eternity takes form, an absolute past which unites all times.
But Levinas makes it clear that for him, there is a specific ethicality 
implicated in the irrecuperable nature of its past time. For him, this 
process is ethicality. The movement of the trace lets slip a certain 
heterogeneous quality of signification even as its irreversible process is 
past.
If the signifyingness of a trace consists in signifying without making 
appear, if it establishes a relationship... which is personal and 
ethical, it is an obligation and does not disclose, and if, 
consequently, a trace does not belong to phenomenology, to the 
comprehension of the appearing and the dissimulating, we can at least 
approach this signifyingness in another way by situating it with respect 
to the phenomenology it disrupts.'30'
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This process is, for Levinas, linked up with God. '...it obliges with 
regard to the infinite, the absolutely other', although this is not 'being 
itself outside of its acts'(^), interruption of absence. What
this shows us, however, is that the process is no longer neutral or 
undecidable as it is for Derrida. Levinas explicitly calls this 
'exaggeration or this infinite overbidding' a divinity. He writes: 'let us 
say the word - this divinity.. . ' . Although it is 'that which properly 
speaking has never been there...is always past', it is clear that he 
refuses to equivocate on the sex of this notion.
Through the trace the irreversible past takes on the profile of a 'He'. 
The beyond from which a face comes is in the third person. The pronoun 
'He' expresses its inexpressible irreversibility, already escaping every 
relation as well as every dissimulation, and in this sense absolutely 
unencompassable or absolute, a transcendence in an absolute past. The 
illeity of the third person is the condition for the 
irreversibility.
If the trace is not conmensúrate with any particular identity but may 
divulge its hiddenness in a range of markings, why should its hiddenness 
here be explicitly given a masculine marking? There is nothing to presume 
that its 'third person' status as that which is infinitely other but also 
signifies corporally should be already marked in its very inception as 
masculine. Levinas could not countenance the trace as feminine. He links 
the signifyingness of the trace to this (absent) infinity of God but it is 
still one which bears identifiable links with an Old Testament God. He may 
be respecting the Talmudic heritage of interpretation which has marked this 
site already with a masculine sign, but there is no necessary reason why he 
should do this. The displacement of an origin and a plenitude of excess 
concerning presence and the proper name should also act to displace the
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paternalistic version of God. By introducing this non-coincidence in the 
trace, the possibility of any 'true' interpretation and accurate mimetic 
representation are also troubled and dislodged.
This is where Irigaray's 'Questions to Levinas' hit their mark.(^) She 
suggests that there is a danger that 'the obligations to believe or to give 
one's allegiance, the injunction not to touch, form an integral part of a 
monotheism, which conceals its passional nature' and that to risk 
reintroducing the mono-dimensional associations of God is to risk 
eradicating not only the passional/camal dimension but also the 
f eminine/ma terna1.
The assertion that the other is always situated within the realm of the 
father, of the father-son, man-God relation and that it is there and 
only there that ethics may be established, seems to me to belong to the 
imperatives of the metaphysical tradition. So the phenomenology of the 
caress in Levinas falls back within the boundaries staked out by the 
philosophical constition of the masculine subject.. .After having been so 
far - or so close - in the approach to the other sex, in my view to the 
other, Levinas clings,once more to this rock of patriarchy in the very 
place of carnal love.'®3 *
Irigaray suggests there could be a mode of understanding difference which 
has hitherto been obscure, but which could open to ethicality. She does 
not shrink from exploring the religious or mystical connotations of such an 
idea, but she resists the explicitly theological claims which Levinas makes 
in the context of ethics.
At one point in 'The Fecundity of the Caress' Irigaray writes of 'the 
caress which precedes every caress' and 'a becoming in which the other 
gives of a space-time which is still free'.(k5) This hints of an
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irreducible horizon of alterity as archaic, a 'remembrance of what has not 
yet taken place...That which has not yet been born into language? That 
which has a place, has taken place, but has no language. Sensibility which 
speaks for the first time. Which pronounces the other in silence.'(^6)
Like Levinas, she intimates a return to the experiential breach of that 
which exceeds the Said, which is 'a memory of the flesh, the place of 
approach'. But for her, this moment must also allow the possibility of the 
appearance of the feminine/matemal. For Irigaray this is 'ethical 
fidelity to incarnation. To destroy it risks suppressing alterity, both 
God's and the other's. Thus dissolving all possibility of access to 
trancendence'.
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CHAPTER WINE: ETHICS AM) SIGNIFICATION
So far, the feminine has been suggested as a disruptive force in the 
context of more orthodox philosophical distinctions between subject/object, 
transcendence/invnanence, spirit/carnal. I have attempted to show how this 
force might be used strategically as an 'operative viewpoint' ^  from which 
to conduct a critical revaluation of ethics and embodiment as these notions 
are articulated in phenomenology and psychoanalytic theory. The feminine 
has been codified as an 'excess', that which overreaches and underplays the 
intentional analysis of desire and the structure of the subject as desiring 
being. Excess is not exhausted by this codification. Rather, it is taken 
up strategically to provoke the question of sexual difference for feminist 
philosophy and to renew the resources of phenomenological description and 
regenerate psychoanalytic narratives.
Levinas, Kristeva and Irigaray are all concerned with the systems of 
signification, interpretation and language which engender the horizons of 
ethics. But they are also concerned to see ethics as an enactment or 
dramatic encounter with the other which is not reducible to textual 
interpretation. This concern is an attempt to find a mode of expressivity 
for an experiential dimension which is neither a return to identity and 
presence, but is not prone to the loss of ethical discrimination in the 
free play of signification. This revaluation of ethics attempts to locate 
ethicality 'elsewhere' to the inexorable force of the Law. And yet, it 
must rely upon the systems of signification to explicate the significance 
of naming ethics as 'elsewhere'.
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What is the relation between textual re-interpretation, the reading and/or 
subversion of the resources provided by the socio-symbolic, and the desire 
to retain an iamediacy of the experiential encounter with the other? In 
the context of the thinkers discussed here, both approaches seek a language 
of equivocal possibility, a thematisation which is not a closure. Both 
seek a mode of re-presentation, which can rupture its own conditions of 
presentation in the process. Such meaning does not rely upon a conception 
of truth which is to be re-interpreted mimetically, but is instead 
generative of its own potentials. The process of presenting that which is 
already unpresentable renews itself through its very inpossibility. This 
version of truth is '... not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, 
like art, the act of bringing truth into being'.
In the present chapter, I will examine the fascination which these 
thinkers display with sacred texts and mythologies. In the search for a 
way of characterising ethics which will allow for the recognition of 
difference, and particularly sexual difference, the critical interrogation 
of the site of the sacred provides a possibility of rethinking these 
concerns.
Levinas, Kristeva and Irigaray read the sacred texts of Western
culture, and Greek mythology in order to refract a different possible 
account of otherness. In so doing they evoke other hidden aspects of these 
texts which will be brought to bear on understanding difference in an 
ethical context. A certain method of reading which is not seeking to close 
interpretation, which can entertain equivocation, corresponds to their 
attempts to allow for difference.
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The question of the Hebraic and the Hellenic is as Derrida writes, 'a space 
of interrogation' or 'a passageway'^) which can be opened up in 
considering difference. If these two traditions constitute the major 
strands of thought in Western culture, the two terms of this polarisation 
can also function to articulate problems of interpretation and difference.
If Kristeva and Irigaray appear Hellenic in their concern with (an 
Hegelian?) negativity, dialectical relations and modes of signification in 
the symbolic, Levinas is Hebraic in his concern with the mysterious 
dimension of otherness in the revelation of alterity. But Kristeva and 
Irigaray are also concerned with the interpretation of otherness as it 
arises in the sacred texts of Western thought, and the concern with the 
feminine places them as 'marginal' to philosophic concerns with 
rationality. Similarly, Levinas is articulating his thought in the context 
of philosophy (his Hellenic dimension). These thinkers are all concerned 
with 'heretical' or disruptive versions of ethics, and as such, seeking to 
negotiate these sets of polarities. Further, it is not clear to what 
extent the Hebraic and Hellenic can be distinguished in their impacts on 
Western culture when they share the common influence of Old Testament 
texts, and when subsequent 'translations' of the strands of thought have 
become intertwined through time.
Despite Levinas's separation of his philosophical and exegetical texts, as 
Edith Wyschogrod points out, in Levinas's thought we find '...that to which 
one is responsible is a non-thematisable value unique and inescapable 
without a corresponding dis-value. Levinas does not hesitate to name this 
value: it is God'.(^) Although he would dissent from being named as a
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theologian, Levinas is undoubtedly influenced by the impact of ethical 
activity on selfhood drawn from Judaic sources, and a certain Rabbinic 
tradition of commentary and interpretation, which focusses on text and 
conversation rather than metaphysical speculation in Platonic or Christian 
terms. In this sense the Judaic element in Levinas's philosophy filters 
through and cuts across his more overtly philosophical work, in that it 
coincides with his characterisation of the ethical as that which has been 
'forgotten' by p h i l o s o p h y . H i s  work cannot really be read as a 
synthesis of these polarities, but if the Hebraic corresponds to the Other 
for philosophy (in a thinking of ethics, not ontology), we might recognise 
a kind of translation process at work, in an attempt to render less hidden 
the otherness to philosophy, while refusing to over-expose or distort its 
differences.
The final section of Catherine Chalier's book on Levinas^) begins with an 
epigraph from Levinas's Difficile Liberté; 'The non-comprehension of the 
ethical essence of spirit is due, in the most part, to the forgetting of 
Hebrew'/7)
Chalier goes on to make a parallel between the Said as the Greek logos, and 
the Saying as Hebraic. The Said, the logos, reveals a certain equivocation 
even as it tries to speak with the voice of coherent reason, an 
equivocation which comes to distort or derange it. Even harsher measures 
are required to try and exercise control.
Philosophy founds itself on a profound allergy to alterity. But there 
is a persistent evocation of a saying otherwise to the said. It is this 
which the Said would have to hear/understand (entendre), in becoming, 
not logically or.rationally, as it elects a Greek place to name that 
which exceeds.'8 ’
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She suggests that while every language could be said to be punctuated by 
the process of absence and its constant evocation, perhaps 'the Hebraic 
language persists in the thinking of the necessity of absence more than any 
other language'.
While it would be artifical to equate the Hellenic dimension with 
philosophy and ontology, and the Hebraic with a religious dimension, we can 
recognise in the articulation of hiddenness, otherness and excess a mode of 
drawing out that which remains already in diffuse abeyance. The 
'persistent evocation of a saying otherwise' is linked, in Chalier's book, 
with the feminine and the possibility of giving an account of otherness 
which is no longer neutral but nor is it a return to essentialism. (10)
'Judaism and the feminine element', an early essay by Levinas,(H) deals 
explicitly with the feminine as this force of disruption. This is not just 
a reading of women of the Old Testament, but casts a crucial light on his 
exposition of the feminine in Totality and Infinity, as it comes to 
function in that text as the very condition of ethics. Significantly, the 
essay is prefaced by a short account of the biblical structure of exegesis 
and interpretation, which Levinas even suggests precedes and is responsible 
for the very shaping of the Old Testament itself.
There is already, Levinas suggests, a process of comnent and selection 
shaping what will be included or excluded, the text is not self-justifying 
and there is no 'original' text from which all subsequent interpretation is 
derived. Such an absence of authority undoes a particular founding 
certainty to which appeal could be made; the Old Testament is rendered text 
and so seems to become fallible. Levinas denies that this is a
-199-
relativising of the sacred place that the Old Testament occupies; it does 
not reduce its significance to a question of the writers and the selection 
of sacred texts. It is not just a 'consensus of all' which renders such 
texts significant. Rather, this approach opens up possible questioning 
which, for Levinas, increases the sacred nature of the texts; not so they 
remain untouchable and irreproachable, but to show that such potentials 
were already evoked in the work themselves, and interpretation is not a 
matter of chronology and cause and effect in this strict sense. If the 
texts implicitly contain and erupt with other meanings, then there is a 
possibility of these meanings being re-activated in certain epochs.
Levinas links this mode of interpretation and its openness to radicality 
with his reflections on women in the Old Testament, figures who feature 
almost mythically, yet only become radical in accordance with the readings 
of contemporary feminist theory. It is because they can signify as 'heroic 
figures' but also as sites of excess as 'the feminine' that the possibility 
of reinterpreting their significance is broached.
Thus his reading interprets the names of Old Testament women; Miriam and 
Deborah, Tamar, Naomi and Ruth, Bathsheba, the Shulamite in the Song of 
Songs, Judith, Esther, and Sarah, in this light. His concern is not merely 
attending to the indispensable role they played in keeping the tradition 
safe, ('Biblical events would not have gone forward as they did but for 
their watchful clarity, the toughness of their determination, and their 
cunning and spirit of sacrifice'),(^) but to read this indispensability 
with a view to a mode of being which begins to rupture the category of 
identity. Levinas indicates that morality is not a category added 
antecedently to these figures, but 'already has the weight of an
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ontological b a s i s T h e moral reminder such figures evoke is 
inseparable from their figuring as feminine. Their force is not merely an 
insistence on the morality of the tradition, where their actions would be 
contextualised in the narrative of an inevitable unfolding of a 
teleological horizon, but as an excessive version of femininity, which 
shakes any supremacy of being. Figuratively, the feminine threatens 'spirit 
in its masculine existence' not ^ t h  counter-threat but with a
reproach which comes 'before' the ontological has broken with the 
elemental. This failure to be similarly uprooted and destructive as the 
masculine which is violently t o m  away from 'spontaneous l i f e ' i s  the 
way that the feminine intersects the 'geometry of infinite and cold 
space'.(I**) The modes of domination and colonising tendencies are 
symbolically seen to share a masculine codification.
An insurmountable crudeness is left in the products of our conquering 
civilisation. Tne world in which reason becomes more and more self- 
conscious is not habitable. It is hard and cold like those supply 
depots where merchandise is piled up which cannot satisfy; while there 
it neither clothes nor feeds those who are hungry;... true with the truth 
of calculation and brought into the anonymous realm of the. v 
economy...There it is - spirit in its masculine existence.''1''
But as Levinas points out, he does not mean by this that the figure of the 
woman is merely a cipher for all goodness and kindness, which is to 
obliterate her identity in respect of an ideal beyond her. In this sense 
she would be instrunental as merely facilitating an understanding of that 
which is other - she would be reduced to the status of a symbol without any 
identity of her own. Rather it is on the level of her very selfhood, in 
the context of the proper names of the Biblical women for example, that 
this dimension might be articulated. And it is also to say that this 
possibility is inscribed in the very notion of identity, in the disruptive
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interstices of self-presence which does not coincide with itself.
The attempt to retain an equivocation between woman as identity and woman 
as a mode of being, or the feminine, without obliterating either, 
corresponds to the equivocal readings of women in Greek mythology which 
Irigaray explores, and Kristeva's readings of Christian symbolism.
A great deal of Kristeva's work is engaged with examining the signification 
of the mytho-poetic symbols which gain cultural domination, an archaeology 
of meanings which corresponds to Levinas's interpretative dialogue with 
Talmudic texts. For both Kristeva and Levinas, this process is not one of 
just de-mythologising but also of enriching an interpretative tradition. 
Similarly for Irigaray, Judafio-Christian theology and the Greek gods and 
goddesses provide a locus of rich literary and religious symbolism which can 
be reactivated in the context of her own work.
One of the most important aspects of Irigaray's texts is the attempt to 
're-construct' a maternal genealogy or an articulation of the effaced 
mother-daughter relations, from the resources of a culture responsible for 
occluding this possibility in the first place. One of the ways this 
project can begin is through an analysis of religious and mythological 
discourses, partly to illustrate the nature and extent of the sacrifice of 
mother-daughter relations, and partly to try and establish a less damaging 
process of iconography and idealisation for women.
Apart from her consideration of the Christian tradition, Irigaray also 
examines the mythological figures of women in antiquity.
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Ariadne is considered as a figure symbolically entrapped in the labyrinths 
of masculine constructions; she sacrifices her own 'exit' from the 
labyrinth as she is sacrificed for Iheseus and abandoned on Naxos. While 
she facilitates freedom, she is also left with no means to articulate her 
own. Irigaray also sees Ariadne as symbolically used by Nietzsche as a way 
to negotiate death and sensuality in his own texts. While her identity is 
essential to the successful negotiating of the labyrinths of language and 
death, she herself fulfills the function at the cost of her own 
possibilities. (20)
Similarly, the figures of Athena and Antigone, despite representing the law 
of the state or of the father and being conscripted for such purposes, also 
bear witness to the potentially disruptive and hidden feminine forces 
within the masculine-coded constructions. Antigone is 'the eternal irony 
of the caimunity', essential for its reproduction yet at odds with its 
attempts to stand independently of family allegiance. She is sacrificed, 
yet her very sacrifice serves as a constant reminder of what is 
symbolically walled up in the very heart of the comnunity. For Hegel too, 
Antigone constantly chafes at the attempt to establish ethics and the 
universal in the comnunity if they are constructed at her expense.^!) 
Athena is her father's daughter, mediating justice and knowledge at the 
cost of her own mother and the symbolic matemal/feminine. She seems to 
represent an icon through which and by which the masculine line can be 
perpetuated, whether it is the patrilineal name or the transmission of 
knowledge. Veiled, seductive and desirable, she promises creative, 
generative potential. But in being positioned as such, she is also 
threatening; she can kill/castrate with such power. And yet, as Irigaray
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makes clear, this power is achieved at the sacrifice of her own passion, 
she speaks with her father's words, not her own.(22)
Appropriating the mother's power, swallowing it up, introjecting it, he 
engenders, produces this daughter who gives herself for what she.is 
not: a simulacrum assumed by the God to help him in his work.'
Each of these figures is a symbolic instantiation of the ambiguous 
positioning of the feminine as other but also as occupying a central site 
in the sacred preservation of the community and of ethical continuity.
Each time the attempt to conscript the equivocal is disruptive and 
disrupting. As Grosz expresses it:
These female figures do not represent a pre- or non-patriarchal 
narrative, but are the consequences of an already functioning 
patriarchal order. Nevertheless, they represent an excess or 
superfluity that overflows their patriarchal context.'^'
In the first part of About Chinese Women, &5) (and aiso Tales of 
Love) (26). Kristeva looks at the significance of Christianity as an attempt 
to synthesize Hebraic and Hellenic, an synthesis which is itself an attempt 
to regulate the equivocal relationship between differences. She is 
involved in an analysis of the elements of undecidability which still 
resonate within such an attempted synthesis, the forces which refuse to 
silence their evocative voices even when recuperated under one heading.
In tracing the way that the identity of a mono-theistic community emerges, 
she notes the way a notion of communality precedes, but eventually merges 
with state unity and law. The concerns of the community are fused under 
paternal moral concerns, such that what is seen as counter to the interests 
of that comnunity must be suppressed or excluded. This familiar narrative
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of the logics of exclusion is given particular force for women, since it is 
the 'paganistic' element of undecidability which must be kept under 
control, and this is equated with the undecidable figure of the woman, seen 
as diversifying, fragmentary and splitting. The sacrifice of that which is 
seen as disruptive allows the establishment of 'the principle of One Law - 
One Purifying Transcendent Guarantor of the ideal interest'.(26) ^ 
monotheistic God becomes masculine, aligned with the law as unequivocally 
uniting. The bond which is established will ensure the continuity of the 
community. But it also ensures a difference is maintained between the 
sexes, and it is at the expense of women who must both protect the 
community against the eruption of the outlawed elements, but also stand 
symbolically for that which threatens the whole system.
The figuring of women does not merely place them as peripheral or 
disruptive, which would accord them a dangerously independent status, but 
centralises them within the symbolic, precisely as symbolic. Impurity, 
which is the contamination of unity with foreign elements, is aligned with 
the interiority of the body. 'Unclean' secretions, bodily fluids, disrupt 
the clean lines which might otherwise establish purity of form. In 
attempting to expel them from the body, it becomes clear they are also 
already part of the body. (Kristeva discusses this process in Powers of 
Horror, and it corresponds to Irigaray's essay 'The"Mechanics*of Fluids' in 
This Sex which is not One, and her discussion of the morphology of the 
female body, passim).(28) This alignment of impurity and interiority is 
further aligned with femininity and maternity.
Biblical impurity is permeated with the tradition of defilement...It 
points to but does not signify an autonomous force that can be 
threatening for divine agency...Such a force is rooted historically (in
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the structure of religions) and subjectively (in the structuration of 
the subject's identity) in the cathexis of the maternal function - 
mother, woman, reproduction. But the Biblical text - and therein lies 
its extraordinary specificity - performs the tremendous forcing that 
consists in subordinating maternal power (whether historical or 
phantasmic, natural or reproductive) to symbolic order as pure logical 
order r^gg^ating social performance, divine law attended to in the
Here Kristeva and Levinas are dealing with a process of separation from 
'spontaneity' which is simultaneously a 'forgetting' of the feminine 
maternal in attempting to regulate the forces of uncontrollable 
equivocation, but which also establishes it symbolically as a realm of 
inferiority - at the heart of the cormunity in the home, and within the 
body. In this position it functions as an orthodox equation of woman with 
ethicality, maintaining the protection of the interests of the conmunity 
and the tradition, and placing women within the spheres of reproduction and 
iirmanence associated with the body.
But it is also possible to recognise in this equivocal moment a rupturing 
of the very unity it is supposed to protect, and attach a feminine force to 
this rupture, which exposes the deceptive nature of neutrality masquerading 
as objectivity.
In conjunction with the process of presenting a narrative of unity which is 
also a neutralising of difference, we can see the importance of the 
analysis of the mythological origins of sexual difference. The symbolic 
consequences of such stories are what is at stake, not whether or not they 
are believed in any literal sense. The implications of such narratives 
have far-reaching effects on the kinds of symbolic and cultural modes of 
identification available for men and women. But it is also important to 
consider under what conditions such stories present themselves; as singular
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truth or as interpretation. If sexual difference is seen to originate in 
the derivation of Eve from Adam's rib, then not only is Eve secondary to 
Adam, condemned to be other and inferior, but she is also biologically 
secondary (as it is a physical separation), and Adam has the primary 
relation to God. But this narrative of Adam's priority is undermined by 
other possible interpretations offered by Rabbinic texts. Of other 
possible mythological interpretations the following are offered:
- Woman is 'derived quasi-grammatically from man' in the derivation of 
ishah from ish in Hebrew; an etymological justification which draws 
attention to the primarily linguistic nature of difference and so to an 
absent transcendental signifier (similar to Lacan's position).
- two separate acts of creation were called for; one for the masculine and 
one for the feminine, giving separate access to God for both parts.
- The woman has priority over the man in terms of prophecy and hearing 
God, as Sarah's priority before Abraham illustrates.
- Eve hears the divine word and the voice of God, so she is also an 
'interlocutor of God'.
- Adam was created sexually undifferentiated or hermaphrodite (an 
interpretation of the verse 'Male and female created he them', Gen 
1:27). This is suggested by the Midrash (Genesis Rabbah 8:1), and 
discussed in the Talmud (Er. 18a).
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Commenting on th is , Levinas w r ite s ;
Did not God give the name Adam to man and woman joined together, as if 
the two were one, as if the unity of the person were able to triunph 
over the dangers which lie in wait for it only by a duality inscribed in 
his very essence?
These possibilities establish the absence of one 'true' interpretation in 
the very exposition of the narrative. Sexual difference is already 
inscribed from the first, in these suggestions of equal but different modes 
of access to an original account of sexual difference. This is, as Tina 
Chanter(33) points out, the content of Aristophanes' myth in Plato's 
Symposium. (34) But does this not amount ultimately to a move to an initial 
neutrality and so to the obliteration of sexual difference? If there is an 
initial hermaphrodite or androgynous being, it would seem to privilege a 
loss or lack of sexual marking, rendering sexual difference less 
important or a constant and tragic attempt to regain the sense of loss 
realised in the differentiation. For Aristophanes, the two halves are 
destined to roam the world seeking their missing half, yearning for what 
has been severed. If they meet, they long to melt into one another and 
'become one instead of two*.(35) This fusion corresponds to an erasure of 
difference in a totalising equality.
But Levinas is instead suggesting that sexual difference is not secondary 
in being less than adequate; it is seen as more important that the division 
take place than the initial state of unity. Hence there is no 
nostalgia for a lost origin. It is important for each sex to have its 
own identity and not to be subordinate to each other, or to one, or to a 
totalising horizon. In this version of sexual difference as 'secondary', 
the difference is not only acknowledged but affirmed; it is not tragic, to
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be overccxne in favour of an equality based on its obliteration.
Levinas also points out that any notion of 'evil' is now seen as socially 
produced, since it arises with difference - it cannot be ascribed on a 
primordial level to Eve.
Levinas offers the structure of these symbolic stories as a strategic 
cament on the priority of the masculine which is commensurate with the 
'popular idea of the r ib'.^^ In other words, his concern is to find a 
way of articulating the way the masculine has come to dominate over the 
proliferation of possible meanings, when the masculine is aligned with 
totality, unity and priority. In addition the alternative interpretations 
throw into question the 'natural' course of the narrative, the entrenching 
of the notion of the feminine as secondary which permeates cultural 
structures. Such entrenchment is closure for the kind of equivocation 
which allows productive relations of difference.
We can notice a similar agenda in Kristeva's analysis of the role of the 
Virgin Mary. In her essay 'Stabat M a t e r ' s h e  draws heavily upon Marina 
Warner's book Alone of All Her Sex; the Myth and Cult of the Virgin
MarY<38) to indicate how the Virgin Mary becomes a symbolic axis of the 
conjunction between Hebraic and Hellenic; and as a conjunction between 
virginity and maternity. In a moment of undecidability, the figure 
presents a potential site of ambivalence, for the two traditions, as well 
as for understandings of women. There is a potential disruption of the 
Greek logos and Jewish monotheism in the presence of a divine feminine 
figure, central to religion but neither one thing nor another. But this 
dangerous ambivalence is conscripted for control and synthesis, in that the
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virginal aspect becomes a pure and holy asceticism, and maternity becomes 
the continuity of the comnunity via reproduction.
A woman's discourse, would that be it? Did not Christianity attempt, 
among other things, to freeze that seesaw? To stop it, tear women away 
from its rhythm- settle them permanently in the spirit? Too 
permanently...*
The freezing of undecidability sets up an ideal, fusing with the existing 
ideal of virginity in courtly love and the ideal of devoted maternal love. 
The impossible totality of the virgin mother is not only disseminated 
within patriarchal cultures, but becomes the prototype for Western love 
relations.
Apocryphal sources make Mary into an eternal virgin by establishing her own 
immaculate conception - she is not even b o m  with original sin like mortal 
women. As an eternal figure, her sexuality can be written out, separated 
from her to signify sin, bodily transience and a reminder of the mortality 
which is punished by death. In contrast, chastity signifies eternity and 
continual life. In such purity, Mary can become the mother not only of 
Christ but of God and man, serving this triple role. As she is no longer 
mortal she can move freely from one incarnation to another. In an echo of 
oriental religions she is 'transported'.
Her authority is further extended when she becomes not only Queen of Heaven 
but is charged with the care of the Church and accorded supreme earthly 
power. Analogous to the noble lady of the Mediaeval court, she demands 
ardent, chaste and exclusive desire as exemplary Woman, free of all sin. 
Such apparent authority disguises the severity of its demands. As this 
inaccessible totality she is not only remote from her suitors but also from 
the aspirations of women forced to try and emulate her.
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When the attributes of the Virgin are changed to encompass maternal love, 
apparently tender and homely, it seems as if the lofty figure is being 
mediated by human signs of fallibility; the fluids of milk and tears which 
mark some materiality and emotions of compassion. But even here, the signs 
are already part of an attempt to deny death; there is nothing excessive 
about her grief.
'The sorrow of Mary is never a tragic overflowing; joy and a certain 
triunph follow the tears, as if the conviction that death does not exist 
were an irrational but unshakeable maternal certitude upon which to base 
the principle of the ressurrection...
The suppression or repression of mortality which amounts to a denial of 
death, requires the presence of a feminine/matemal figure to bear the 
weight of the resurrection or the passage to immortality. The price is the 
raising of the maternal to an immortal biology, bridge across death for the 
masculine, at the cost of her own self-realisation. There is no 
corresponding space for her to have a relation to death.
In Kristeva's terms, the dangerous moment of rupture is contained by 
erasing jouissance, in virginity, and channelling it, in maternal 
reproduction, to sustain the deathless ideal of the masculine, whether this 
is the law, the community or the subject.
This figure, the epitome of romantic idealisation, utterly serene icon
as ideal and untroubled, functions as a sublimating vessel for various 
cultures. And yet Kristeva indicates its 'clever balanced architecture 
today appears to be crumbling' the* psycho tic sore of modernity' is
'the incapacity of contemporary codes to tame the maternal'
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Thus it reveals that which it cannot contain even in trying to cover over 
the slippage of excess, codified both as death and as jouissance.
In a similar way, Irigaray discusses the figure of the Virgin Mary as 
simultaneously freezing the feminine/matemal into its symbolic position 
and denying any agency as s u c h . s h e  draws upon Feuerbach's analysis of 
religious discourse as the 'perfecting' of hunan horizons, the human 
aspiration towards the divine given shape in the context of religion. (****) 
Religious discourse has given cultural shape to this projection as the 
relation between Father and Son, with the Holy Ghost as mediating relation 
between them. God acts as a goal for hunans, withdrawn from the world into 
a concentrated focus of aspirations and accomplishments. The uniqueness 
and unreachable infinity of God must, however, be interrupted by the 
relation with the son, in order to grant some kind of access to an 
otherwise unbroachable divinity. The son establishes a mediation between 
hunan and divine. However, as Feuerbach points out, the feminine is 
'veiled out' of the divine in any other function or guise than that of the 
maternal function, which is severely limited, constrained and given a 
merely instrumental role.(^) The Virgin Mary is coded as a cipher through 
which the divine spirit may pass, and even in her very instantiation as 
mother is reduced to an icon of stasis and self-denial, to allow the son to 
come to be. Any dynamism she might present on her own terms is effaced in 
such representations.
For Levinas, the romantic attitude may constitute a way of denying 
anbivalence (coded as the feminine), because it refuses to recognise a 
certain openness or interruption to its movements - even in the heights of
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the cult of the Virgin Mary or the Eternal Feminine. He suggests Talmudic 
interpretation is able to diffuse this closure by exposing the alterity 
(death, excess), in its process. Even the textual moments in the Old 
Testament which seem to have no other directive than their own eroticism, 
these 'gripping images', are 'de-poeticized'.
According to Levinas, the romantic deifying of the other which remains 
caught up in its own pleasure, the repetitious circuits of desire which 
correspond to this escape from death/excess even as its haunting returns, 
'is foreign to J u d a i s i m . L o ve as its own end, as an enclosing of 
these circuits without a further horizon of difference, has covered over 
the eschatological dimension of love, but cannot succeed in exorcising it 
altogether. If there was a way to recognise this spacing effect, we could 
perhaps suggest 'more appropriate fulfillments' of difference. It may seem 
paradoxical to affirm death in the context of love, but Levinas is 
suggesting a dimension of alterity which is excessive to strategies of 
containment, found in both the erotic and death.
The forms of the romantic that one finds in the Bible are soon 
interpreted in the Midrash in such a way as to make the eschatological 
side come out...What one calls sentimental love...- the romances of 
Isaac and Rebecca, of Jacob and Rachel, of David and Bathsheba- 
undergoes a de-poeticization in the Midrash. This is not due to prudish 
timidity but to the permanent opening of the messianic 
perspective...
There seem to be a number of worrying points raised by what Levinas 
suggests here; is a particular form of erotic love to be sacrificed to 
something beyond? - which is not in the name of closure, but to keep open 
other possibilities - how can Levinas expect to ensure this horizon is not 
recuperable as the deathless ideals of (in this context) the Virgin Mary? 
Or, as he writes, to the 'dynamism of love (which) leads it beyond the
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instant and even beyond the loved person'.
Maternity is, in the Rabbinic interpretation of love, subordinate to a 
human destiny which exceeds the bound of the "joy of the family": it is 
necessary to fulfill.Israel, to "multiply the image of god" inscribed on 
the faces of men.'^9'
The 'subordination' of maternity in this respect rescues it from a 'duty' 
to the family to reproduce, which casts the woman in the determining role 
as mother. But maternity is then reconscripted for a further ideal, which 
may leave women in an equally constricting position. Levinas is seeking a 
means of characterising relations otherwise to those which appear as a 
flight from death, for example, romantic love seems to idealise the other 
and to deny openness. For Levinas, a certain version of erotic love can 
only be described pejoratively (eg. 'in the romances of Amnon and Tamar, 
or, in certain respects, in the loves of Samson'),^®) in appearing to 
totalise. This totalising move is also a closure of the feminine.
However, as already noted, it seems that Levinas replicates some of this 
closure, if he seeks to pre-judge the relations which are to count as 
'opening the messianic perspective' and those relations which are 'merely' 
erotic. If Levinas' project is fundamentally one of ethics, his 
interpretative readings of sacred texts need to be developed in the context 
of a feminist perspective in order to illustrate ways that the dangers of 
his texts might be circunven ted.
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QiAPTHt TfH: KRISTEVA. IRIGARAY AND TOE MAlERNAL/FPflWINE
We have seen that Kristeva's notion of the semiotic chora, Irigaray's 
notion of the imaginary and the 'natural', and Levinas's 'pre-ontological 
past' all have reference to the maternal as a symbolic figuring of that 
which is disruptive and anarchic, and, while being positioned as originary, 
also works to unsettle such a notion of origin. The process of drawing 
attention to such disruption and its exclusion, is given an ethical force, 
in order to be able to respond to otherness in other than a dominating 
fashion.
But if these notions are not to replicate a reductively essentialist 
equation between woman as constituted identity and those qualities 
considered ethically desirable in orthodox approaches to ethics, we must 
still consider the equation from a feminist perspective. Can it ever be 
anything other than a repetition of existing and restrictive equations?
The figure of the mother is traditionally associated with the embodiment of 
idealised virtues of forbearance, fortitude, care and patience, 
associations which, in present patriarchal relations work not as a paradigm 
for different ethical relations, but as a site of constraint and 
exploitation. Here the qualities associated with caring and with 'access 
to the other', in any attempt to address the vulnerability of the other, 
have been conscripted to the interests of the classical family structure 
and appear to hold that structure in place.
According to both Irigaray and Kristeva, the construction of what is 
culturally understood as ethical is built at the expense of the suppression 
of certain forces associated with the matemal/feminine, or their diversion
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into rigid symbolic structures. This formulation of a founding move of 
exclusion or repression is to be understood from its effects, the diagnosis 
of violence and crisis which is perpetuated in the discourse of the same. 
Kristeva writes:
Man overcomes the unthinkable of death by postulating maternal love in 
its place - in the place and stead of death and thought... Such a love 
is in fact, logically speaking, a surge of anguish at the very moment 
when the identity of thought and living body collapses. The 
possibilities of comrnmication having been swept away, only the subtle 
gamut of sound, touch and visual traces, older than language and.newly 
worked out, are preserved as an ultimate shield against death.' '
Kristeva indicates the symbolic link of the maternal with death, as absence 
of communication and a continuity which obliterates the fragile boundaries 
of identity. The sense of identity as something solid and reliable, 
becomes counterposed to the chaos of an origin prior to identity, and the 
dispersal or extinction in death.
By creating an icon of mother love which is represented as ideal, eternal 
and unchanging, the anxiety of this process is ca thee ted into the solid 
identity of the maternal. In Kristeva's work this is linked to the 
symbolic realisation of such processes in Christianity, through the figure 
of Mary as mother, presented as ideal.^ But the vestiges and residues of 
this process are left to resonate as traces in the interstices of bodies and 
representations of bodies, which constantly reinvade the attempt to forget. 
For Kristeva and Irigaray this leads to ever-increasing attempts to shore up 
defences against uncertainties, in increasingly costly ways. Kristeva 
draws attention to the cost of this sacrificial ordering for women 'living 
the sacrifice', (3) as the lay ramifications connected to these psycho- 
symbolic structures.
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Irigaray also identifies this process of a certain sacrifice of the 
maternal feminine.
The culture, the language, the imaginary and the mythology in which we 
live at present...let us look at what foundations this edifice is built 
upon...This underpinning is woman producer of the social order, acting 
as infrastructure of that order; all of Western culture rests upon the 
murder of the mother.W
This symbolic 'murder' is, for Irigaray the surreptitious exchange of a 
sacrificial element in the rites and rituals of a society into the 
immolation of a scapegoat - codified as women or nature. ^  This sacrifice 
is seen as necessary, as that which 'brings the social space into 
being'.(6) But Irigaray questions whether there might be some more 
productive way of approaching rites and rituals which preserves the 
sociality of the practice and yet is less destructive. 'Something of a 
sort has dominated certain eras, and is trying to emerge in our own, 
without, however, being conceived as a reworking or an abolition of the 
sacrificial* • is it possible to formulate practices not based on 
'killing, cutting up and eating'?
For Irigaray, the possibility of articulating such rites and rituals would 
allow for respect, not 'dereliction'. Irigaray is not proposing to 
circunvent death in the eternal life of an ideal society; for her 
dereliction demands an unreasonable price extracted without acknowledgement 
of value, in an economy of violence. There is a kind of destruction, she 
argues, which is a prelude to rebirth and can be understood as such; this 
would be part of 'a culture of health in so far as it is spiritual and 
divine. A community should organise a space-time which is in harmony with 
micro- and macrocosmic needs'. Of course, she inmediately questions; 'Is 
this a utopia? Can a society live without sacrifice?'. ^
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Kristeva also hints at this possibility of re-reading rituals in a less 
destructive fashion, through her critical examination of the symbolic 
sacrifice of Christ on the cross. This moment of the death of identity, 
the mark of a threshold of spiritual and bodily forces, is the obliteration 
of the body in favour of the elevation to the divine: 'the killing of the 
body is the path through which the body-self has access to the Name of the 
Other who loves m e ' . ^  While the body's destruction in this sense is a 
passive masochism of suffering in allowing the action of Agape or God's 
love to be received, it is not inseparable from the sacrifice of identity 
as presence and the relinquishing of essential subjectivity we find in some 
post-structuralist writings. If the obliteration of self in the
process of desire and transcendence is seductive in its loss of 
responsibility, of sexual differentiation and of the problematics of 
identity, it is also a passivity lacking agency.
However, Kristeva seems to indicate that the processes of the shedding of 
self in the context of a kind of elective passivity, in being chosen, 
creates the possibility of a different conception of the self not based on 
the ego. 'Agape builds psychic space as the complex space of a 
subject'.'**' Somewhat paradoxically, an 'excess' of passivity opens a 
space which may be seen as other than sacrificial. It seems to allow for 
the development of a kind of subjectivity not based on self-identity, since 
its very constitution is allowed by an other, and it also seems to open 
access to others. Kristeva writes; 'the love of one's neighbour contains 
an additional element...The absorption of narcissism within the image of 
the Oneself is stretched out to include neighbours, foreigners and 
sinners...
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For Kristeva this process of an 'unsettling' of the self which allows for 
an ethical openness to the other is not contained by the negativity of a 
relation to death - death is only a symbolic realisation of one aspect of 
this process. The other part is the excess of otherness found in the 
relations of love and idealisation. In this sense, the death of Christ is 
a mark of abandonment to love, the dynamic processes of construction- 
destruction played out in 'the erotic unleasing of the death drive'.(13) 
This excessive passivity which is beyond even masochism, is, Kristeva 
contends, seen as virtue in suffering only when it is frozen in a static 
symbolic formation such as Christ on the cross. At this level it becomes 
universalised and hypostatised and, as such, works as a negative force to 
provoke guilt and feelings of inadequacy. In this manifestation, it is 
fixed into a representation of death which 'writes out' the ecstasy of 
passion. What indeed is sacrificed is 'a lustful body, the erotic body', 
which becomes that element of embodiment obliterated in the 'synthesis of 
the resurrection' Consequently, despite the positive elements for an
ethical!ty in the excess of love, the horizon of death as negativity once 
again inscribes its boundaries. In so doing, it symbolically excludes one 
element of abandon, then codified as the uncontrollable forces of desire 
and the erotic, which come to be associated with women.
If there was a more fluid way to interpret these processes which did not 
necessarily result in the traps of these kinds of representation, but also 
refused to sacrifice one element into the oblivion of non-representation, 
there would be a way to develop rites and rituals other than as destructive 
circuits. This would also be a way of acknowledging the unpaid debt to the
-219
underlying (maternal/feminine) forces underlying the whole process; 
allowing these forces to perhaps gain a mode of expression.
But Kristeva seems less optimistic than Irigaray in this respect, since she 
returns to the aesthetic dimension and thereby to a certain inevitability 
concerning the forms of representation. In other words, there is no choice 
but to submit to the process of reinscribing the horizon of death in the 
process of representation. It seems that 'no one escapes it. Except 
perhaps the saint, the mystic or the writer who through the power of 
language, nevertheless succeeds in doing no better than to...identify with 
love itself - a fire of tongues, an exit from representation'. But
this either/or choice is mediated somewhat by aesthetic possibility, the 
constant revising of the boundaries of this process (which we can link up 
to Kristeva's writing on the avant garde).
...it seems to me that there is only one way to go through the religion 
of the Word, or its counterpart, the more or less discreet cult of the 
Mother; it is the 'artist's^ way, those who make up for the vertigo of 
language weakness with the oversaturation of sign-systems.' '
Irigaray interprets this 'oversaturation of sign-systems' with more 
political directness than Kristeva would perhaps intend. She argues in 
favour of a process of intervention and critique, placing positive symbolic 
constructions of women in the face of the damaging circuits of logos and 
the idealisation of identity.
And yet, curiously this desire for a political dimension leads her to 
appear far more tentative and uncertain about her own positionality than 
Kristeva.
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In the formulation of 'new' possibilities of representation, a certain 
concern to avoid the repetition of the same, a separation from the mother 
as (symbolically) unmediated jouissance, is required. As Jane Gallop^8  ^
puts it, the daughter must be able to separate from her mother in order to 
speak for herself, to work out an identity and to be able to establish 
difference. But this seems to entail a rejection of the (symbolic) mother.
To speak the same language is to speak the 'langue matemelle', the 
mother tongue, taught to the daughter by her mother...The obligation to 
reproduce - the daughter's obligation to reproduce the mother, the 
mother^|gSjtory - is a more difficult obstacle than even the Father's
The separation from the mother which is yet not a sacrifice engenders 
Irigaray's ambiguous postion; she does not want to assume the place and 
role of the mother and yet she wants to preserve a space for the maternal 
function as a force in its own right; to be able to negotiate the otherwise 
sometimes destructive relations. The separation of identities which would 
allow an exchange of dialogue, not the repression of the maternal function 
nor a fusion into the continuity of jouissance, requires the possibility of 
some form of signification.
It is necessary to create a symbolism between women such that love can 
take place between them. This love is only possible in any case at the 
moment between women who can speak with each other. Without intervals 
of exchange, or words, or gestures._Dassions between women can show 
themselves...in quite a cruel way.^u>
Is there a way to negotiate the separation which is not violent?
Irigaray's own dialogue addressed to her mother is uncertain, moving 
between a desire to separate and to change, also demanding that the mother 
keep herself separate, but still maintain a dialogue and exchange.
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You put yourself in my mouth and I suffocate... Continue to be also 
outside. Keep yourself/me outside too. Don't be engulfed, don't 
engulf me, in what passes from you to me. I would so much like that we 
both be here. So that.one doesn't disappear into the other or the 
other into the one.'21'
The relationship to the maternal other is also discussed in Kristeva's 
essay 'Stabat Mater'.(22) Kristeva raises two questions. The first is a 
challenging question for feminism; 'What does the desire for motherhood 
correspond to?'. What Kristeva seeks here is a means of considering 
maternity in conjunction with 'the new forms of representation' demanded by 
a feminist perspective, a way of thinking which is neither negation nor 
acceptance. The challenge for feminist thinking lies in analysing this 
notion without a view to either rejecting it, as for example de Beauvoir 
tends to do, in seeing it as an imprisoning of women into a misconceived 
biological destiny, or else unproblematically valorising it in the name of 
woman as mother or earth-goddess. The valorisation of motherhood and its 
association with ethicality is discussed extensively in feminist theory; 
for example, Sara Ruddick's Maternal Thinking 2^ )^ and the work of Nancy 
Chodorow,^) but it is often given a positive association without a 
deeper analysis of what is at stake in such an identity itself. In the 
context of an object relations account of mothering in general, there is a 
more static account of identity as cultural or biological, which minimises 
any conception of intrapsychic disruptions in order to focus on relations 
in the intersubjective realm. This approach also tends to locate any 
possible changes wholly within interpersonal or interfamilial relations and 
not to broaden the analysis to wider concerns. Such concerns would include 
the consequences of these forms of representation on the social,cultural 
and historical understandings of women and maternity.
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The danger of these analyses is that in focussing on identity in the 
intersubjective realm, they accept the terms and conditions of ontological 
determinations, which once again lead back into a refusal or domination of 
the other. In order to seek a displacement of the self which is radical 
enough to allow for otherness, it is necessary to probe deeper into the 
structuring of such identities and their relations. To begin this process 
is to open 'a discourse' for a motherhood which is positioned without one, 
which is expressed as 'a need for an ethics for this "second sex" in its 
'reawakening'.(25)
Kristeva's second question echoes Freud and Spinoza, in asking 'Are women 
subject to ethics?'. (26) ye can takg this question to mean are women good 
enough to meet the criteria of being called ethical agents, can they become 
fully aware of what is at stake in making ethical choices (ie are they 
rational enough). The problem of denying women status as ethical agents is 
that it casts doubt on the extent to which any agent can be said to be 
fully rational and/or ethical, and still qualify as an agent. In other 
words the question of women has been fundamental to the development of 
philosophical theories of ethics, and the way in which this 'problem' is 
variously negotiated gives us insight into the way identity is assuned to 
be structured.
We could also interpret this question as asking to what extent women are 
subjected to ethics - as schemas they did not devise and which are manifest 
as sacrifice, subjugation and distortion. In the very broaching of this 
question we recognise an implicit challenge to the ethical framework as a 
whole. If such a framework valorises freedom and equality for all 
individuals, yet simultaneously demands that the criteria for achieving
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those aims be those generally associated with that which has been coded as 
masculine - a capacity for abstraction, an ability to compete in the public 
arena for example, then a fundamental contradiction is thrown up which the 
framework will find it difficult to sustain. In naming ethics as its 
concern it stands opposed to inequality between individuals, while at the 
same time demanding that certain qualities be promoted at the expense of 
others, leading to a disparity between the sexes.
A particular example of such contradiction is found in Rousseau's attempts 
to negotiate ethics and a force coded as feminine. In The Discourse on 
Inequality and In The Social Contract/27) “ “ire 1» seen to ln P«8t 
(a primitive idyll left behind), but also in the future (as the possible 
state of 'true human nature' still to be attained). Nature is 
characterised as feminine, so that in both aspects it is given a moral and 
maternal figuring. Nature is the mother who 'hides the weapons of science 
from a child', attempting to restrain men from the abuse of the natural by 
the scientific.
Let men learn for once that nature would have preserved them from 
science, as a mother snatches a dangerous weapon from the hands of her 
child. Let them know that all the secrets she hides are so many evils 
from which she protects them, and that the very difficulty they find in 
acquiring knowledge is not the least of her bounty towards them. (28)
It is also women who are 'ahead' of men in terms of moral virtue, providing 
an ideal to aim for. The women of Geneva, 'chaste guardians of our 
morals', will act as exemplars for future morality.^^0 
So as nature, women epitomise a capacity for disorder which must be tamed. 
But in their very lack of reason, they are somewhat 'free' from the
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corrupting influence of culture} and in this innocent role, provide, 
through their difference, a symbolic reminder both of what was and what 
will be in Rousseau's texts.
Except, of course, this process is built on positioning women not only as 
differing, but also as pre- and post- culture or reason. In this role, 
they present a danger to the kind of egalitarian morality Rousseau is 
seeking to establish. Women also remind the harmony of the social sphere 
(where all wills should be directed towards the continuance of the social 
contract), of the unruly and equivocal emotions, the partiality of maternal 
affections, and the private realm which diverts the citizen from the 
general will of the state. But Rousseau cannot dispense with motherhood as 
this is, necessarily, what will provide future citizens. Mothers are, 
further, charged with the responsibility of bringing up the future 
citizens, teaching them restraint and control, which means the mothers have 
to be bearers of the values of the state. And yet how can they do this, 
being both already moral, and yet not moral enough?
Rousseau is faced with this problem too, in grappling with the question of 
education for girls, in Bnile.^O) Should autonomous individuality be 
allowed to girls? If it is, they will become 'authoritative', in 
possession of reason, and so refuse to be properly submissive and feminine. 
If they are uneducated, they will be unsuitable companions for men, 
untutored in the requirements of femininity. So the moral dilemna 
continues. Rousseau uses the illustation of the Spartan mother who is able 
to subordinate maternal feeling (her particular affection for her sons) to 
the interests of the state (in being told of her sons's deaths, she sternly 
demands to know the outcome of the battle as a more important detail), as a 
moral e x e m p l a r . A n d  yet, this version of rationality would also be the
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perversion of what is 'natural' about women for Rousseau; their maternal 
instinct. Rousseau wants to establish a social contract which could 
promote equality for all, (and so be moral) making the criteria for such a 
contract the rational ability to understand and keep such a contract (the 
moral individual as it basis). And yet he is forced to disallow this 
ability to women, as they are both prior to and beyond such morality. It 
is not women who make this contract. As Genevieve Lloyd and Carole 
Pateman^2) show, the social contract 'disguises a sexual contract' which 
can only be exposed by forcing the contradictions it presents, to 
illuminate the framework of such thought.
Another illustration of this paradox is found in the famous passage from 
Freud which draws attention to 'Some Psychical Consequences of the 
Anatomical Differences of the Sexes ';(33)
I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that 
the level of what is ethically normal is different in women from what it 
is in men. Their superego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so 
independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men. 
Characteristics which critics of every epoch have brought up against 
women - that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are 
less ready to submit to the greater exigencies of life, that they are 
more readily influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or 
hositility - all these would be amply accounted for in the formation of 
the superego which we have inferred above.
Again, we find the question of the relevance of sexual difference to ethics 
being raised. Is it vitally important to maintain it (whether this is in 
the interests of excluding women as inadequate, or to promote difference in 
order to argue for specificity), or should difference be subordinate to an 
argunent for equality and universality? This debate is significant in 
considering maternity, because if sexual difference is irrelevant,
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maternity can have no place in discussions of ethics.
Freud's speculation on the ethical inequality of men and women points to 
the contradiction inherent in, on the one hand, sustaining universal 
ethical norms or laws, and, on the other, positing determining differences 
between men and women. Because Freud maintains different development 
patterns for men and women, it is logical in this context to identify 
different apprehensions of ethics. The next step is then to see women's 
apprehension as inferior or defective. But as with Rousseau, when we 
examine the criteria of neutral ethics assuned in this passage, it turns 
out to be a capacity for acting in such a way as to be free of emotional 
'distraction', impersonal and abstractly judgemental, capacities which are 
then correlated with masculine characteristics. This legacy of the 
Enlightenment, which manifests itself in liberal moral structures, 
emphasizes individual moral choice at the expense of a morality with 
history or histories, i.e. one which can expose networks of power. Such 
relations of power are occluded if the neutrality of the ethical agent is 
the sole focus.
But is Freud to be accused of merely duplicating prejudice here? He places 
ethics in the realm of the superego, demanding a certain repression of 
forces in order to be able to articulate the universality to which 
traditional ethics has appeal. But in this extract the question of 
difference introduces a threat to this universality by suggesting a prior 
figuration of difference, splitting the possibility of rational ethicality 
through not only sexual difference but also via the forces of the
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unconscious. Freud's text 'exceeds' itself here, caught between orthodoxy 
and radicality.
In negotiating the spectre of determinism raised herein, we can 
provisionally see the relocation of ethicality from the prime centre of 
the social superego to the very margins of this arena of rationality. Here 
we find a self no longer immune to doubt, but opened to the limitations as 
well as the socially defined powers of a sovereign subject.
Kristeva identifies such practices as a generalised dissent, practice as 
the frontier at which ethicality is developed. She writes: 'The ethics 
that develops in the process of negativity's unfolding is not the kind of 
'ethics' which consists in obedience to laws'• Here she seems to be 
suggesting that the location of ethicality is no longer adequately situated 
in the reformulation and attempted perfection of codes of behaviour, rules 
and laws. Unless the disruptive traces of the subject, constantly being 
rewritten in its processes, can also be accounted for, these projects are 
destined to keep re-treading the same ground. The constant transgression 
and renewal of positioning in relation to the process of signification 
gives onto the possibility of considering new practices, forged at the very 
boundaries of thinking.
What qualifies this practice to be called ethical? In terms of a 
generalised analysis of the crisis thrown up by modernity, we can recognise 
a certain bankruptcy in pursuing narrowly rationalist versions of ethics.
At its most extreme, we have seen rationalising, totalising moves produce 
atrocities in its name, the most hyper-paranoic attempts to excise
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difference and homogenise identity. A resistance to such formats does 
not invalidate the whole process of thinking but rather indicates that the 
vitality of theorising productive and fulfilling relations must be re­
conceptualised. Far from heralding the gloomy celebration of nihilism, 
such a conceptual shift engenders an event of ethical magnitude. Such an 
event is intertwined with, though not reducible to, a feminist project of 
reappraisal.
Kristeva finds in maternity the metaphoric expression of the above boundary 
location of ethicality, which is given the force of subversion tut as 
embodied in the figuring of the feminine/matemal. Maternity connotes a
intp
possible irruptionAand interruption of the Symbolic, centrally placed, yet 
disruptive, the disturbances of stasis and dynamism, cyclical/monunental 
time and discursive/grammatical time. In 'Stabat Mater', the poetic, 
lefthand (sinister?) 'other' side of the text irrupts into the historical 
and chronological mapping of motherhood. This textual move aspires to a 
writing of the metaphoric mother, positioned as a body in signification and 
yet already split, separated, pleasuring; 'the heterogeneity not subsumed 
under any law'.(^) A space is opened for different subjective 
possibilities, yet retaining the specificity of women.
Now, if a contemporary ethics is no longer seen as being the same as 
morality; if ethics amounts to not avoiding the embarasssing and 
inevitable problematics of the law but giving it flesh, language, 
jouiss^gg^ - in that case its reformulation demands the contribution of
This 'heretical ethics' is not based upon avoiding the law, but enriching 
it through the excessive re-presentation of the feminine to the aridity of
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the law. If positionality is in effect a co-operation with the conditions 
of historical and cultural legislation concerning subjectivity, there is 
nothing inmutable about such a process, it must be open to re­
interpretation.
However, according to Kristeva, the positionality which may lead to a 
metaphysical hypostatisation of Woman is to be found in feminist discourse 
too. This is perhaps what leads her to be unnecessarily harsh on the 
variety of feminist positions which do not coincide with her own; a fear of 
the reintroduction of the essentialist subject which has led women to 
'sacrifice or violence'. If this is a challenge to feminist theory, is it 
the kind of critique which feminist theory needs? Many feminist writers on 
Kristeva find her scathing attacks on feminism uncomfortable, especially 
when they seem to emanate from a position apparently as the 'queen of 
theory' which gives her the powerful role of (masculine) critic.(^9) 
Ultimately they reluctantly part company from her, and her 'maternal' 
influence, in order to seek a more palatable version of feminist 
solidarity. Kristeva is proposing to occupy both the position of feminine 
disrupter of the symbolic order, and cultural commentator, and she seems to 
resort to the latter more frequently. But I do not think Kristeva's work 
is exhausted by a hasty dismissal, and it may be as necessary to attend to 
her work as to the other 'mothers' from whom much can be learned, if only 
in dissenting, challenging dialogue. 'Women doubtless reproduce amongst 
themselves the strange gamut of forgotten body relationships with their 
mothers...'i40)
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Remaining with the subversive elements of Kristeva's texts for the time 
being, I would suggest that in 'Stabat Mater' we do find a feminist 
approach to the body (the maternal body) which constitutes a potential 
rethinking of corporeality in keeping with a radical perspective on 
difference; for example as outlined by Rosi Braidotti (although she is 
later critical of Kristeva in. tins text);
...the body thus defined cannot be reduced to the biological, nor can it 
be confined to social conditioning. In a new form of 'corporeal 
materialism', the body is seen as an inter-face, a threshold, a field of 
intersection of material and symbolic forces; it is a surface where 
multiple codes of power and knowledge are inscribed; it is a 
construction that transforms and capitalises on energies of a 
heteronomous and discontinuous nature.. The body is not an essence, and 
therefore not an anatomical destiny...'41'
It is clear that Kristeva is not dealing with an ontological reduction of 
woman to the maternal, and nor is she subordinating the specificity of 
women to the more general principle of dissidence or subversion which 
includes revolutionaries and the avant garde.
There might doubtless be a way to approach the obscure place that 
maternity constitutes for a woman... one might equally try to see more 
clearly into the incredible construction of the maternal which the West 
elaborates through the Virgin...
Although it concerns every woman's body, the heterogeneity that cannot 
be subsumed in the signifier nevertheless explodes violently with 
pregnancy (the threshold of nature and culture) and the child's arrival 
(which extracts a woman from her unity and gives ber>.a possibility - not 
a certainty - of access to the other, of ethics).V**-'
In terms of such a possible access to the other, of Kristeva's heretical 
ethics, we need to read this aspect of the text in conjunction with its 
'other' hand, where she writes of the 'abyss' of inaccessibility, 
separation, and the impossible, irredeemable otherness of the other, 
between and within. This consititutes the divisional spatiality of a
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maternal figuring...'and consequently a division of l a n g u a g e . .(^3)
But is this version of maternity to be merely a constant disruption, an 
anarchic 'demented jouissance?' The question which must be taken up
is the extent to which such versions might permeate and challenge the 
borders of languages of representation, how the very conditions are to be 
made flexible enough to facilitate this transformation.
Let a body venture at last out of its shelter, take a chance with 
meaning under the veil of words. W)RD FLESH. From one to the other, 
eternally..broken u d visions, metaphors of the invisible _...wisps of words, droplets of sentences...take refuge xn tones to 
recover an underwater, trans-verbal communication between bodies...(45)
In Kristeva's essay 'Motherhood according to B e l l i n i s h e  seems to 
write of or from the mother without according any specific subject identity 
to the mother; maternity becomes a process in which 'no one is present',
'it happens but I'm not there'. In Elizabeth Grosz's t e r m s , i t  seems 
that Knsteva is prepared to deny any form of agency being present in 
maternity in order to escape the charge of essentialism, to the point that 
it becomes 'ludicrous'. Grosz sees Kristeva refusing to accord a sex to 
the maternal body and as a result acceding to the biological and 
physiological telos of a 'natural' species-memory. It seems as if the 
relinquishment of a subject category puts the notion of motherhood into a 
more longterm biological narrative, as an intrunental requirement of 
reproduction. In this sense the mother as agent seems to be written out, 
and she becomes merely an agent for the generation of the species.
But the primary reason for Kristeva's denial of essential identity is as 
part of her critique of an epistemic basis upon which ethics and - in this 
essay - aesthetic judgements are founded. The notion of representation
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which resides in a mimetic figuration of that which is taken to be by 
definition 'true', is undermined by forces which threaten to invade both 
the objects of representation and the subject who is apparently 'mastering' 
them through representation. The key term in her essay is 'reproduction', 
which works co-ex tens ively in the context of both painting and maternity. 
What is at stake in 'reproducing' the conditions which preceded a moment of 
reproduction? How do these conditions -as they are symbolically understood 
- start to change culturally and historically?
Kristeva is concerned to confront those forces which may present motherhood 
as a serene and untroubled icon - in fact, as the epitome of identity, 
frozen and perfect in its capacity to regulate chaos and present a respite 
from the uncertainties of dynamic processes, and the recurring hints of 
failure to present these processes in a stable or static way. The 
idealisation of motherhood is what makes the Madonna 'fit' to be the mother 
of the Son of God; she makes the space to allow transitivity between divine 
and hunan, at the expense of her own self.
A quite revealing Orthodox conception of the Virgin defines her as 
ergasterion - privileged space, living area, ladder (of Jacob), or door 
(ofthe Temple, in Ezekiel’s vision) - dwelling, in short; she is seen 
as union, a contact without gap, without separation, and these functions 
make of her a metaphor for the Holy Ghost.
There has to be 'someone' placed in this filter, according to the demands 
of this kind of economy; a powerful figure who can be accorded the capacity 
to master and control the whole process. Yet in being accorded this power 
the figure of the mother is being manipulated as 'a thoroughfare'. But it 
seems without this figure, identity would crunble, 'every speaker would be
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led to conceive of its Being in relation to some void, a nothingness 
asymetrically opposed to this Being, a permanent threat against first its 
mastery and ultimately its stability
How necessary is the frozen image of perfect motherhood to this process? 
Kristeva writes of Christianity's need to position a figure in the 
dangerous (as it is perceived) moment of splitting, construed as 'the 
threshold of nature and culture' which presents a threat to social 
coherence with its 'psychotic tendencies' - and it places the mother there. 
The consequences of this particular placing are
a) the sacrifice of motherhood to be the lodestone of the spiritual/social 
community, holding it together at the woman's expense, and
b) an implicit recognition of hazardous psychotic splitting, in the very 
need to ensure against it.
In identifying this process, Kristeva is caught in a double bind; if she 
says 'no one is there' in this curious site, she is capitulating to the 
sacrifice of the mother. If she defends the mother against this symbolic 
sacrifice she is collaborating in presenting her as a hypostatised 
identity, essentialised and manipulated as such.
However, Kristeva also acknowledges an 'other' codification of maternity, 
the excessive forces which act against the constraints of identity in a 
different way. These forces are to be contrasted with a pathological fear 
of the void from which the mother came to stand as a symbolic shield, and 
the excessive forces which are not a void but are not representable in the 
terms of the proper name either.
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How can we verbalise this pre-linguistic, unrepresentable memory? 
Heraclitus' flux, Epicurus^ atoms, the whirling dust of cabalic, Arab 
and Indian mystics and the stippled drawings of psychedelics - all seem, 
better metaphors than the theories of Being, the logos and its laws.'30-'
Gesturing toward these forces allows Kristeva to negotiate the either/or 
dilemma of the representation of maternity, as here she can indicate a 
notion of the maternal space which is not a void, but nor is it an identity 
of Being. The excess of maternal jouissance is symbolically an archaic 
memory which works as a kind of thread or fault between metaphysics.
We must note at this point that having created this space of articulation, 
Kristeva seems to return to the discourse of 'drives and instincts', a trap 
she could have avoided if she had once again acknowledged the symbolic 
network these notions must inhabit. It seems curious to reinstate biology 
as the 'real' when she had previously been so cautious to point out how 
the process of signification does not allow us to name this kind of ground 
other than as a kind of absence.
This move is particularly odd when she is using her whole argument to 
precisely question the relations of representation. Should we read this as 
the fatal flaw in Kristeva's work (it occurs in a number of places)? Or 
should we take as given that when she writes of biology she realises its 
mediation through a certain representation of biology? In certain places 
she seems to indicate this is what she means, but the passages are dense 
and unclear. It appears that she is writing not of an actual biological 
teleology, but the inscription of such a 'programmeinto the social 
narrative of the journey from nature to culture.
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But this discussion of maternity cannot be read in isolation from the rest 
of the piece. Kristeva is concerned with an analysis of Bellini's use of 
colour which, in its 'luminous density' allows her to give a 
phenomenological reading of the visible which reveals the hiddenness of its 
dimensions; the 'volune' of light which seems to 'open out infinitely to 
another spatiality'.^^ In other words, she is seeking the conditions of 
possibility of presentation, even at the very 'limits of 
representation'. In a similar way in her piece on Giotto and the
maternal, which also considers the 'massive irruption of bright colours', 
'chromatic differences that throb into a third dimension',(53)
attempting to articulate the way in which the conditions of representation 
are unsettled as the simultaneous moment of their presentation. The force 
of colour is equivalent to the excess of jouissance which disrupts the 
formalistic elements of the painting as the axes of space and time.
If Kristeva is more interested in the disruption of representation which 
Bellini's use of colour effects, we must still ask what connection is to be 
made between the figural representation of the Madonna and the force of the 
excess of maternal jouissance. Although it is not explicit, Kristeva is 
pointing out that the conditions of representation are shifting and 
changeable forces which, if they are somehow made more open, can allow for 
shifts in the particular representations which emerge from them. With 
reference to the maternal body, the openness would be an articulation of 
the debt which is owed to this hidden function.
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...craftsmen of Western art reveal better than anyone else the artist's 
debt to the maternal body and/or motherhood's entry into symbolic 
existence.. .A unique biographical experience and an uncorimon, historical 
intersection of pagan-Orientalism with sacred Christianity and incipient 
hunanism was perhaps needed for Bellini's brush to retain the traces of 
a marginal experience, through and across which a maternal.body might 
recognise its own, otherwise inexpressible in our culture.
If Kristeva allows that the marginal experience must be that which can be 
re-invented in the processes of creativity (given the specificity of each 
realisation), then this reinvention is a kind of breaching of the sacred, 
an interruption in the continuity of representation of its own mirror held 
up (in this case) to the Madonna and to motherhood in general (in its 
symbolism). Bellini's painting testifies to this event. The profanation of 
the sacred - the representation of what is constituted as divine - would
correspond to Kristeva's notion of the opening of the space of maternal 
isjouissance, whichAnot merely a space outlined or waiting to be represented. 
As such, it could only mark that which is not present or presence as a 
self. The sacred is not a place replete with meanings, it is a 
withdrawal, signed by what has passed - and as such it makes a space for 
possible presentations of the sacred in different forms. If new 
understandings of difference both require and indict the process of 
representation, we can see an example in Bellini's work, as Kristeva draws 
attention to it, of the way this might function. In this way, I think 
Kristeva's understanding of the relation of the sacred and representation 
captures the same notion which Irigaray describes in terms of 'women 
becoming divine for themselves', an opportunity to reconsider the processes 
of idealisation and creativity.^-*)
Another way to account for this process is given by Jean-Luc Nancy in his 
essay 'Of Divine Places'.
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Jean-Marie Pontevia once wrote: 'The cult of the Virgin is one of the 
major events in Western history. It is certainly an event, whose 
principle phases are datable, and it is a major event, because it may 
well perhaps be the last example in the West of the birth of a 
divinity'. I propose to add that this last example perhaps 
signifies..that a divine birth is always possible, and that it is 
therefore still possible. But at the same time it means that such a 
birth bears no relation to a 'return', a restoration or a reinvention of 
the divine - quite the opposite... the sacred cannot be reinvented. The 
divinity born in the figure of the Virgin was in no way the return or 
reincarnation of a former divinity. It was the divinity of a new age; 
of a ^|^age of painting and of woman..It was a divine sign opposed to
We can see in this process the possibility Irigaray also seeks. But it is 
not achieved in the name of directly correlative biological processes, 
simplistically 'represented' by colour densities. Kristeva is also at 
pains to indicate the ideological networks which go to make up conceptions 
of value (both 'biology' and 'representation' too) - with attention to 
the specificity of Bellini and Giotto, as well as to the present day. What 
this points to is an articulation of jouissance as conveyed through the 
understanding of Giotto or Bellini, in the context of their conception of 
the sacred - which must refer us to the particular processes of 
representation. Although she does not stress this strongly enough, there 
is a means to activate this process in a feminist context.
But as Jane Gallop teasingly suggests, Kristeva is all too ready to occupy 
the position of phallic mother - the powerful mother figure who possesses 
knowledge and is in control of signifying processes. She identifies the 
means of an emancipatory mode of thinking the maternal/feminine, but fills 
up the content of this process with her own analysis of male artists, 
dramatising her own position, and showing her command of the process. 
Whether she is more or less successful, Irigaray wishes to leave this space
-238-
free for women to situate their own access to the divine. Kristeva has 
already exposed the conditions of this process, the exercising of 
creativity as a means to power, as fraudulent, if it means thinking one is 
invincible (and witness her criticisms of feminists who might presume 
this). She writes in many places of the new mode of being that might be 
opened up as vunerability.
...the maternal function can be the apprenticeship of modesty and of a 
permanent calling into question; and if a woman lives maternity and her 
artists work thus, far from being a totalising Mother<,ocdess, she is 
rather a locus.of vulnerability, of calling into question oneself and of 
languages' • '
As we have seen, the one rare location we find evidence of this 
vulnerability is in the 'poetic' side of 'Stabat Mater', where Kristeva 
calls herself into question in and against her text which speaks of 
motherhood. We can also see her admission of vulnerability in her 
problematising of the identity of the analyst, which is to say, as she 
herself is an analyst, a problematising of her own position. Nevertheless, 
her relations to and her writing concerning other women is perhaps not 
tentative enough. There is a hint of possibilities in the following 
passage:
Nevertheless, androgynous paradise and, in another way, lesbian loves 
comprise the delightful arena of a neutralised, filtered libido, devoid 
of the erotic cutting edge of masculine sexuality. Light touches, 
caresses, barely distinct images fading one into the other, growing dim 
or veiled without bright flashes into the mellowness of a dissolution, 
a liquefaction, a merger...It evokes the loving dialogue of the 
pregnant woman with the fruit, barely distinct from her, that shelters 
in her womb. Or the light runble of soft skins that are irridescent 
not from desire but from that opening-closing, blossoming-wilting, an 
in-between hardly established that suddenly collapses in the same 
warmth, that slunbers or wakens within the embrace of the baby and its 
nourishing mother. Skin; mouth; empty, excited, or the filled opening 
of lips - they coat such emanations, drain their tension, and, beyond
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any aggressive breakthrough, float, cradle, drug. Relaxation of 
consciousness, daydream, language that is neither dialectial nor 
rhetoric^^g^but peace or eclipse: nirvana, intoxication and
The forms of signification drawn upon in both Kristeva's and Irigaray's 
work in this respect correspond to what might be called 'syntax 
morphology'; the (hypothetical) translation of a language of excess, of the 
equivocal borders and fissures of the edges of the body, and of the 
'differences' between names and bodies. Although every language might be 
said to contain these possibilities, it is the urgency of a feminist 
project to develop this language of sensibility which gives it an ethical 
instantiation. As such, it cannot be completely recuperated into an 
understanding which would equal its control, nor into systems of 
representation and knowledge. The morphology, sensibility and proximity 
which it evokes is fragile and tentative, and yet offers a challenge to the 
still destructive circuits which it indicts.
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CHAPTER ELEVB): CONCLUSION
So far, I have identified a certain need to approach a reading of 
philosophy from a perspective which can allow a critique of some of its 
presuppositions and yet not situate itself wholly outside that tradition.
In order to elaborate on this notion I have borrowed from psychoanalysis 
resources of analytic interpretation and therapy, to conduct an analysis of 
the subject as other than wholly self-present, and an analysis of 'the 
unconscious' of philosophy. This analysis is conducted with a view to 
proposing ways of understanding difference which will also be restorative 
rather than destructive, a strange version of 'therapy'.
The disruptive effect of a feminine/matemal force has been established, 
even when this force is theorised in the context of phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis. The feminine corresponds to an excess which is capable of 
overreaching the intentional analysis of desire and the structure of the 
desiring subject. This is a codification of the feminine which does not 
exhaust its codification, but extends it. 'The feminine' is taken up 
strategic ally to provoke questions of sexual difference in the context of 
philosophy. The potential of such a strategy concerns signification, 
meaning and language, but in an indirect, mimetically skewed and mimicking 
fashion. This version of signification may be extended to develop an 
'ethical language' which can allow for the articulation of the feminine.
If scepticism occupies a bizarrely anti-philosophical position with respect 
to philosophy, it has an equally venerable ancestry within that tradition. 
This well-known paradox may be framed thus: 'Scepticism may be understood
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as an expression of an extreme form of dissatisfaction with the logos in 
its philosophical form. Scepticism tries to evade philosophy; but is there 
any logos-free space where it could settle to enjoy a human life?'^
If thinking is continually condemned to a movement of imprisonment, 
encompassing and repulsing, 'Which experiences, adventures of the mind, or 
events of history do not permit the gathering of logos to enclose them 
within its h o r i z o n s ? ' . H o w  are we to find a strategy of critique which 
is not merely repetition of the same, but manages to avoid the infinite 
regress of a scepticism forced to be sceptical of its own position?
This is the problematic which faces those thinkers who seek to reproach 
philosophy for what it has repressed or left out, and to reproach it in the 
name of a legitimate cause, and yet this contaminates the basis of an 
appeal to legimation in reproaching philosophy. In his essay 
'Presentation' on Levinas, Adrian Pepperzak calls this a problematic of 
evasion. How can we dodge philosophical containment while at the same time 
utilising its resources to articulate otherness? Engaging in this 
'impossible' enterprise is to offer an ethical reproach to philosophy, the 
conditions of this reproach being a determination to avoid quietism or an 
abdication of any concerns with philosophical thinking. In this study, I 
have conducted this reproach in respect of contemporary feminist concerns, 
and engaging the resources of phenomenology, feminist theory and theology 
to elaborate its possibility.
So is this a reinstatement of a metalevel concern? Where can this level be 
found to allow a critique of all other critiques? Is it either too naive a 
demand or self-refuting in its internal contradiction?
The disjunct between the exposing of a moment of scepticism and its own
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refutation indicates a dislocation, a non-synchronised fault or fracture 
which may make a new space for such a reading to take place. This reading 
will show an awareness of non-coincidence which would not be a weakness, 
simultaneously naive and too sophisticated in its interpretation.
The questioning of ontology belongs to an immense volume of work which 
patiently uncovers the conflation of singularity, identity and presence, 
and the connection to and from the power structures which not only create 
such formations but maintain them as the most successful means of 
sustaining the status quo. The totalitarian thinking which occludes 
difference in the name of a more coherent theorisation of unity is not 
confined to those political regimes more imnediately identifiable as 
repressive, but also to the liberal framework which argues for equality at 
the expense of celebrating difference. If feminist theory has been 
concerned to question identity in the context of post-modernist thinking, 
it is in order to analyse the alignment of presence and power. But the 
recent 'return to the subject' in philosophical theory, which is heralded 
as the chance to re-consider questions of ethics and political 
responsibility now that subjectivity has been unsettled from its complacent 
fixity, is not really new for feminist theory, in that it has sought to 
preserve some version of subjectivity.
In the work of the thinkers I have examined in this study, there are 
consistent attempts to rethink a mode of being which is not recuperable 
under orthodox categories of subjectivity, and in this context, the site of 
the body has been a persistent preoccupation. Despite the apparently 
different terrains which these thinkers occupy, they share a fundamental
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proccupation with the apparent determination of otherness as a problem for 
the epistemologically and ontologically grounded subject. Their analyses 
may be said to be ethical in that they stir up once again the various 
oscillations between poles of unity/multiplicity, masculine/feminine, 
I/other, where such oscillations have generally resolved into the first 
term coming to take precedence over the second. The process of stirring up 
these solidifications allows at least the potential for a 
reconceptualisation of identities, as well as relations between them, but 
not at the expense of dispensing with them altogether. Instead, we are 
introduced to a realm of equivocation in a provocative flouting of the 
principle of non-contradiction. How can one thing be and not be at the 
same time? But as I have suggested, it is only if this ambiguity is 
allowed that we can come to understand the complex operations of difference 
in any way other than a reductive and reducing fashion. Hence such 
thinkers attempt to sustain an equivocal position with respect to not only 
an intersubjective dimension, but also with respect to a dimension of 
transcendence.
This simultaneity of need and desire, of concupiscence and trancendence, 
tangency of the avowable and the unavowable, constitutes the 
originality of v the erotic, which in this sense, is the equivocal par 
excellence'.*3 ’
A constant alteration between time and its "truth", identity and its 
loss, history and the timeless, signless extra-phenomenal things which 
produce it. An impossible dialectic: a permanent alteration: never one 
without the other.
A potential is opened by Levinas' claim for 'ethics as first 
philosophy' .(5) This is a radical dimension of infinity as absence, which 
could recast questions of sexual difference in different terms. This
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potential is matched by the attempts of Kristeva and Irigaray to re­
interpret sexual difference through the resources of signification,
Kristeva through 'heretical ethics' and Irigaray through the female 
imaginary, as a way of revealing the hidden aspects of the 
feminine/matemal.
The question which has preoccupied us here may be stated simply: is the 
ethical relation one of neutrality, ultimately an understanding of the 
Other as a threshold to a sexually unmarked infinity, or is the ethical 
relation already and irremediably sexed - the other as feminine? This is 
not just a question for feminists, but accords with attempts to think 
ethics as a relation to Being as neutral or beings as sexed and situated. 
The feminist problematic is still related to this larger scale 
'philosophical' diLenina; perhaps uniquely though in the history of 
philosophy, it is at the heart of the ethical agenda. Since Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty insist upon the sexual and embodied nature of any ethical 
agent, feminist theory can engage with the implications of this insistence. 
As we have seen, Kristeva and Irigaray take up this possibility for 
feminist theory, although it is Irigaray who presents the most 
comprehensive and optimistic political implications for a feminist 
understanding of 'an ethics of the p>assions', an embodied, experiential 
ethicality which acknowledges the vicissitudes of sexual difference and 
draws this possibility to the attention of the discipline of p>hilosop>hy.
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INTRODUCTION
1. The primary writers I include in this broad generalisation are Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-Franpois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, 
Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. Other authors would 
include Jean-Luc Nancy, Phil ippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Sarah Kofman and 
Monique Wittig. I intend to indicate the context of post-war critical 
theory which takes up questions concerning power, language and desire 
in the wake of Nietzsche, Kojeve's lectures on Hegel, Sartrean 
existentialism, structuralist theories of language and Lacanian readings 
of Freud. For fuller characterisations of the 'French intellectual 
scene' and post-modernism, see for example Vincent DescombcsModern 
French Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1980. For a critical 
examination of subjectivity in this context, see Peter Dews (1987).
The theoretical framework may still be concerned with ethics as a 
problematic, but not necessarily with the development of ethics.
2. For example, see R.M. Hare The Language of Morals, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1952, and work which considers specific problems within ethics 
eg. abortion, euthanasia, suicide, animal rights, promising etc. An 
opposing view is taken in the context of 'ordinary language' philosophy 
after A.J. Ayer, which has led to the devaluing of ethics as a 
discipline, as empirically neither verifiable nor falsifiable, but 
expressive of emotion, or the subordination of ethics to questions 
about the philosophy of mind and/or philosophy of language.
3. For critiques of reason and autonomy which nevertheless hold on to such 
notions as ethically or politically necessary for the development of a 
critical theory which can have some purchase, see the work of the 
Frankfurt School and of Gadamer and Habermas (Dews, 1987).
4. See for example Genevieve Lloyd (1986), Jean Grimshaw (1986), Sarah 
Kofman, Elshtain (1986), Susan Okin (1980), Clark and Lange (1979) etc. 
for feminist critiques of the apparent neutrality of reason and 
autonomy in the history of philosophy.
5. See the work of Onora O'Neill for example, for
feminist defences of Kantian ideals of equality and autonomy.
6. The philosophical canon is reflected by the philosophers taught on the 
majority of syllabuses in contemporary philosophy departments, e.g. 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Rousseau, Hune, Locke, Descartes, Sartre 
etc.
7. Kant Critique of Pure Reason, p. 597.
8. Hune is most often held to be a counter position to the alignment of 
reason and ethicality, epitomised by his statement 'Reason is the slave 
to the passions'. But as Lloyd (1986) indicates, Hune makes a
distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' passions, whereby 'strong' 
passions are the capacity for public interest, deliberation and the 
development of 'virtue'. In the long run, such passions correspond to 
the preservation of society, public justice and human progress, in 
opposition to the 'private1 morality of sentiment and particular 
affections. This opposition corresponds to the public/private 
distinction and the division of the sexes.
9. In the context of contemporary feminist theory, questions have been 
raised about 'the feminine' in language as another example of (male) 
philosophers appropriating and recuperating the critical force of this 
notion. See Jardine (1985), Braidotti (1990), Allen and Young (1989). 
'The feminine' may be radically disruptive and unrecuperable as a force 
within the text, as via its very non-determination as an ultimate 
heterogeneity it undermines identity thinking: see David Krell 
Postponements, woman, sensuality and death in Nietzsche, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press. 1986. or Derrida's Spurs (1979), or Graybeal 
(1989) for this view. But it is not automatically feminist; the 
feminist implications need to be developed in the context of the 
paradox between women's experience and the feminine as a radical force 
of negativity. It is the work of Irigaray, for example, which develops 
this paradox further.
10. I will argue that while Luce Irigaray's work may be called explicitly 
feminist, there are feminist implications in the work of Julia Kristeva 
which can be developed and expanded. For objections to this view see 
Grosz (1989), Jones (1985) or Stone (1986).
11. See Irigaray Ethique de la difference sexuelle, passim.
12. It may be objected that the possibility of developing an ethics for the 
future is implicitly teleological; and so has an implicit view of hunan 
nature and of progress towards an ideal. As Whitford (1991) points 
out, while the critical/sceptical perspective of Kristeva avoids the 
accusation of idealism or utopianism (as Kristeva seems to resist 
speculation or projection), Irigaray's work seems to be open to this 
charge.
13. For example, Plato's Republic begins by assuning fundamental 
inequalities between the inhabitants of the ideal state, Aristotle 
accepts that definitions of happiness and ways of life will differ: 
'...when it comes to saying in what happiness consists, opinions 
differ...Ethics, p.66), and Kant observes differences in his practical 
anthropology etc., but the overall aim is to overcome such differences.
14. The notion of identity as process will be expanded in later chapters, 
in the context of psychoanalytic theory.
15. See Moi in Brennan (ed) (1989).
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CHAPTER 1.
1. Focussing on The Second Sex and The Ethics of Ambiguity.
2. See The Second Sex, p. 16, where de Beauvoir writes; 'She is defined 
and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to 
her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the 
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is the Other.'
3. See Michèle Le Doeuff (1986) and (1990). Le Doeuff's position is that 
philosophy as a discipline has not explicitly excluded women from 
thinking or reasoning, but has established its boundaries in such a way 
as to focus on reason and knowledge, and to sustain a 'master-pupil' 
relation which corrsponds to masculine-feminine relations. It has also 
had recourse to the metaphor of 'the feminine' to sustain its position 
as 'master discourse', while simultaneously disavowing such a metaphor. 
However, she argues that a pluralising of the philosophical enterprise 
would allow women to engage in 'a collective form of philosophical 
work', so, like de Beauvoir, she is optimistic about women's capacities 
to overcome the constraints which place them as 'Other'.
4. See The Second Sex, p.91, where de Beauvoir writes;
In our attempt to discover woman, we shall not reject certain 
contributions of biology, of psychoanalysis, and of historical 
materialism; but we shall hold that the body, the sexual life, and the 
resources of technology exist concretely for man only in so far as he 
grasps them in the total perspective of his existence.
5. See Michèle le Doeuff (1980) for an account of this tension.
6. Second Sex, p. 28.
7. See Kristeva's essay 'Women's Time' in Moi (ed) (1986) for this notion 
of 'waves' of feminism.
The first wave is supposed to be the struggle for equality 
on the same terms as men, the second is the argunent in favour of 
difference, and the third is the negotion of the previous two 
positions. This characterisation of feminism is misleading in that it 
suggests each generation is a homogeneous body of thought, and that 
each generation successively 'overcomes' the previous one. Kristeva 
argues that she is not presenting an historical account and that the 
strands of thought can co-exist, but this point is often overlooked.
'My usage of the word 'generation' implies less a chronology than a 
signifying space, a both corporeal and desiring mental space. So it 
can be argued that as of now a third attitude is possible, thus a third 
generation, which does not exclude - quite to the contrary - the 
parallel existence of all three in the same historical time, or even 
that they be interwoven with each other. ' p.209.
8. Sartre's works were published in 1943 and 1960 respectively.
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9. Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 8.
10. ibid., p.13.
11. For Kierkegaard's account of the paradox of existence as despair and 
dread, see The Sickness Unto Death or Fear and Trembling, for example.
12. See Jaspers, Buber and Marcel, for example. For a brief overview of 
different strands of existentialist thought see John Macquarrie 
Existentialism, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1980.
13. Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 15.
14. ibid., p.17.
15. ibid.
16. ibid.
17. ibid., p.ll.
18. See Paton (ed) Kant The Moral Law for a distinction between the 
pathological and the purity of the moral law, for example.
19. Ethics of Aribiquity » p-35.
20. ibid., p.105.
21. ibid., p.82.
22. ibid., p.48.
23. Michèle le Doeuff (1986).
24. ibid., p.279.
25. Second Sex, p.13.
26. ibid., p.15.
27. ibid., p. 15.
28. Second Sex, p. 60.
29. Second Sex, p. 63.
30. See Monique Plaza 'Phallomorphic power and the psychology of woman', 
Ideology and Consciousness. 1978, no. 1, voi. 4, pp.6-7, for example:
'...nature does not speak the difference, it supplies indications which 
we interpret as a function of social relations. The individual does 
not have a "natural existence", he [sic] is always already socialised, 
including his "biological irreducibleness". We shall not find the
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woman by eliminating the social from our questioning, because the 
social is always there, imposing its impressive construction...
See also Shulamith Firestone The Dialectic of Sex. New York, Bantam, 
1970.
31. Lloyd (1986), Chapter 6.
32. ibid., p.102.
33. See Judith Butler 'Gendering the body; Beauvoir's philosophical 
contribution' in Garry and Pearsall (eds) (1989), pp.253-62.
34. ibid., p.249.
35. Ethics of Ambiguity, p.41.
36. Second Sex, p.66.
37. See Foucault (1980):
'...the notion of 'sex' made it possible to group together, 
artifical unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, 
sensations and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of 
fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent 
meaning...'(p.154).
and Merleau Ponty (1968):
'The thickness of the body, far from rivalling that of the world, is on 
the contrary the sole means I have to go unto the heart of things, by 
making myself a world and by making them flesh.' (p.152). In 'making 
myself a world', Merleau-Ponty indicates, one is 'restoring a power to 
signify, a birth of meaning...an expression of experience by experience 
which in particular clarifies the special domain of language' (p.155).
It seems that Foucault resists this possibility of judging, although 
Merleau-Ponty suggests it is the re-enactment of such meanings which 
can direct future possibilities of bodily meanings. However, as I 
suggest, this once again imputes some kind of rational choice to 
agents. However, Butler points out tensions in Foucault's work 
between the view of sexuality as an effect of the discourses of power 
in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1. and the materiality of the body in 
Herculine Baroin (1980).
38. See Butler 'Gendering the Body', in C|arry and ftaraall (eds) (1987), 
p. 258.
39. For Butler this question seems to resolve itself in an arena of 
theatrical costuming, drag and the playful subversion of established 
gender identities through 'impersonation'. See Butler(1190),
40. ibid, p. 256-7.
in an
conducts,
this
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41. See Butler (1990).
42. See Derrida (1982), where he writes;
'...what if we were to reach...the area of a relationship to the other 
where the code of sexual marks would no longer be discriminating? The 
relationship would not be a-sexual, far from it, but would be sexual 
otherwise...I would like to believe in the multiplicity of sexually 
marked voices. I would like to believe in the masses, this 
indeterminable number of blended voices, this mobile of non-identified 
sexual marks whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of 
each individual, whether he be classified as a man or a woman according 
to the criteria of usage', (p. 76)
43. 'Interview with Simone de Beauvoir', Wewzél,fl1il),p.ll.
44. Second Sex, p. 718.
45. Significantly, de Beauvoir discusses her ambivalence concerning 
psychoanalysis in interviews later in life, acknowledging that she and 
Sartre did not really explore it in the '40s and '50s (see Alice 
Schwarzer Simone de Beauvoir Today; conversations 1972-82. London, 
Chatto and Uindus, 1984). See Mitchell (1974), 'Part Two, Section II 
'Transatlantic Psychoanalysis; the Feminists 1. Simone de Beauvoir' for 
a discussion of de Beauvoir's ambivalence, where Mitchell argues that 
de Beauvoir appreciates the insights of Freud for its 'psychology' but 
that from an existentialist perspective she is bound to reject Freud for 
the apparent determinism accorded to biology and for his stress on 
sexuality at the expense of 'other' aspects of existence.
46. Rosi Braidotti (1991), p. 140.
47. Butler (1990), p. 10.
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CHAPTER 2
1. See Mitchell and Rose (eds) (1982), Brennan (1989) and Gallop (1982), 
for example, for a much fuller account of the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and feminism. As my concern is to develop the ethical 
implications of these two areas of theory, I discuss some of the 
important implications of the mutual influence and criticisms each has 
on the other, but this account is not intended to be exhaustive.
2. See Grosz (1989), chapter 1.
3. Kristeva 'Women's Time' in Moi (ed) (1986), p.209.
4. Quoted in Whitford (ed)(1992).
5. See Jessica Benjamin (1988) for an analysis of feminism and 
psychoanalysis which focusses on the intersubjective relation of sexual 
difference. She argues that object relations psychoanalysis provides 
a way of negotiating the problems of domination/submission in relations 
between men and women. Her analysis corresponds to a Habermasian 
position in that it argues for an 'ideal speech situation' posited 
between the sexes, such that difference could engender mutual respect. 
However, I think she is able to reach this optimistic conclusion 
because she occludes or overrrides the intrapsychic divisions and 
splits and forces which would fundamentally undermine such a project.
In a footnote she acknowledges such forces, but proposes to focus on 
the unified aspect of the subject. n discussing intersubjective and 
intrapsychic relations, she writes in a footnote:
Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this discussion to propose a 
scheme for synthesizing the two approaches. The problem is that each 
focusses on different aspects of psychic experience which are too 
interdependent to be simply severed from one another. I am emphasizing 
intersubjectivity over intrapsychic theory because the latter is better 
developed and usually overshadows the former, not because I think one 
ought to preclude the other, (p.21)
See Grosz (1990) for a concise account of Kristeva and Irigaray's debt 
to Lacan. She writes:
Kristeva and Irigaray share Lacan's broad anti-hunanism, his commitment 
to the primacy of language in psychical life and his understanding of 
the necessarily sexualised position assuned by the subject in the 
symbolic. They share a familiarity with Freud's work, with texts of 
(largely)idealist philosophies, as well as as a background in Lacan's 
seminars. Both are practising psychoanalysts. Both are committed to 
developing analyses of the production of sexed subjectivity. Both 
focus on the relation obscured in Freud and Lacan's work - the mother-
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child relation (for Kristeva) and the mother-daughter relation (for 
Irigaray)...Both affirm the fluid, polymorphous perverse status of 
libidinal drives and both evoke a series of sites of bodily pleasure 
capable of resisting the demands of the symbolic order, (p.149).
6. Kristeva (1981), p. 132.
7. We will see the implications for intentionality and desire in the next 
chaper in the context of phenomenology.
8. Gallop (1986), p.xii.
9. This claim will be explored in later chapters in the context of 
phenomenology as it is re-interpreted by Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. My 
argunent for this psychoanalytic/phenomenological nexus for feminism is 
supported on both sides; Lacanian psychoanalysis acknowledges the 
influence of phenomenology in analysing the relation between the 
scopophilic field and intending acts of consciousness (which applies to 
sexual desire), and phenomenologists discuss sexuality and the erotic 
as part of intentionality. I hope to show how these perspectives are 
workable for feminist theory, in an ethical direction. Both Kristeva 
and Irigaray are familiar with the philosophical aspects of these 
theories.
10. The socio-symbolic is acknowledged to be 'masculine'. See Grosz (1990) 
for a feminist critique of Lacan.
11. See Butler (1990), Introduction, for a forceful account of this 
paradox.
12. Although this is Freud's phrase, it occurs in a number of feminist 
works on Lacan as a metaphor for feminine jouissance and the strategic 
position of woman (or 'the feminine') as other.
13. See Derrida (1978) and Krell (1986).
14. Lacan in Mitchell and Rose (eds) (1986), p.166.
15. Lacan, Ecrits (1976), p.287.
16. Lacan in Mitchell and Rose (eds) (1986), p. 135.
17. ibid. p.147.
18. Moi (ed) (1988), p.118, and Whitford (ed) (1991) p.165.
19. ibid.
20. The Pythagorean table opposes ten sets of principles in pairs of 
contraries, thus:
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Light
Good
Square
Limit
Odd
Unity
Right
Male
Rest
Straight
Unlimited
Even
Plurality
Left
Female
Motion
Crooked
Darkness
Bad
Oblong
This table is printed as an appendix to the Penguin edition of 
Aristotle's Ethics, with a note by Hugh Tredennick: 'The selection of 
these pairs seems rather capricious...but evidently there is a system 
of a sort; the first column is meant to exhibit order, unity and 
goodness, and the second the corresponding defects.1 p.346, my 
emphasis.
21. Rose in Brennan (ed) (1989).
22. ibid.
23. Irigaray writes: 'Woman remains this nothing at all, this whole of 
nothing yet where each male (one) comes to seek the means to replenish 
resemblance to self (as) to same. And so she is displaced, yet until 
now it was not she who displaced herself' ('Volume-Fluidity' in 
Speculum p.227, retranslated in Whitford (ed) (1992), p.53.
24. IrigarayThkSex, p.150.
25. Speculum and Éthique de la différence sexuelle are the texts which 
engage most explicitly with philosophy.
26. The title of the first section of Speculum which deals with Freud.
27. See 'The Power of Discourse', This Sex, where Irigaray writes:
...the domination of the philosophical logos stems in large part from 
its power to reduce all others to the economy of the same. The 
teleologically constructed project it takes on is always also a project 
of diversion, deflection, reduction of the Other to the Same. And, in 
its greatest generality perhaps, from its power to eradicate the 
difference between the sexes in systems that are self-representative of 
a 'masculine subject'... (p.76).
28. In Éthique de la différence sexuelle Irigaray writes:
Wonder (admiration, in Descartes' terms) might allow them (the sexes) 
to retain an autonomy based on their difference, and give them a space 
of freedom or attraction, a possibility of separation or alliance. 
Whitford (ed) (1991), (p. 173) and Moi (ed) (1988), p. 124.
29. In This Sex Irigaray writes:
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There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one 'path', the one 
historically assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry. One must 
assume the feminine role deliberately. Which means already to convert 
a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to 
thwart it. (p.76).
See also the rest of this essay, and Ethique de la difference sexuelle, 
passim, for Irigaray's characterisation or this project as ethical or 
political.
30. Broadly speaking, this shift is from the 'scientific' discourse of 
linguistics and Marxism( the topics of structural linguistics and 
Maoist Marxist theory are the main themes of Revolution in Poetic 
Language and About Chinese Women) towards topics such as romantic love, 
the abject and melancholia in keeping with Kristeva's deepening 
involvement in psychoanalysis.
31. See Tales of Love and Desire in Language respectively for these 
directions.
32. Kristeva Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 110.
33. ibid., p. 113.
34. ibid., p. 116.
35. This analysis of the Hegelian dialectic is also found in Derrida, in 
the attempt to resist the idealism and monism implied by the Hegelian 
system. And yet Hegel is vital to the analysis of identity and 
difference. See Glas, and 'From Restricted to General Economy; a 
Hegelianism without reserve' in Writing and Difference, for example.
The view of Hegel's philosophy as totalising and implying totality is 
shared by Levinas. See Wyschogrod (1974), Chapter
36. John Lechte (1990) writes:
'On 7 November 1955, Jacques Lacan - doctor of medecine, psychoanalyst, 
friend of surrealism - 'officially announced his famous 'return to 
Freud' in a paper given at a neuro-psychiatric clinic in Vienna'.
See 'The Freudian thing, or the meaning of the return to Freud in 
psychoanalysis', Lacan Ecrits (1977), pp.114-45.
37. This symbolic structure is, in addition, marked as masculine. Lacan 
writes:
'It is the name-of-the-father that we must recognise as the support of 
the symbolic function, which, from the dawn of historv has identified 
his person with the figure of the law'. (Écrits, p.67).
See Whitford (1988) and (1990) for a fuller account of the imaginary in 
Irigaray's work. In This Sex, Irigaray writes:
-256
if the female imaginary were to deploy itself, if it could bring itself 
into play otherwise than as scraps, debris, would it represent itself, 
even so, in the form of one universe? Vfould it even be volune instead 
of surface? Mo. (j»30).
Kristeva says in an interview (1984):
(I wanted to) make more detailed the archaic stages preceding the 
mirror stage because I think that the grasping of the image by the 
child is the result of a whole process. And this process can be called 
imaginary, but not in the specular sense of the word because it passes 
through voice, taste, skin, and so on, all the senses, yet doesn't 
necessarily mobilise sight, (p.22-3)
38. Kristeva 'The Ethics of Linguistics' in Desire in Language, pp. 23-36.
39. ibid., p.24.
40. See Noam Chomsky Cartesian Linguistics, a chapter in the history of 
rationalist thought. New York, Harper and Row, 1966.
41. Moi (ed) (1989), p.91.
42. The influence of Husserlian phenomenology and the critique of the 
transcendental unity of consciousness will be developed in the next 
chapter. See Husserl Cartesian Meditations.
43. Kristeva Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 31.
44. ibid., p. 32.
45. Wyschogrod (1990), p. 170.
46. Kristeva Revolution in Poetic Language, p.25.
47. ibid.
48. ibid.
49. ibid., p. 68.
50. Rousseau (1965).
51. Pascal (1987).
52. Many critics of Kristeva make these points. See Butler (1989), Grosz 
(1989).
53. Plato Timaaus.
54. Kristeva Revolution in Poetic Language p.26.
55. ibid.
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QiAPIER 3
1. Irigaray Ethique de la différence sexuelle, p. 115.
2. ibid, p.121.
3. See Grosz (1989), pp.95-7, Butler (1989) and Eleanor Kuykendal's essay 
'Questions for Kristeva's ethics of linguistics' in Allen and Young 
(eds), (1989), pp.180-94.
4. See Chapter 2, note 13, and Kristeva About Chinese Women, p. 16.
5. Wyschogrod (1990).
6. ibid., p.234.
7. ibid.
8. ibid., p. 235.
9. Kristeva About Chinese Women, p. 35.
10. For a discussion of the abject in relation to the maternal, see 
Elizabeth Grosz 'The Body of Signification', in Benjamin and Fletcher 
(eds) (1990), pp.80- 103.
11. Mark C. Taylor Altarity.
12. Kristeva About Chinese Women, p. 35.
13. ibid., p. 36.
14. ibid., p. 16.
15. ibid., p. 35.
16. Kristeva Desire in Language, p.166.
17. Moi (ed) (1986), pp. 187-214.
18. ibid., p.199.
19. This sacrifice is conceptualised either as 'murderous fusion or 
incorporation' or 'a deadly immobilising division of the sexes in which 
women have been allocated body, flesh, nature, earth, carnality while 
men have been allocated spirit and transcendence', as Whitford (1991) 
writes, p.158.
20. See Ethique de la difference sexuelle, p.106. Irigaray writes of the 
need for a 'feminine genealogy’, necessary for the 'becoming' of women, 
to be consolidated. The symbolic re-construction of relations which
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have been suppressed or represssed involves a'vertical' relation 
between mothers and daughters, and a 'horizontal' relation between 
women being emphasized. With such a genealogy, women could begin to 
individuate themselves for themselves, and so intervene on the circuit 
of a sacrificial economy.
21. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 200.
22. ibid., p. 208.
23. ibid., p.192.
24. ibid., p. 191.
25. Kristeva Tales of Love, p. 8.
26. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 194.
27. ibid., p. 210.
28. ibid.
29. At the end of 'Stabat Mater', Moi (ed) (1986), Kristeva writes:
If a contemporary ethics is no longer seen as being the same as 
morality; if ethics anmounts to not avoiding the embarrassing and 
inevitable problematics of the law but giving it flesh, language and 
jouissance - in that case its reformulation demands the contribution of 
women.
30. Kristeva About Chinese Women, p. 31.
31. ibid.
32. Irigaray 'The culture of difference', Pli, vol. 3, issue 1, Spring 
1990, p.47.
33. 'The gesture in psychoanalysis', in Brennan (ed) (1989).
34. Lechte (1990), pp. 211-14.
35. Kristeva 'll n'ya pas de maître à langage', (1979). Cited in Lechte 
(1990), p.214.
36. ibid.
37. Kristeva Tales of Love, p. 30.
38. ibid., p.380.
39. Irigaray 'The gesture in psychoanalysis', in Brennan (1989), p. 129.
40. Kristeva Tales of Love, p. 379.
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41. ibid., p. 382.
42. ibid., p. 30.
43. See Moi (ed) (1986), pp. 160-86.
44. Kristeva Tales of Love, p. 38.
45. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 208.
46. Feuerbach (1957).
47. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 210.
48. Whitford (1991). p 46.
49. Irigaray Éthique de la différence sexuelle, p. 122.
50. ibid.
51. ibid., p.123.
52. Irigaray This Sex, p.88.
53. Mitchell and Rose (eds) (1986), pp. 137-48.
54. Irigaray This Sex, p.96.
55. Irigaray Speculun, pp. 191-202.
56. ibid., p.195.
57. ibid, p.192.
58. ibid., p.192.
59. Moi (1985), p. 140.
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CHAPTER 4
1. Plato's attempts to keep the artists out of the Republic because of the 
dangers of 'infection', Kant's resistance to the 'pathological' as 
unruly and unreliable in the Groundwork and Descartes' attempts to 
classify the body as the ship piloted by the mind in Meditation VI are 
instances of the attempt to contain or exile that which threatens the 
place of reason.
2. The work of the two thinkers is used selectively here; it is my 
intention to draw upon those aspects of their philosophy directly 
relevant to a phenomenological understanding of the body and sexuality.
3. The relation between Husserl's phenomenology and the perspectives 
developed here cannot be covered in detail. However, we can go back to 
Husserl's statement in the Cartesian Meditations: 'The beginning is 
the pure and, so to speak, mute experience which is to be articulated 
in its own sense'. The return to the 'things in themselves' is taken 
up by existential phenomenologists, at the expense of Husserl's logical 
and rigorous methodology, to be developed in a more ontological 
direction. However, they identify the characteristic intentionality of 
phenomenology as problematic, in that although it illustrates the world 
as it is presented and constituted by consciousness, intentionality is 
also a version of dominance of objects and experience. To describe and 
to objectify is to classify that which is before consciousness with a 
pre-given meaning. For Husserl, the description of this experience is 
part of the process of isolating what is specific about the structures 
of consciousness in general. Levinas and Merleau-Ponty seek to 
preserve the specificity of the re-description of experience as a way 
of resisting the universality of Husserl's transcendental 
consciousness.
4. Lacan Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,pp.?l~~Z.
5. Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible (1968).
6. ibid. p. 72.
7. ibid., p. 71.
8. ibid., p. 73.
9. See Alphonso Lingis 'Bnmanuel Levinas and the Intentional Analysis of 
the Libido', Philosophy in Context, where he writes:
The carnal, "object" of erotic desire, is a transcendency aimed at an 
other, but aimed at in its weakness. This infirmity is essential to 
the eroticised body, and is not the relative deficiency of an attribute 
convnon to oneself and the other, and measured by comparison. Frailty 
constitutes the substance of the carnal approached in tenderness, as 
the coefficient of resistance an object opposes to one's grasp is 
constitutive of its very being as a transcendent entity and an inert 
object, (p. 62)
-261-
10. De Beauvoir The Second Sex, p. 38.
11. In 'The Intervening, the Chiasm', Merleau-Ponty writes:
For if the body is a thing among things, it is so in a stronger and 
deeper sense than they: in the sense that, as we said, it is of them, 
and this means it detaches itself upon them, and, accordingly, 
detaches itself from them. (p. 138).
12. ibid., p. 103.
13. ibid., p. 114.
14. Hand (ed) (1989) 'Ethics as First Philosophy', p. 79.
15. In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty writes:
...bodily existence continually sets the prospect of living before 
me...my body is what opens me out onto the world and places me in a 
situation there, (p.165)
16. In The Visible and Invisible Merleau-Ponty writes:
The 'little phrase', the notion of the light, are not exhausted by their 
manifestations, any more than is an 'idea of the intelligence'; they 
could not be given to us as ideas except in a carnal experience. It is 
not only that we would find in that carnal experience the occasion to 
think them; it is that they owe their authority, their fascinating 
destructive power, precisely to the fact that they are in transparency 
behind the sensible, or in its heart, (p. 150)
17. Flesh of the world, described (apropos of time, space, movement) as 
segregation, dimensionality, continuation, latency, encroachment...That 
means that my body is made of the same flesh as the world (it is a 
perceived), and moreover that this flesh of my body is shared by the 
world, the world reflects it, encroaches upon it and it encroaches upon 
the world, (p. 248)
18. ibid., p. 134.
19. Merleau-Ponty writes:
The handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself touched as well and 
at the same time as touching...Why would the synergy not exist among 
different organisms, if it is possible within each? Their landscapes 
interweave, their actions and passions fit together exactly.. .(p. 142)
20. See also Levinas 'The Phenomenology of Eros' in Totality and Infinity, 
on the shadowy and clandestine realm of the caress.
21. Merleau-Ponty writes:
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If we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the hunan 
body, its ontological framework, and see how it sees itself and hears 
itself, we would see that the structure of its mute world is such that 
all the possibilities of language are already given in it. (p.155)
22. The notion of archaeology, uncovering the meanings already implicit in 
the framework to regenerate its potentials, is one of the central 
themes of the thinkers under discussion.
23. Merleau-Ponty The Visible and Invisible, p. 155.
24. See 'the Intertwining; the chiasm', passim, for various metaphors of 
complementary and intertwined halves: two leaves of being, two halves 
of an orange, two maps, two lips etc.
25. ibid., p. 142.
26. Levinas' essays on Merleau-Ponty are translated in Johnson and Smith 
(eds) (1990), pp. 53-66.
27. ibid., p.55.
28. ibid., p. 60.
29. ibid., p. 62.
30. Merleau-Ponty Signs, p. 168.
31. Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception, p. 170. See also p. 173, 
where he writes: 'There is history only for a subject who lives through 
it, and a subject only in so far as he is historically situated.'
32. Levinas p. 58.
33. ibid., p. 59.
34. ibid., p. 64.
35. ibid., p. 65-6.
36. For example, see Martha J. Reineke 'Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray,
reflections on a specular drama' Auslegung (1987). essays in Allen and
Young (eds) The Thinking Muse, Sandra Lee Bartky 'Towards a phenomenology
of feminist consciousness' in Vetterling and Braggin (1978).
37. Allen and Young (eds) The Thinking Muse (1989).
38. ibid., p. 54.
39. ibid., p. 58.
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CHAPTER 5
1. Merleau-Ponty 'Ihe Intertwining, the Chiasm', in The Visible and the 
Invisible, pp. 130-55.
2. Ihe translations of quotes from Ethique de la difference sexuelle which 
follow are mine. A full translation of the text is forthcoming from 
Columbia University Press, translated by Carolyn Burke.
3. ibid., p. 168-170.
4. This notion will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter 
in relation to Levinas.
5. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter 8.
6 . Irigaray Efttique, y-171.
7. As we saw in Chapter 2, this analysis is in keeping with Lacanian 
theory concerning the suppression/repression of the feminine/matemal.
8 . Irigaray Ethique,p • 144•
9. ibid.
10. This regenerative possibility is discussed in Irigaray Sexes et 
parentes, Paris, Minuit, 1987.
11. Merleau-Ponty, 'The intertwining, the Chiasm', p. 134.
12. ibid.
13. ibid., p. 136.
14. Although much of the critique is directed at 'auto-affection' as the 
problem of the socio-symbolic as masculine, Irigaray is arguing that 
such auto-affection is denied to women. Therefore, she suggests this 
is a necessary aspect to be developed. However, the 'two lips' are not 
reductively biological; as Whitford (1991) shows, they are open to very 
different interpretations: variously, as metaphorically subversive of 
the Lacanian 'black hole', the 'nothing to be seen' of women as a 
reference to the possibility of women speaking, as a deconstructive 
'undecidable' etc. Whitford quotes Irigaray from Parler n'est jamais 
neutre, where she writes:
To seek to discover-re-discover a possible imaginary for women through 
the movement of two lips re-touching.. .does not mean a regressive 
recourse to anatomy or to a concept of 'nature', nor a recall to a 
gential order - women have more than one pair of lips! Rather it means 
to open up the autological and tautological circle of systems of 
representation and their discourse so that women may speak (of) their 
sex [parler leur sexe]. (p.272). See ¿teo ThtIriyray Reader,p. 1*.
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15. Merleau-Ponty refers to 'an element, a general thing', and 'an 
incarnate principle of a style of being* p. 139.
16. See Speculum, passim. The metaphor of the mirror is a complex one in 
the context of Irigaray's work, since it is used to 'reflect' back to 
philosophy some of its pre-suppositions, refracting them in the 
process; to 'mimic' the extent to which women have been a mirror for 
men; to draw attention to the dominance of specular imagery in 
philosophical discourse...etc.
17. Irigaray, Éthique de la différence sexuelle, p.160 and 168.
18. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and Invisible, p.131.
19. See also the essays by Butler and Young in Allen and Young (eds)
(1989).
20. 'in-fini'; meaning both unfinished and infinite.
21. See Kristeva Powers of Horror, an essay on abjection. Kristeva writes:
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of 
being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, 
the tolerable, the thinkable, (p.l)
22. The distinctions between sacred and profane correspond to the 
distinctions between divine and carnal in Irigaray's work, and as both 
thinkers show, to the distinction between feminine and masculine. 
Kristeva indicates this with her cultural critique of religious 
discourses, vAiereas Irigaray focusses on philosophers who have dealt 
with the question of transcendence in an onto-theological context.
23. Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p.10.
24. ibid.
25. Irigaray's discussion of bodily fluids is meant to draw attention to 
the 'unnameable' elements of philosophical discourse. But it is also 
referable to Sartre's discussion of 'holes and slime' at the end of 
Being and Nothingness, where he claims the ambiguity of that which is 
neither solid nor liquid, neither within the body nor outside it, is 
ontologically repulsive, because it is undecidable. This elision is 
suspicious on two counts; first because Sartre goes on to identify this 
undecidability with 'the feminine' (and so women), and second, because 
he is claiming it is a fundamental ontological disgust at ambiguity, a 
claim at odds with his affirmation of the ambiguity of existence.
26. Irigaray Ethique de la difference sexuelle, p. 159. See also Whitford 
(1991), p. 163.
27. ibid., p.152.
265-
28. ibid., p.141.
29. ibid., p.140. It is interesting that of the philosophers who discuss 
the notion of attentiveness, we may note Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt and 
Iris Murdoch.
30. ibid., p.139.
31. Merleau-Ponty 'The intertwining, the chiasm', p.269.
32. ibid., p. 155.
33. ibid., p. 183.
34. In This Sex, Irigaray writes: 'How then are we to try to redefine this 
language work that would leave room for the feminine?'
35. Irigaray Ethique de la difference sexuelle, p. 165.
36. Merleau-Ponty 'The intertwining, the chiasm', p. 168.
37. ibid., p. 155.
38. ibid., p. 207.
39. ibid.
40. ibid., p. 206.
41. ibid., p.209.
42. ibid., p.208.
43. See Lefort's essay in Johnson and Smith (1990), pp. 3-14.
44. ibid., p.5.
45. Merleau-Ponty 'The intertwining, the chiasm', p. 149.
46. Lefort, p.6.
47. ibid., p.12.
48. See Kruks (1986) for a discussion of Merleau-Ponty's anti-colonial 
political philosophy. See Robert Bemasconi's essay in Johnson and 
Smith (1990) for the argument that Merleau-Ponty's political philosophy 
and his phenomenology cannot be separated; i.e. that his critique of 
colonialist politics is connected to his critique of the intentionality 
of phenomenology.
49. Wyschogrod (1989), pp. 139-50.
50. Merleau-Ponty The visible and the invisible, p.10.
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51. Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 154.
52. Lingis (1978), p.66.
53. Wyschogrod (1989), p.52..
54. ibid.
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CHAPTER 6
1. Irigaray, £thique de la difference sexuelle, p. 119.
2. Irigaray, Speculum, p.165.
3. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 49.
4. Ethics and Infinity, p. 66.
5. See Moi (1986), for example, and Plaza (1978). As Whitford (1991) 
notes, this interpretation was the predominant one in Irigaray's 
initial reception in Anglo-American feminist theory.
6. From Levinas' title Otherwise than Being.
7. Otherwise than Being, p.89.
8. 'Time and the Other', in Hand (ed) (1989), pp. 37-58, p.49.
9. ibid. For conments on Levinas and the feminine, see Tina Chanter 
'Feminism and the Other', and Noreen O'Connor 'The Personal is 
Political; discursive practice of the Face-to-Face', in Wood and 
Bemasconi (eds) (1988;; Catherine Chalier Figures du feminin; lecture 
d'Emmanuel Levinas (1982), and Wyschogrod (19/4), pp. 117-20. For 
comments on Irigaray and Levinas's 'feminine', see Grosz (1989), pp. 
141-58 passim, Whitford (1991), pp. 151-161 passim.
10. tondtecO itta fyp .fS .
11. ibid., p. 49.
12. i.e. the symbolic network which inscribes woman as other.
13. ibid., p. 54.
14. Simone de Beauvoir points to this understanding of Levinas when she 
quotes from 'Time and the Other'on 'the feminine' in a footnote in 
The Second Sex, and comments:
'I suppose that Levinas does not forget that woman, too,is aware of her 
own consciousness, or ego. But it is striking that he deliberately 
takes a man's point of view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject 
and object. When he writes that woman is mystery, he implies that she 
is mystery for man. Thus his description, which is intended to be 
objective, is in fact an assertion of masculine privilege.' (p.15).
As already suggested, it is not a simple 'reciprocity' which would 
correct this fundamental asymmetry,asdeBeauvoir thinks. But she is 
pointing out the difficulties of characterising woman as other, and of 
activating 'the feminine' in the process.
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15. Totality and Infinity, p.256.
16. 'Time and the Other', in Hand (ed) (1989), p. 51.
17. In Bernasconi and Critchley (eds) (1991), pp. 11-48.
18. ibid., p. 44.
19. Braidotti (1986), p. 2.
20. See Catherine Chalier 'Ethics and the feminine', in Bernasconi and 
Critchley (eds) (1991), pp. 119-29, for a discussion of this notion.
21. 'Fécondité de la caresse', in Éthique de la difference sexuelle. pp. 
178-99. Translated by Carolyn Burke as 'Fecundity of the Caress' in 
Richard Cohen (ed) Face to Face with Levinas (1986), pp. 231-57.
22. ibid., p. 239.
23. ibid.
24. ibid., p. 240.
25. See also 'Sexual difference' in Moi (ed) (1988), p. 129, where Irigaray 
writes:
Something of the consummation of sexual difference has still not yet 
been articulated or transmitted. Is there not still something held in 
reserve within the silence of female history: an energy, morphology,
26. ibid, p.239.
27. For Levinas' discussion of 'fecundity', see Totality and Infinity, 
pp. 259-62.
28. ibid, p.240.
29. 'God and the Jouissance of (Jhe) Woman' in Mitchell and Rose (eds) 
(1985), p.147.
30. 'Introduction II' by Jacqueline Rose, ibid., p. 54.
31. Levinas, Totality and Infinity p.258.
32. Irigaray 'Fecundity of the Caress', p. 237.
33. i.e. 'Otherwise' to the temporal progression of moments as conceived in 
chronological time.
34. Irigaray 'Fecundity of the Caress' p.241.
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35. ibid., p. 246.
36. ibid., p.245.
37. ibid., p.247.
38. ibid., p.246.
39. ibid., p. 241. The exhortation to women to be 'responsible' in the 
struggle for autonomy is reminiscent of Beauvoir's remarks at the end 
of ^ie Second Sex. For example, she writes: 'It is all very well not 
to be duped, but at that point all else begins. Woman exhausts her 
courage dissipating mirages and she stops in terror at the threshold of 
reality.' (p.719). Irigaray is not judgemental or condemnatory in this 
fashion, however.
40. Irigaray 'Fecundity of the Caress', p.240.
41. There is an echo of Heidegger in this conception of the 'authentic' or 
ethical dimension of poetic language in this respect, and a need for 
're-inmersion in the elemental'. But Irigaray again points to an 
unacknowledged debt to the feminine, a critique which she expands 
through the element of air. See Irigaray's L'oubli de l'air, on 
Heidegger, or Graybeal (1990). or Carolyn Burke 'Romancing the 
Philosophers' in Hunter (ed) (1989), pp. 226-40.
42. Irigaray This Sex, p. 78.
43. Nye (1986), p.127.
44. Chanter in Bemasconi and Wood (eds) (1988), p. 34.
45. For an account of the complex relation between Heidegger and Levinas, 
see Wyschogrod (1974). See Levinas' remarks on Heidegger, for example, 
in 'Meaning and Sense', in Collected Philosophical Papers.
46. Levinas in Hand (ed) (1989), p. 40.
47. ibid.
48. Levinas Otherwise Than BeinR, p. 170.
49. Irigaray 'Fecundity of the Caress', p. 248.
50. ibid., p. 253.
51. ibid., p. 255.
52. See the discussion of Irigaray's conception of the divine in the 
following chapters of this study.
53. Irigaray in Bemasconi and Critchley (eds) (1991), pp. 109-118.
54. ibid., p.110.
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55. The (by now famous) footnote in Derrida's 'Violence and Metaphysics' in 
Derrida (1981), where Derrida writes: 'let us note in passing that 
Totality and Infinity pushes the respect for disymmetry so far that it 
seems impossible, essentially impossible that it could have been 
written by a woman...(p. 320).
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CHAPTER 7
1. We can see this characterisation of the maternal in Kristeva's essays 
on Bellini and in'Stabat Mater'. For example, she writes:
'Cells fuse, split, proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch and body 
fluids change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down...Such an excursion 
to the limits of primal regression can be phantasmically experienced as 
the reunion of the woman-mother with the body of her mother. ' 
('Motherhood according to Giovanni Bellini', Desire in Language, 
p. 239.)
Irigaray writes in many places of the equation of the maternal with the 
elemental, the liquifying fluidity of, for example, blood, the sea, 
milk and/or the earth. The metaphor of this elemental uncontainability 
is discussed in 'The "mechanics" of fluids', for example, where she 
writes:
...it is continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, 
diffusible...That it is unending, potent and impotent owing to its 
resistance to the countable...(p.111).
The contact with the 'elemental' is both an experience of bliss but 
also of death, in the Emersion and loss of identity.
2. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 141.
3. Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible, p. 267.
4. See Adrian Peperzak 'Beyond Being' 1978, for example, where he writes: 
'Autrement qu'être ou au delà de l'essence, which was published in 
1974, can be considered as the second opus magnum of Levinas. In more 
than one regard it continues and develops the main ideas of Totalité et 
infini and answers - mostly in an implicit way - the main criticisms 
which were brought against the first book.' (p. 239).
5. Levinas 'There is: Existence without existents' in Hand (ed) (1989).
6. ibid., p. 30.
7. ibid.
8. ibid., p. 31.
9. ibid.
10. ibid., p. 35. Irigaray deals extensively with the equation of 
maternity and the sea in her quotations from Plotinus in 'Un mère de 
glace', Speculum, pp. 168-79. 1
11. Kristeva Desire in Language, p. 237.
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12. Levinas, ibid., p. 32 and 31.
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. See Chalier (1981), Irigaray 'Questions to Eninanuel Levinas' in 
Bemasconi and Crltchley (eds) (1991), and Wyschogrod (1976), for 
example.
16. Hand (ed) (1989). p. 32.
17. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes:
Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at 
the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine insofar as 
it 'is' at all. And indeed, death signifies a peculiar possibility of 
being in which the very being of one's own Dasein is an issue. In 
dying, it is shown that 'mineness' and existence are ontologically 
constitutive for death. Dying is not an event; it is a phenomenon to 
be understood existentially, (p. 249).
18. Hand (ed) (1989), p. 31.
19. For example, Kristeva writes of this experiential realm as '...the 
polymorphic body, desiring and laughing’. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 141. In 
'La Mystérique, Irigaray writes: 'she is cut to the quick within this 
shimmering underground fabric that she had always been herself, though 
she did not know it. And she will never know it or herself clearly as 
she takes fire, in a sweet confusion whoses source cannot at first be 
apprehended. She is t o m  apart in pain, fear, cries, tears, and blood 
that go beyond any other feeling. ' Speculun, p. 193.
20. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 139.
21. See Levinas, 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity', Collected 
Philosophical Papers, p. 52, where he writes:
When Heidegger calls attention to the forgetting of Being, veiled by 
the diverse realities it illuminates, a forgetting for which the 
philosophy developed from Socrates on would be guilty, a regime of 
power more inhunan than mechanism (and which perhaps does not have the 
same source as it; it is not sure that National Socialism arises from 
the mechanist reification of men, and that it does not rest on the 
peasant rootedness and the feudal adoration of subjugated men for the 
masters and lords who command them). This is an existence which takes 
itself to be natural, for whom its place in the sun, its ground, its 
site, orient of all signification - a pagan existing.
See also 'Heidegger, Gagarine, et nous', Difficile Liberté, pp.255-9.
22. p.53.
23. Levinas Otherwise Than Being, p. 164.
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24. Moi (ed) (1986), p. 120.
25. Bemasconi and Critchley (eds) (1991), p. 113.
26. Irigaray Divine Women, p. 1.
27. See Amante marine. Passions élémentaires, and L'oubli de l’air, in 
particular.
28. Irigaray L'oubli de l’air, p. 130.
29. See 'There is; from existence to existents', in Hand (ed) (1989).
30. See Levinas 'The Dwelling', in Totality and Infinity, yp.151-¿S.
31. See Genevieve Lloyd (1986), where she draws attention to the 
oppositional place of the Family and the private sphere for Hegel. She 
quotes from The Phenomenology of Spirit, Sections 144-76:
Womankind - the everlasting irony (in the life) of the conmunity - 
changes by intrigue the universal end of the government into a private 
end, transforms its universal activity into the work of some particular 
individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a 
possession and ornament for the Family.
See also Irigaray's essay in Speculun 'The Eternal Irony of the 
Connunity' pp. 214-27.
32. See Levinas' discussion of pain, suffering and death in 'Time and the 
Other', in Hand (ed) (1989), pp. 39-42.
33. Levinas Totality and Infinity, p.152.
34. ibid., p. 149.
35. ibid., p. 150.
36. ibid., p. 151.
37. ibid., p. 155.
38. Irigaray Éthique de la différence sexuelle, p.105.
39. ibid., p. 115.
40. Bemasconi and Critchley (eds) (1991), p. 113.
41. ibid., p. 114.
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CHAPTER 8
1. Irigaray writes in Amante Marine:
From this reserve, all forms are bom. She brings it to the world, she 
'produces'. All new figures are born from between her lips: a 
glowing/embrace detaches itself from this touch and becomes 
'visible', (p.98).
2. In 'Women's Time' Kristeva writes;
...by demanding recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal 
in the opposite sex, and ,as such, exploded, plural, fluid, in a 
certain way non-identical, this feminism situates itself outside the 
linear time of identities which conrmmicate through projection and 
revindication. Such a feminism rejoins, on the other hand, the archaic 
(mythical) memory and, on the other, the cyclical or monumental 
temporality of marginal movements, (p. 194*5).
3. In terms of finding spaces within the 'logos' for the other to be 
heard, in Figures du féminin, Catherine Chalier writes:
To write grammar otherwise or to invent some surprising faults is not 
to wish a reversal of that determination. It is not a defiance 
equating itself with pride. It is to beco me aware that language is 
not a simple modality of thinking. That the logos is not neutral, as 
Levinas had also recognised. That the difficulty confronting him, in 
his election - which seems to him that which cannot be exceeded - of 
using the Greek site in order to make a thought which comes from 
elsewhere be understood is not perhaps foreign to a certain mutism of 
the foninine. As if the surprise of another syntax loses its way in 
the necessity of borrowing the path of a unique logos, p. 97.
4. See Heidegger Being and Time.
5. See Irigaray L'oubli de l'air, and Levinas 'Time and the Other', in 
Hand (ed) (195971
6. See Leonardo Boff The Maternal Face of God.
7. Irigaray This Sex, p. 97.
8. Irigaray 'Divine Women', p. 11.
9. ibid.
10. Feuerbach The Essence of Christianity.
11. Nietzsche's discussion of religion, his 'psychoiogising' and 
'historicising' of apparently eternal values, corresponds to 
Feuerbach's position in this respect.
12. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 91.
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13. ibid. Feuerbach writes:
Flesh and blood is life and life alone is corporeal reality. But flesh 
and blood is nothing without the oxygen of sexual distinction. The 
distinction of sex is not superficial.. .A moral God apart from nature 
is without basis; but the basis of morality is the distinction of sex. 
(p.92).
14. See Engels Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German 
Philosophy. London, Martin Lawrence, or Marx 'Theses on Feuerbach1 in 
the same voiune, no date cjwert.
15. For example, in 'This sex which is not one' Irigaray writes:
Whence the mystery that she represents in a culture that claims to 
enunerate everything, cipher everything by units, inventory everything 
by individualities. She is neither one nor two. She cannot, strictly 
speaking, be determined either as one person or two. She renders the 
definition inadequate. Moreover, she has no 'proper' name. And her 
sex organ, which is not a sex organ, is counted as no sex organ.
16. Irigaray 'Divine Women', p. 4.
17. Irigaray This Sex, p. 77.
18. Irigaray 'Divine Women', p. 3.
19. ibid., p. 11.
20. See Lacan 'God and (J»i£) jouissance of the Woman', where he writes:
'And why not interpret one face of the Other, the God face, as 
supported by feminine jouissance?',in Mitchell and Rose (eds) (1986), 
p. 147.
The connection which Levinas makes between the feminine/matemal and 
the divine will be discussed shortly.
21. Lacan in Mitchell and Rose (eds) (1986), p. 140.
22. Lacan Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 59.
23. Irigaray 'Women, the sacred and money', Paragraph, p. 6.
24. See Bibliography for more detailed references to these works.
25. Kristeva Tales of Love.
26. Irigaray This Sex, p. 77.
27. Irigaray Speculum p. 197.
28. Irigaray 'Divine Women', p. 8.
29. Levinas Totality and Infinity.
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30. ibid.
31. ibid., p. 276.
32. Lacan Ecrits, p. 117.
33. Levinas Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 127.
34. Levinas Totality and Infinity. p.Z59.
35. Richard Cohen Time and the Other, (Introduction) p. 11.
36. Levinas Otherwise Than Being, p.74.
37. ibid., p. 185.
38. Hand (ed) (1989), p. 104.
39. Levinas Otherwise Than Being, p.74.
40. ibid., p. 75.
41. ibid.
42. ibid.
43. ibid., p. 72.
44. ibid., p. 75-6.
45. Levinas Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 146.
46. Old Testament, Jeremiah, 31:20. This verse is translated misleadingly 
in the King James as follows:
Is Ephraim my dear son? Is he a pleasant child? For since I spoke 
against him, I do earnestly remember him still, therefore my bowels are 
troubled for him, I will surely have mercy upon him, saith the Lord.
The implications of maternal care and responsibility and God's 
apparently faulty omniscience strikes a curious note in this verse.
47. Levinas Time and the Other, p. 11.
48. Levinas Otherwise Than Being, p. 109.
49. ibid., p. 195.
50. ibid., p. 77.
51. Irigaray Speculun, p. 234.
52. Irigaray 'Questions to Entnanuel Levinas' in Bemasconi and Critchley
(eds) (1991), p. 114.
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53. Derrida 'Violence and Metaphysics', in Writing and Difference.
54. ibid., p. 139.
55. Kevin Hart The Trespass of the Sign.
56. See Levinas Otherwise Than Being, passim.
57. Levinas Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 104.
58. ibid.
59. ibid., p. 105.
60. ibid., p. 104.
61. ibid.
62. Irigaray 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', in Bemasconi and Critchley 
(eds) (1991), p. 114.
63. ibid, p. 113.
64. See p. 116 of 'Questions to Emnanuel Levinas, where Irigaray writes: 
'When it is not traditional metaphysics, what governs the ethical order 
in Levinas is fundamentally a law deriving from God.'
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preservative or nurturing. Women learn to be mothers through having 
been daughters. A feminist understanding of this process would 
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